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


ЗАПРЕТНАЯ ПРАВДА О ПОБЕДЕ

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
СТАЛИН ПРОИГРАЛ ВТОРУЮ МИРОВУЮ



THE MOST
FORBIDDEN
BOOKS
ABOUT THE SECOND WORLD

Dmitry VINTER

Viktor Suvorov is right!



STALIN LOST
THE SECOND
WORLD WAR

*Запретная
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The Forbidden Truth About Victory! The fourth edition of the most shocking bestseller about World War II.

VICTOR SUVOROV is RIGHT: contrary to all expectations, Stalin did not like the Victory Parade, because he considered himself not a winner, but a loser - his plan to conquer Europe was thwarted by Hitler's preemptive strike, the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army did not reach its final goal, and without the urgent "Sovietization" of the whole world, the USSR was doomed ...

But why was the victory of the Soviet Union "Pyrrhic"? If both Stalin and Hitler were defeated, who won the Second World War? Who managed to unravel the secret plan of the Kremlin tyrant and oppose his "icebreaking" plans? Who pitted the two dictators, forcing the totalitarian regimes to bleed each other in a suicidal struggle?

This sensational book is a new look at the causes and results of the most terrible war since the beginning of time, a radical revision of the past, a decisive revision of history, a refutation of Stalin's key myths about World War II.

**UDC 355/359
BBC68**

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Two countries, the USSR and the USA, have the necessary resources for world leadership. It is these countries that will decide the outcome of the war.

(I. V. Stalin. Secret speech before military academy graduates 5 May 1941)

Chapter I

SO WHO IS THE WINNER?

June 24 , 1945.

Red Square. The Victory Parade is the greatest military parade in the history of mankind. Why, contrary to all the expectations of the parade participants, contrary to all accepted rules, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin did not accept the parade? Why was he present as a mere spectator?

Viktor Suvorov (aka V.B. Rezun), author of a number of works from the Icebreaker series, gives an explanation that fits very well with his concept:

The Second World War was started by Stalin as a war for the establishment of world communist domination. For the sake of this, Stalin carried out collectivization, industrialization, created a military-industrial complex unprecedented in power. For this, Stalin helped Germany restore its military power, destroyed by the Treaty of Versailles. For this, Stalin trained the best generals of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet academies (and Guderian in the Kazan Tank School). For the sake of this, in 1932 Stalin forbade the German communists to form a coalition with the Social Democrats and thereby ensured the Nazis a relative majority in the Reichstag and cleared the way for Hitler to power. Finally, for this purpose, a pact was signed with Germany on August 23, 1939, which gave Hitler the opportunity to start a war (more precisely, Stalin the opportunity to start a war with Hitler's hands).

The goal, however, was not achieved - when everything was ready for the start of the "liberation" campaign in Europe captured by Hitler, Hitler at the last moment struck first and disrupted everything. As a result of the war, the Soviet Union got only the smaller and worse half of Europe, the northern half of Iran (which had to be abandoned a year later under pressure from the Americans), the northern half of Korea, and some territories in China. The fact that, thanks to the underestimation of the role of China by the Americans, all of it in 1949 would go to the communists, then somehow it was not even thought. However, there is reason to believe that even then Stalin understood that even if the Communists won in China, this country would not become a reliable ally for the USSR anyway. But about this is below.

Such an outcome of the war was not a victory for Stalin, but a defeat. Then only the collapse of the communist system could come - sooner or later. And Stalin behaved in 1945 not as a winner, but as a vanquished—in particular, he asked for his resignation. Not then did he ask, of course, to really leave, but then to be asked by those close to him to stay (*Suvorov V. Last Republic. M., 1995. S. 5-28, 45-47, 96*). This is a common tactic of defeated dictators. Ivan the Terrible also behaved in the early 1580s, losing the Livonian War (*Kostomarov N.I. Russian history in the biographies of its main figures. M., 1995. Vol. 1. P. 410*), Egyptian President Nasser in 1967, after losing the Six-Day War to Israel, and Saddam Hussein in 1991; Stalin behaved in the same way in 1952 (*Simonov K.M. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. M., 1989. S. 244-245*), when it became clear that the war he had started in Korea would not lead to a new world war and to the victory of the communists throughout the world.

So, everything seems to fit. But there are at least two points in Suvorov's version that raise questions.

Firstly, in his later works - *The Last Republic, Purification and Suicide* - Suvorov repeatedly makes the reader understand (and supports this point of view with factual material): all the politicians of the 1930s-1940s - fools, only Stalin is a genius. The question arises: how did he lose with all that?

Secondly, if Stalin lost, then who then won? Not Hitler! And Suvorov gets something like this: wise Stalin prepared everything so carefully for many years, and stupid Hitler almost accidentally ruined everything at the last moment (*Suvorov V. Den-M. M., 1993. P. 248-249; Suvorov V.*

Icebreaker. M., 1992. S. 332-333).

Even today, some of the supposedly democratically minded people believe that it was only thanks to Hitler that Europe got rid of the need to slurp the Stalinist gruel, but that communism will soon rush to conquer the planet again, since the democracies are not capable of resisting it, "and then again you will have to rely on some corporal" (*Stanilov V. Whom to rely on? // Pravda Viktor Suvorov. M., 2007. P. 288-291).*

However, such conversations will immediately stop and the answer to the question about the winner will become clear if we turn to the works of Anglo-American geopoliticians. The Anglo American geopolitical concept involves the division of the world into three large parts: the Heartland (the territory of the former USSR and neighboring states of Eastern Europe and North Asia), Rimland (the oceanic parts of Europe and Asia from Norway to Japan) and the World Ocean (both Americas plus countries formerly part of the British Empire).

So, British geopoliticians believed that whoever owns the "Heartland" will sooner or later take over the whole world. And their American colleagues had a slightly different point of view: in order to defeat the Heartland, the World Ocean must

wives, according to American geopolitical calculations, to establish control over the Rimland. Judging by how the Cold War ended, American geopolitics were closer to the truth.

Suvorov portrays Roosevelt almost as a fool, dancing to the tune of Stalin. The question arises: why, then, did the war end with the implementation of the American geopolitical scenario? After all, such a favorable situation in the world for the Anglo-Americans, which had developed by 1945-1946, by the beginning of the Cold War, did not arise by itself. It was created, mainly during the Second World War, and it was probably those who benefited from it, the Americans and the British, who played the main role in its creation. Let us now compare American geopolitical studies (primarily those written by Admiral Mahan) with the actual outcome of the Second World War, and the question of who won it will disappear by itself.

... By the time Stalin refused to accept the Victory Parade and asked to resign, the main winner had already been gone for three months. Yes, the big winner was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. And to understand how and why he outplayed Stalin, we have to go back from 1945. Very easy back. First you need to understand why Stalin needed to start a war for world domination.

Chapter II

HOW MUCH WAS SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATIONS

The idea of the existence in history of only two socio-economic formations - slavery and capitalism - is not mine. Back in Soviet times, for obvious reasons, its author asked me not to expand too much on this topic; after 1989 I don't have

information about where he is and how to contact him. I did not dare to mention his name without his times solutions, and at the same time I cannot help mentioning - not God forbid, accused of plagiarism. At the same time, the lack of education in the humanities had an effect: the author of the theory (he is a mathematician) could not, as they say, "bring it to perfection". In general, I had to do a lot of work on the concept: to exclude some obviously erroneous provisions, to add others, on the contrary. Thus, there are some grounds for claiming co-authorship.

K. Marx, as you know, spoke of four formations ("modes of production") - Asian, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois (*Marx K. On the Critique of Political Economy // Marx K., Engels F. Works 2nd ed. T. 13. S. 7*). Soviet (and generally communist) historical science tried to pretend that there was no Asian mode of production in nature and that neither Marx nor Engels wrote anything about this mode of production (see, for example: Struve V.V. On the issue on the specifics of slave-owning societies // *Bulletin of the Leningrad State University*, 1953, No. 9, pp. 81-91). To be fair, F. Engels himself, towards the end of his life, practically abandoned the idea of the Asian mode of production as an independent OEF (*Marx K. Das Kapital*.

Hamburg, 1890. S. 104), apparently afraid of the too obvious similarity between it and the already outlined model of the future "socialist" society.

M.S. Voslensky wrote an acclaimed classic on the class analysis of the "real socialist" system. He also fully understands the reason for this desire of the communists to ignore the whole formation: a painfully transparent analogy with "real socialism" is obtained (*Voslensky M.S. Nomenklatura. The ruling class of the Soviet Union. M., 1991. P. 573- 577*). But here he is a little further,

having studied some Western historians (for example, K. Wittfogel - see: *Wittfogel K. Oriental Despotism*. New Haven, 1957), contradicts itself: there was no "Asian mode of production", but there was just slavery and feudalism with oriental specifics (*Voslensky M.S. S.* 583).

And indeed, what is the difference between the "Asiatic mode of production" and ancient slavery? By the fact that the "Asiatic mode of production" presupposes the general slavery of subjects to a despot monarch who can do with any of the inhabitants of his country whatever he pleases? But this was far from being the case everywhere in the East—the power of Chinese emperors, for example, was substantially limited by Confucian morality; on the other hand, why are some Roman emperors - Caligula, for example, or Nero - better than the Eastern despots in relation to their subjects and their rights? Or perhaps the difference is in the role of the state in the economy? But in the East it was by no means everywhere and far from always prevailing. Or that in the East private property was not inalienable? But even in Imperial Rome, confiscations of property were commonplace.

What is the difference between a feudal system and a slave system? The fact that the slaves had nothing and themselves belonged to the slave owners, while the peasants had some kind of property (including the means of production), and therefore they were interested in the results of their labor? But after all, even in ancient society (with the exception of Rome in the era of decline, when the entire free population turned into lumpen, who preferred to beg from the state for "bread and circuses", but not to work), it was not the slaves who were the main producers, but the peasants; and no one has yet refuted the generally accepted point of view that it was precisely the refusal of free Romans from productive labor that led to the decline, and then destroyed

Periy. Moreover, under serfdom, the master could just as easily lay hands on the property of his peasants, as any oriental despot could lay hands on the property of his subjects.

But it is obvious that there is a very important difference between capitalism from all previous systems - the transition from forced labor to free labor. The same Voslensky formulated three criteria for forced labor:

1. forced to work;
2. working conditions undividedly determines the work giver;
3. leaving work or refusing to work is not allowed by measures of physical coercion (*Voslensky M.S.* S. 259).

In fact, no one forces a worker under capitalism to work like a serf, a slave, or a subject of the "Eastern despotism" - he goes to hire himself to feed his family. At the same time, the worker is not without rights: he has the opportunity to influence the definition of working conditions - to negotiate with the owner of the means of production, for example, on the length of the working day, wages, time and duration of vacation, and in the event of a clear conflict of his interests with the interests the capitalist even has the right to strike. A slave or a serf would try to go on strike! At the same time, the possibilities of the worker with the development of capi

Talisma do not decrease, but grow - let's compare the miserable (essentially semi-slavish) existence of industrial workers during the times of "wild capitalism" (when they did not always even have the right to strike - in France, for example, strikes and labor unions were prohibited from 1791 to 1864) with the current life of workers in the developed capitalist countries.

The question arises: why do the working people under capitalism have such enormous advantages over their predecessors in the past?

foodist formations? Perhaps precisely because labor has changed from compulsory to free employment? If the worker cannot be made to work by force, then the conclusion suggests itself that his labor force

belongs to himself, and against his will can't be ordered. Well, since labor power belongs to the worker, and the means of production belong to the capitalist, then their owners have to negotiate among themselves, since neither the means of production without labor power, nor labor power without means of production, will ensure the functioning of the economy. Moreover, the more developed the economy, the more the ratio of the value of the commodity "labor power" and the value of the means of production changes in favor of the former, which leads to an ever greater opportunity for the worker to influence the determination of working conditions.

In pre-capitalist societies, however, labor power is not a freely tradable commodity, since it does not belong to the direct producer and can be disposed of against

his will.

That is why we can divide the entire history of human society into two socio-economic formations - slavery, where the labor force is alienated from the direct producer and, thereby, both the means of production and the labor force are concentrated in the same hands - the hands of the ruling class (so that representatives ruling class can dispose of labor power against the will of workers), and capitalism, where labor power belongs to the worker himself, who negotiates the terms of its sale with the owner of the means of production.

production - the capitalist.

Each of the two formations has a so-called "basic contradiction". Under slavery, it is enough for the representatives of the ruling class to simply take more from the worker, leaving him less, in order to provide himself with a more comfortable existence.

Thus, the main contradiction of slavery as a formation is the contradiction between the ruling class and the direct producers in the sharing of the produced product.

But under capitalism, everything is more complicated. Of course, the capitalist also strives to take more for himself and give less to the worker. However, under a system where labor power is an object of purchase and sale, it is not enough for the capitalist to produce goods, they must also be sold. Sell to the same workers who are the bulk of the consumers. And if they are poor, then who will buy? Thus, the main contradiction of capitalism is not between "the social character of production and the private character of appropriation," as we were taught in schools. The social character of production takes place not only under capitalism, but also, for example, under totalitarian regimes, which are in fact "slave counter-revolutions", but more on that below; appropriation in any class society is "private", because it is the ruling class that appropriates and distributes the surplus value, i.e. part of society, and a smaller part. The main contradiction of capitalism is between the attitude of the ruling class towards the working people as producers and its own attitude towards them as consumers. In the first aspect of the problem, the ruling class, as in the case of slavery, is interested in appropriating more for themselves and giving the workers less, but in the second aspect, the capitalists interested in the fact that the workers received more - in order to maintain consumer demand.

Well, under early capitalism, when the majority or a significant part of society is still made up of representatives of the pre-capitalist classes, you can sell goods to them, or even outside your own country; however, over time, the majority of the population turns into proletarians who do not have their own

means of production, and foreign markets are not unlimited. What then to do? And the poverty of the majority of the population is very dangerous for the rulers. We have to look for a way out through the growth of labor productivity. There is a formation of a new "middle class" - now from hired workers; in modern developed capitalist countries it has already reached 80-90% of the population.

There is another difference - the nature of the incentive that prompts the direct producer to work. If slavery presupposes mainly outside economic incentives to work, then capitalism is economic.

There is also a difference in relation to property. Under slavery, power is primary: whoever has power has wealth, and the loss of power is very often accompanied by the loss, if not of all wealth, then of a significant part of it.

Capitalism changes the relationship between power and property in a polar way: whoever has property has power; At the same time, the loss of power by one or another group of capitalists does not mean the loss of their property—private property is sacred and unlawful. indirect.

As a result, the ruling circles of the capitalist countries cease to hold on to power in a "death grip", it becomes possible both a peaceful, democratic transfer of power and the development (although very slow and gradual) of a system of freedom of expression of political views, i.e., simply speaking, democracy.

There are other differences, but for us the main thing is different. The 20th century, as you know, gave rise to the so-called totalitarian regimes in those countries where by the beginning of the 20th century. - by the time the media appeared as a means of "stupefying" the broad masses of the population, strong bourgeois democratic traditions had not yet been formed (Russia, Germany,

Italy, Spain, Japan, the countries of Eastern Europe - in what follows we will call them the countries of the Second Echelon of Capitalism - not to mention the Asian states). The countries of the First Echelon are England, France, the USA, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, where capitalism won not in the middle of the 19th century, as in the countries of the Second Echelon, but as early as the 16th-18th centuries, where political power by the 20th century. was firmly in the hands of the bourgeoisie (and not the pre-bourgeois aristocracy, as in the Second Echelon), where strong bourgeois-democratic traditions managed to form - they withstood the onslaught of totalitarianism and preserved democracy, although tendencies towards totalitarianism took place there too (remember, for example, the years of "McCarthyism").

All totalitarian regimes, regardless of whether what are they called and what color are they waving banners, there are "slave counter-revolutions" - no matter if it is Russia in 1917, Italy in 1922, Germany in 1933, Eastern Europe and China after 1945, Iran in 1979 . etc.

The slave totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, which were attempts to turn the wheel of history back, created a unique system of external her policy - the so-called "defensive aggression" (however, it had its beginnings in the countries of the "Holy Alliance" of the 19th century, which was an instrument of struggle between the outgoing slavery and the advancing capitalism). Slave regimes cannot (and do not want to - they generally look at the production of consumer goods for the population as production costs (for more details see: *Voslensky M.S.* Ch. 4, esp. pp. 242-243)) to ensure their for the population a standard of living comparable to that in the developed capitalist countries. At the same time, it is obvious to their leadership that any "iron curtains" and "locked borders" can only stop, but not stop,

dissemination to all among the population subject to them of the truth about life "beyond the hill".

Therefore, the only final solution to the problem for the slave regimes is the elimination of the world capitalist system as such, the extension of its dominion to the whole world.

Chapter III

WHY RUSSIA?

This whole international gang,
as unscrupulous as it is talented,
has turned Russia into a
springboard for their global plans.

(F. Engels, 1890)

Many authors have written about Russia's special path of development and that it is simply doomed to oppose the West and fundamentally incapable of accepting the values of modern society ("Western", "capitalist" or "universal"). They wrote about this both with a plus sign (Slavophiles, Eurasians, Dugin), and with a minus sign (Chaadaev, Novodvorskaya). It seems that the Russian intellectual is generally capable of perceiving Russia only in two extreme hypostases. Either "Russia is a fiend", and then "everything that is bad for Russia is good" (if he is a "general person"), or "Russia is the city of God on earth" and "God's chosen country", and everything around (in first of all, of course, the West) are only doing what they are plotting against it (if he is a "statesman"). What neither one nor the other is capable of is to present Russia as a normal country, the same as everyone else, with its own history, in which there was everything - both good and bad, with its own national interests, with its enemies and allies, which can in different

positions and change places ...

From this approach to your country, organically you

another is flowing. And A Ilyin also wrote that in the West (and many in Russia, more precisely, among the Russian emigration in the same West) they identify the USSR with Russia, in particular, they identify the global expansion of the USSR with the aim of establishing "world communism" - with traditional regional expansion of tsarist Russia (Our tasks. Book 1, pp. 8-9), although tsarism never, even when it was its "gendarme of Europe", did not lay claim to world domination. Thus, in 1959, in a special memorandum issued by the US State Department, all the peoples of the USSR, except for Russians, were indicated in the list of peoples enslaved by the communists.

Another thirty years passed, and during the years of "perestroika", Ukrainian nationalists declared that, they say, "communism is a myth, that it's not the communists, but the Russians want to take over the whole world" - and now, states A.I. . Solzhenitsyn, the Americans write that the "Russians" have captured China or Tibet (Quoted from: *Solzhenitsyn A.I. How do we equip Russia* // Komsomolskaya Pravda. 1990. September 18.).

The communists themselves, especially the admirers of Stalin, are adding fuel to the fire. "To hate Steel on is to hate Russia!" — about this statement by S.G. Kara-Murza has already been said. About "Anti-Russian meanness" by Yuri Mukhin, too. And there are many such examples. After all this, is it any wonder that foreign (and even homegrown) ill-wishers of Russia again started talking about the fact that our country should apologize, or even pay compensation for the atrocities committed by the Communists against

their countries - Poland, Georgia or the Baltic countries?

How legitimate, however, is the identification of Russia with the communists? To answer this question, among other things, it does not hurt to analyze the composition of the leading figures of various Russian political forces on the eve, during and shortly after 1917 with the localization of their "small homelands" in

territory of the Russian Empire. For analysis, the most famous "white" and "red" military leaders, leaders and prominent figures of various political parties, active participants in the October Revolution and the Civil War, as well as "red" and "white" representatives of various national outskirts of the Russian Empire in more than 1000 people.

At the same time, the task is set: to calculate the percentage of those born outside the current Russian Federation; in addition, the percentage of those born in the western lands annexed to Russia under Catherine II or later is calculated separately.

Another aspect of the problem needs to be taken into account. Russia is an organic unity of the East Slavic and steppe peoples, created back in the 12th century, when Vladimir Monomakh united Rust and the Kipchak Steppe into one polycentric state (we will talk about this in more detail below). Therefore, the following question deserves attention: what percentage of the leaders of various political movements in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. was born outside the Eurasian unity, which, in our opinion, includes Russia (excluding some regions of the Caucasus), Ukraine (excluding Galicia), Belarus, Kazakhstan and Northern Kyrgyzstan.

So, let's start with the military leaders of the White movement (personal data are taken from the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, the electronic encyclopedias "Wikipedia" and "Chronos"). So, out of 340 names, 105 (30.88%) were born outside the current Russian Federation. Of these, 28 (8.24%) are in the western provinces, only under Catherine II and later included in Russia. Outside the Eurasian community, 31 people were born, i.e. 9.11%.

Let's move on to the commanders of the Red Army. At the same time, when analyzing the command staff of the Red Army, it is necessary to distinguish between "Red Army soldiers according to

calling" and the so-called "specialists" - high-ranking officers of the old Russian army, who went to the service of the Reds, often under duress. Separation is not always easy. Of course, ensign Krylenko, who suddenly became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, or lieutenant Tukhachevsky, who led the armies and fronts, should be more correctly ranked among the first, and not the second. In general, the division will take into account the time spent in the Red Army, the speed of a career, and some other factors. In addition to the military, some civilian "specialists" will also be analyzed.

So, **red commanders** and "**specialists**". Of the 155 Red military leaders outside the current Russian Federation, 71 (45.8%) were born, of which 35 (22.6%) were born in the western territories annexed under Catherine II and later. Of the 27 "specialists", these categories include 9 (33.5%) and 3 (11.1%), respectively. As for those born outside the Eurasian community, there are 34 of them (21.94%) among the Red military leaders and 3 (11.1%) among the "specialists".

Now let's move on to civilian politicians. Let's start with **leaders and activists**

bourgeois parties. Out of 69 activists of bourgeois parties, we get 18 (26.08%) who were born outside the borders of present-day Russia, including four (5.8%) who were born in the territories annexed to Russia under Catherine II and later. Outside the Eurasian unity of peoples, 6 of them (8.7%) were born.

Now it would be logical to go to **the activists the Bolshevik Party**, as well as **the Soviet and economic workers** of the first ten years of the existence of the USSR. Of the 310 Bolshevik party leaders who played a more or less significant role already during the years of the Civil War, 152, i.e. almost half (49%) were born outside the current Russian Federation; 70 (22.6%) of

they are in the western regions annexed to Russia under Catherine II or later. Outside the Eurasian community, 71 (22.9%) were born of them.

Deserve, no doubt, attention and **activists other** (except the Bolsheviks) **socialist parties**. Of the 59 outstanding figures, 22 (37.29%) are born outside the current Russian Federation, including 13 (22.03%) in the western territories annexed under Catherine II and later. Outside the Eurasian community, 8 (13.56%) of them were born.

So, let's sum up some results in the form of a pivot table (see table).

	were born beyond lamina foreign RF	Born on but out territories, affiliated to Russia under Catherine II and later	Born for outside Eurasian Common news
White howls bosses	30.88%	8.24%	9.11%
Red commander Nicky	45.8%	22.6%	21.94%
"Specialists"	33.3%	11.1%	11.1%
activists bourgeois parties	26.08%	5.8%	8.7%
Bolsheviks	49%	22.6%	22.9%
socialists	37.29%	22.03%	13.56%

Speaking of the Eurasian space, let's not forget that according to the 1979 census, the population of the USSR numbered 262 million people, and within the borders of 1913 (that is, with about 40% of Poland and with Finland, but without Galicia) - about 275 million people Of this

Eurasian unity accounted for 224 million, i.e. 82.55%.

Thus, we see that the number of those born outside of present-day Russia, as well as in the new territories annexed to Russia under Catherine II and later, is significantly higher among the Bolsheviks than among their white opponents, and even higher than among members of the Bolsheviks. other socialist parties. As for the Eurasian community of peoples, the percentage of those born outside of it only among the Bolsheviks exceeds the share of non-Eurasian territories in the population of the Russian Empire (17.45%). Thus, Bolshevism was not a phenomenon either - contrary to the statements of Russia's ill-wishers and their

"sparring partners" from the communist camp - specifically Russian, nor - contrary to the incantations of former and current Eurasians - specifically Eurasian. However, the opposite point of view, popular in some nationalist circles, that Bolshevism was "the occupation of Russia by foreigners" does not stand up to criticism: more than half of the prominent Bolsheviks were born on the territory of present-day Russia, and more than three-quarters - on the territory of the Eurasian unity of peoples. Therefore, it would be more correct to speak of the state created by the Bolsheviks as a supranational communist empire.

Let's figure that out too. Later. For now, let's talk about how Russia came to totalitarianism. Yes, Russia is a Slavic-steppe Eurasian formation created on the basis of a symbiosis of the Eastern Slavs and nomads of the Great Steppe (modern South of Russia, Kazakhstan, Northern Kyrgyzstan). This formation was formed from the Scythian-Saka times and ended in the XI-XII centuries of our era, when the steppe part of Eurasia was settled by the ancestors of the Turkic peoples now inhabiting it - mainly the Kipchaks. In the XII century.

a Russian-Kipchak polycentric state was formed, occupying the territories of modern Russia (except for the Caucasus and Eastern Siberia), Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Northern Kyrgyzstan (Gumilyov L.N. *Ancient Russia* and the Great Steppe. M., 1993-S. 327). This state was Eurasian, since it was also based on the Slavic steppe symbiosis, but also European, open to the then West, non-aggressive and quite free for its time.

In the XIII century. this state was conquered by the Tatar-Mongols, who gave the appearance and domestic and foreign policy of Russia-Eurasia an aggressively despotic character. Up to the time of the last Rurikovichs, despotic tendencies were strengthened, and this ended with the upheavals of the Oprichnina and the Time of Troubles. From 1613, European tendencies again took over, and the development of Russia took the same path as the whole of Europe - towards liberation. During this period (1613-1815), all segments of the country's population, and first of all the nobility, were interested in gradual liberalization.

The situation changed after the well-known events of 1789-1815. in Europe. Capitalism that arose in the XVI-XVII centuries. in several Protestant countries, has now begun to claim universality. This forced the slave regimes of Europe to rally against the capitalist West.

It was these considerations that forced Russia, as well as Austria and Prussia, to turn into "gendarmes of Europe"; in order to combat capitalist revolutions. Alexander I and Metternich developed the doctrine of the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another country if it was engulfed in revolution (in the 1960s, the Metternich doctrine was continued in the form of Brezhnev's doctrine of the "limited sovereignty" of the countries of the "socialist camp"). Inside Russia, this policy

was called "crackdown" in the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855).

Russia is not original here either. For example, in the XVII XVII centuries. The "gendarme of Europe" was the supranational empire of the Habsburgs, the core of which at that time was Spain. But then the tasks of the "gendarme" were local: how many centers of "Western" civilization there were - once or twice and Miscellaneous, England and the Netherlands. Now was not the time. Perhaps, for the first time in history, the leaders of the Holy Union at that time set the foreign policy task of a global conservative revolution (in the terminology of A.G. Dugin) or, to use our language, "slave counterrevolution"; Alexander I in 1817 even toyed with the idea of intervention in South America with the aim of restoring Spanish rule there.

Meanwhile, in the era of "Eurocentrism", when Europe was the center of the world, and the rest of the world - the colonial periphery, Russia was invincible and invulnerable to enemy invasion; it is these considerations that contributed greatly to the growth of global ambitions of its rulers. The same fact that, of all the countries of Europe, it was Russia that by the beginning of the 19th century was least influenced by capitalism (which began to develop as a way of life only in the reign of Catherine II), determined its leading role in the struggle against the latter for almost all of the 19th and 20th centuries. In order to please the class interests of the ruling circles, the foreign policy principle, which was in line with the national interests of Russia, was violated: "to be friends not with a neighbor, but through a neighbor"; it was replaced by a continental alliance of Russia with its neighbors, Austria and Prussia. It ended, however, badly: during the Crimean War, the "friends" betrayed Russia by stabbing her.

The incompleteness of the reforms of Alexander II, carried out from above, led to the fact that from the second half of the 19th century. both in internal and external

Russia's policy was, as it were, "going forward and backward at the same time." On the one hand, a free civil society developed, the country more and more evolved towards a modern state; on the other hand, the ruling classes - the nobility and the bureaucracy, more precisely, the most reactionary circles of both - intensified the struggle against all this, which was manifested in the publication in 1878-1881. a series of emergency laws from which there was only one

a step up to the laws of a totalitarian state; another thing is that in a country with a market economy and developed public opinion, these

laws could not be widely applied in practice

ke (*Pipes R. Russia under the old regime. M., 1993 - S. 394-411*).

Two tendencies in domestic development gave rise to shyness in foreign policy as well. Here is just a short list of these shyness:

- 1856-1859 - union with France;

- 1860 - the first half of the 1870s - support for Prussia;

- 1875 - support of Britain and France in their conflict with Germany;

- 1878-1891 - union with Austria and Germany ("alliance of the three emperors");

- 1890s - alliance with France;

- 1904-1905 - an attempt at an alliance with Germany;

- 1906-1917 - alliance with the West against Germany.

However, there were also voices calling for a pro-German orientation; Germanophile sentiments were very strong in the inner circle of Nicholas II and in general in noble and military circles.

As for the Russian emperors, they did not dare to unambiguously take the side of some of the opposite tendencies. Both for the "slave counter-revolution" and for the completion of the bourgeois revolution ("from above" or "from below"), more resolute people were clearly required.

At the beginning of the XX century. aggressor number 1 was another "semi-slave" country - Kaiser's Germany, which unleashed the First World War. Economically, Germany was more developed than Russia, but even there political power remained in the hands of sovereign monarchy and noble bureaucracy, that is, the same ruling classes as under slavery, and not the bourgeoisie.

But the aggressiveness of the slave regimes especially intensified with the emergence of totalitarianism. The Bolsheviks cast aside all the doubts inherent in the tsars about whether to go forward or backward, and the setting was unambiguously taken to the global "conservative revolution" (more precisely, the "slave counterrevolution") in the red version. Let's talk about the emergence of totalitarianism in Russia.

Chapter IV

START

If someone had said in 1917 that twenty years from now they would be talking about "the two leaders of the revolution—Lenya and Stalin", then this would have been considered at best a stupid joke.

(D.A. Volkogonov. Triumph and tragedy)

On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated in Sarajevo. A little more than a month passed, and the First World War began. The researchers of that era again and again raise the question: who benefited from the Sarajevo murder? Obviously not Serbia or anyone else from the Entente countries. Not to mention the fact that such views themselves cast a shadow over the Entente countries, especially Serbia and Russia, it was unprofitable for them to rush to start a war. Time worked for them: Austria-Hungary and another potential ally

tsa Germany - Türkiye - gradually weakened; in France, a rearmament program was carried out, which was to be completed in 1916; in Russia, the completion of a similar but even more grandiose program was expected in 1917 (by the way, it almost succeeded, despite the war and revolution). In addition, constitutional and agrarian reforms were carried out in our country, and their successful completion required at least another ten years.

Moreover, official Belgrade, having some information about the impending assassination, not only warned Austria, but also tried to prevent the assassins from crossing the Austro-Serbian border. Not out of great love for Austria, but because they also saw that they were not ready for war! We must wait! (*Poletika N.P.* The emergence of the First World War. M., 1964. S. 22-25).

The simplest answer to the question "who benefits": Germany! Are allies weakening or starting to think about treason, while enemies are getting stronger? So start a war before all this happens! And something confirms this point of view. For example, let's take the very date of the maneuvers - 28 (old style 15) June. It was on this day that Serbia celebrated the mourning anniversary - 525 years since the Battle of Kosovo, after which Serbia fell under the rule of the Turks. If you wanted to provoke the Serbs, it's better, as they say, you can't imagine! There are other confirmations of the "German trace" (for details, see: *Pisarev Yu.A.* The Austro-Serbian conflict - the prologue of the First World War (myths and facts) // First World War: debatable problems of history. M., 1994. P. 7 -9; *Poletika N.P.* Sarajevo murder. L., 1930. S. 17, etc.).

But if Germany wanted to start a war, couldn't it have been concocted in such a way that the "guilt" of the Serbs would be conspicuous, so that no one, anywhere would doubt it? In practice, it turned out that the Austrians were never able to prove the involvement of official Belgrade in the murder in general (*Kotova E.V.* Saraevs

the murder of June 28, 1914 and the decline of the Habsburg empire // Regicide. The death of earthly gods. M., 1998, p. 472) and eventually started a war against Serbia according to the principle "the strong always blame the weak". Which from the very first days seriously affected the reputation of Germany and its allies around the world. In general, if all this was planned by Austrian or German intelligence, then after the start of the war, its leaders should have shot themselves. Or at least resign. From the realization of one's own incompetence.

The non-involvement of official Belgrade in the Sarajevo murder seems to be obvious. But besides the official Belgrade, there was also a very powerful unofficial Belgrade. On February 8, 1910, a powerful secret organization "Unification or Death" was created, which received the unofficial name "Black Hand". The organization set as its goal the reunification of the Yugoslav lands, half of which fell under the rule of Austria-Hungary. Adopted March 3, 1911 the statute of the "Black Hand" provided that it "organizes revolutionary actions in all territories where Serbs live" (Poletika *N.P.* Sarajevo Murder, pp. 145-147). At the same time, the "Black Hand" was created and managed on the principle of a totalitarian sect. Any member of the organization, having joined it once, no longer had the right to withdraw. At the same time, he had to unquestioningly obey the leadership - the "Supreme Central Board", and also recruit new members for it.

An ordinary member of the organization knew only his guarantor (that is, the one who recruited him and who was responsible for his loyalty with his own head), members of his five and persons recruited by himself (for whom, accordingly, he was responsible with his head). Only the members of the "Supreme Central Council" knew each other by sight, and their subordinates by name. The "Supreme Central Administration" was in no way

accountable to the rank and file members, it included the founders of the organization permanently, although it is not clear how the seats vacated, say, in the event of the death of one of the members of the council, were filled. Probably put themes of co-optation.

N.P. Poletika compares this organization with the monstrous dreams of Pyotr Verkhovensky in Dostoevsky's novel *The Possessed* (Ibid., pp. 151-155). But real Russian revolutionaries also had similar organizations - for example, the famous "Nechaev circle". Its creator, Sergei Nechaev, believed that after the victory of the revolution, all affairs would be run by some kind of secret and accountable to no one "committee"; not yet having seized power, the Nechaevites were already planting forced unanimity and mercilessly killed "apostates". Thus, in 1869 there was a sensational murder of a certain Ivan Ivanov.

And analogies were not limited. In the "Black Hand", at first glance, an unambiguously right-wing nationalist organization, there was a left-radical wing. At the same time, the members of the "Black Hand" not only learned the practice of Russian populist revolutionaries, including individual terror (*Poletika N.P.* The emergence of the First World War. P. 16), but were also fond of disputes about socialism, read out by Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Bakunin. The murderer of Franz Ferdinand Tavrilo Princip, a member of the Bosnian branch of the organization - "Mlada Bosna" - was no exception (*Poletika N.P.* Sarajevo murder. S. 181,201-203).

Some historians and writers—for example, the Yugoslav W. Dedier, the Germans Bruno Bram and S. Possoni, and the Austrian F. Würthle—point directly to the connection between the Russian revolutionaries and the Bosnian terrorists. And if it was beneficial for the great power of Russia to delay the start of the war as much as possible, then the revolutionaries - primarily the Bolsheviks - were opposed, it was necessary to hurry.

If you read the works of Lenin from 1907 to 1914, then it becomes obvious that the "leader of the world proletariat" is sad. He saw what was going on in Russia. I saw that the Stolypin reform was gradually being carried out, which means in the long term the mitigation of the agrarian problem and the reduction of the revolutionary potential of the countryside. I saw that the country, albeit more slowly than necessary, was transforming from a semi-medieval autocratic monarchy into a modern state. And he knew that his train was leaving. In 1917, in a fit of honesty, Lenin would write that without a world war, perhaps there would be no revolution "against the capitalists" in Russia "for years and even decades" (PSS, vol. 32, p. 31)

And this was seen not only by Lenin, but also, for example, by the authors published in 1909 collection "Milestones". So, P.B. Struve wrote about the crisis of socialism in Russia, about how the Russian intelligentsia was gradually "turning bourgeois", i.e. will reconcile with the state and organically spontaneously merge into the existing social order, distributing itself among different classes of society. Deep fermentation had already begun in the intelligentsia, new ideas were emerging, and the old ideological foundations (i.e., the course towards "immediately making the people happy through forced socialism" were shaken and compromised (*Struve P.B. Intelligentsia and Revolution // Vekhi. M., 1909. pp. 144-145*). Approximately the same was written by another author of the collection, M.O. Gershenzon, adding that "now a young man on the verge of adulthood will no longer be met" by strict public opinion and immediately pointed out to him a simple and clear goal. My head will have to work! (*Gershenzon M.O. Creative self-consciousness // Ibid. pp. 90-92*).

At least this fact speaks of the improvement of the socio-political climate in Russia after 1905. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, in all leftist and liberal

In circles it was good form to wish Russia defeat and rejoice in the failures of Russian weapons. When the First World War broke out in 1914, only the Bolsheviks took the position of "defeating their government in the imperialist war". All other leftists (not to mention liberals) took up patriotic positions. And if the war broke out another ten years later, most likely no one would have taken a defeatist position in Russia at all. But the war broke out once in 1914 ... So the murder in Sarajevo ripened just in time. As if by order.

Or maybe it really is right on order? There are, for example, indications that the head of the Sarajevo conspirators, a certain Kazimirovich, was personally known to Trotsky and Lunacharsky. Moreover, it was Trotsky who gave him the command to carry out the terrorist attack (*A. Vinogradov, Secret Battles of the 20th Century*).

However, there is at least one objection to this view. In what, in what, but in the destruction of political opponents by the method of terrorist murders, Lenin and the Bolsheviks in general have never been noticed by anyone. Most his.

But there were comrades in the Bolshevik Party who were noticed in such methods. One of them is well known to everyone and everyone. His cases in terms of political assassinations of his opponents and simply objectionable people are also very well known. Here is a short, far from complete list of such murders and simply criminal acts organized by this comrade. 1907 - Tiflis bank robbery. And this is not the only robbery, but only the loudest. 1925 - the mysterious death of the People's Commissar (Minister) of Defense of the USSR M.V. Frunze during the operation of the stomach, which, apparently, was not required. 1926 - the mysterious death of the founder of the Soviet political police, F.E. Dzerzhinsky at the age of 49. 1932 - mysterious death

his own wife, formally it was suicide, but there were persistent (completely and completely, never refuted by anyone) rumors about the murder.

1934 - the murder of S.M. Kirov. 1935 - the mysterious death of the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR V.V. Kuibyshev at the age of 47. Kuibyshev was one of the most active, if not the most active, opponent of a possible trial of the political opponents of the comrade we are interested in - Zinoviev and Kamenev (*Conquest R. Great Terror*. Florence, 1974, p. 166). 1936 - the mysterious death of the "petrel of the revolution" Maxim Gorky. 1937 - the mysterious death of the people's commissar of heavy industry Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Finally, 1940 - the assassination of Trotsky. The list can go on, but I hope everyone has already understood who we are talking about. Yes, it is he - Io Sif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, he is Stalin, he is Koba, he is also the owner of several dozen more nicknames and pseudonyms.

It is known that in the 1930s. Stalin defeated the so-called school of the historian M.N. Pokrovsky. Moreover, he defeated him posthumously - Pokrovsky died in 1932 and was buried with honors near the Kremlin wall. Why did Mikhail Nikolaevich Joseph Vissarionovich not please him so much? Yes, even if he didn't please, then was it really impossible to distort the statements of the deceased in such a way that it would be beneficial for the Leader? No matter what, we have vast experience in this area. To know that Pokrovsky said something very unpleasant to the Leader, that he would like to forget himself, and most importantly - to make those around him forget. What exactly?

I do not impose my opinion, but something worth thinking about. Pokrovsky expressed the opinion that the aforementioned Serbian nationalist organization Black Hand, of which Tavrilo Princip was a member, played a role in the outbreak of the First World War. There are hints that it was precisely this statement of Pokrovsky that served as the basis for

posthumous repressions against him (*Sherman Sasha*. Black hand // *Gazeta.ru*. 1999. June 25).

Moreover, from the side of his former students, Pokrovsky is bombarded (on orders from above, of course!) with truly square abuse. Such swearing does not look like a calm, restrained Stalin at all. Viktor Suvorov cites one example of how the usually silent, cold-blooded Stalin stooped to bastard abuse and cheap insults. This happened when he learned about the report of the French agency GAVAS at the end of 1939 about his (Stalin, naturally, not the agency) plans for the Second World War - to push Germany against the West, wait for the mutual weakening of the warring parties and then enter into war itself and destroy both. Stalin then called this message "a lie fabricated in a cafe chantane" (Suvorov V. *Ledokol*. M., 2002. S. 51-52). In this case, such secret plans of the Leader were touched, such strings of his soul were touched that he could not restrain himself and behaved unusually aggressively. Was there something similar in the case of Pokrovsky?

Now fast forward to Russia in 1917. Stalin's role in the direct organization of the October Revolution, as is well known, was not significant. Although, on the other hand, the statements of some authors of the Gorbachev era that Stalin spent the October days in no one knows where and almost "slept through" the revolution is, of course, an excess in the other direction. It is known where Stalin was and what he did, but one thing is clear: his role was not one of the leading ones.

However, now we have serious grounds for thinking that without Stalin nothing would have happened in Russia in 1917. Thus, the concept of "two leaders of the revolution — Lenin and Stalin" seemed to be finally and irrevocably buried in 1956 (even ardent Stalinists, except for those who have completely lost their minds, now do not dare to restore it

vat), suddenly gets the right to a second birth
nie.

However, "the victory of socialism in a single country" - this, in the words of Lenin, was "less than half the battle." Just for the sake of self-preservation, it was necessary to extend their dominance to the whole world. Literally all the writings of communist leaders are imbued with one thought: either the communists will win the whole world, or their power will collapse on

everywhere.

The laconic Stalin cast these appeals into precise formulations of the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks": the thesis put forward by Lenin on the construction of socialism in a single country was called the "complete victory of socialism", but not "final": the "final" was declared possible only on a global scale.

And the call was not limited. All 1920s years have passed in attempts to export the revolution:
1920 - to Poland and Germany, 1920-1921 - to Iran,
1921 - to Mongolia (successfully), 1923 - to Germany and Bulgaria,
1925-1927 - to China, 1926-1928 - to Tibet, 1929 - to Afghanistan,
1933 - to Xinjiang (somewhat successful, but more on that later) . But there was another, the main goal.

Chapter V

BATTLE FOR AMERICA

The war has already been won, but no one has yet
does not understand this.

(Jean Tulart, "Napoleon")

There are serious reasons to believe that the Great Depression of 1929-1933. was, if not provoked, then at least greatly aggravated by the intervention of the USSR and the Comintern. In any case, during a search in 1936 at one of the secret

compromising documents were found in the apartments of the Comintern in New York. And in the world press a lot was written about the dumping export of the products of the labor of prisoners by the USSR (it was just then that the GULAG began to grow from the Solovetsky Island to the Archipelago).

Indeed, without the Great Depression, Hitler would not have come to power in Germany, no matter how much Stalin forbade the German Communists to form an alliance with the Social Democrats. However, there is reason to believe that Germany was not the main target.

In the 1920s and 30s much has been written in the USSR about the special role of the United States in the future "world revolution". And words and deeds did not differ. In no other democratic country did the Communists operate in such a secret manner as in the USA. Some authors explain this by the fact that among the founders of the CPUSA there were many immigrants from the former Russian Empire who were accustomed to working in illegal conditions. and, once in a free country, they continued to work in the same mode (*Kuksin I., Ioffe G., Raev M.* Bibliography No. 170 May 21, 2000 Website <http://www.lebed.com/2000/art2153.htm>).

It doesn't sound very convincing, if only because "immigrants from the Russian Empire", including our native RSDLP (b)-shniks, in other words, Bolshevik communists, from the turn of the 19th-20th centuries and until 1917 underwent a good run-in in free countries and knew how to work there. Moreover, there was a sad lesson: the Second Congress of the RSDLP - the same one at which, according to Lenin, Bolshevism as a movement arose - began in Brussels, but, having got used to illegality, instead of renting a room and holding it, as is customary in a free country, one by one, stealthily and looking around, they gathered in the firehouse. Well, naturally, the Belgian townsfolk mistook them for anarchist terrorists, they reported them to the police, so the guys from Belgium, who

called, asked, and had to complete the work in London. In short, has the Comintern not instructed its American section how

do you have to work in a free country?

Perhaps I am mistaken, but for the time being, in the absence of a better version, I will assume that America was given a special place in the plans of the communists. Unprecedented degree development of capitalism and concentration of production the great development of the trade union movement, and on the other hand, complete political freedom (including for extremists) - all this gave the communists great hopes that, under favorable circumstances, they would be able to convert the American people "to their faith." Although it seems incredible today, the mood was very different when the crash of the New York Stock Exchange on October 24, 1929, began the Great Depression.

Already in the spring of 1930, at a communist rally 35 thousand people gathered in New York (*Jakov Lev N.N.* Franklin Roosevelt - man and politician M., 1981. P. 110) - an unprecedented phenomenon in the United States both before and after 1929-1933. By the way, the size of the US Communist Party at its founding (1919) is known - 34 thousand members - and in 1939 - 66 thousand. The numbers are huge for the USA, given that during the years of the Cold War the Communist Party did not exceed three thousand (*Kuksin M., Ioffe G., Raev M.* Decree. work.), but it would be much more interesting to know the number of American communists not at the end, but at the beginning of the 1930s.

Meanwhile, in the winter of 1930-1931. became even harder. Entire regions (for example, most of the state of Oklahoma) were deserted, everyone who could leave from there. Thousands of people died from banal starvation (only in New York in 1931, 2,000 people died of starvation). In 1931, the "hungry marches" of the unemployed on Washington began; one of them was dispersed on July 28

1932 by troops using gases and artillery. And on March 7, 1932, at a funeral in one of the largest

cities of four murdered demonstrators, portraits of Lenin stood on their coffins, and the orchestra played Russian skye revolutionary marches.

A significant part of the American intelligentsia also began to be imbued with communist sentiments. In contrast to the horrors happening in America (without quotes), many representatives of the latter praised the USSR, where, just think, "everyone has a job" (Yakovlev *N.N.* Franklin Roosevelt ... P. 129-131) years when Russian, Ukrainian, etc. the peasant had every reason to say even to an American who was very poor in comparison with the times of the "prosperity": "I would like, my friend, your problems!" And here again the question arises of the organization of the crisis in the West - somehow it broke out just at the right time, just when Stalin needed to distract world public opinion from the collectivization he was carrying out!

And some Americans began to sympathize with fascism (*Ibid.*, p. 132). Well, horseradish is not sweeter, and Stalin in any case remained the winner: the fascists would win instead of the communists - then there would be someone to "liberate" America from! And shortly before that time, in 1928, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected governor of the state of New York.

Roosevelt probably already understood then that the old capitalism would not be able to resist the advancing totalitarianism, that serious social reforms were needed. "Communist ideas will gain popularity in the country if we fail to support the old ideals and the original goals of the democratic ty," he said in the summer of 1930 (FDR *His Personal Letters*. Vol. 3. NY, 1950. PI 19-120).

In 1931, New York State began providing \$23 a month for the unemployed. Not much, of course, but it was about ten times more than the national average, where people were helped

whether only private charitable organizations (*Yakovlev N.N. Franklin Roosevelt ... S. 115*).

By the time Roosevelt entered the White House on March 4, 1933, the Great Depression of 1929-1933 was in full swing. led to very serious consequences for the United States. Industrial production by 1933 fell to 46% of the 1929 level. According to some sources, the number of unemployed reached 17.9 million people. (*Perking F.*

The Roosevelt I knew. NY, 1946. P. 182.), i.e. approximately 13.25% of the total population. In the winter of 1932-1933 in a number of states, crowds of people besieged legislative institutions, banks, and stormed grocery stores. The dean of the business department at Harvard University said in those days: "Capitalism is now on trial, and the whole of Western civilization depends on the outcome of the trial" (*Manchester W. The Glory and the Dream. NY, 1978. P.54*), and he was right. In the last days before the arrival of the Roosevelt administration, the banking crisis also broke out.

Banks threw away huge amounts of unsecured "securities". Depositors withdrew gold and money from the banks. On February 14, 1933, the Governor of Michigan, with the approval of the Detroit bankers, shut down the banks for eight days. And just two days before Roosevelt came to the White House, 500 million dollars were withdrawn from banks (*Warren H.*

Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression. NY, 1967. P.291.). On March 3, the states of New York and Illinois closed their banks, where the main financial centers of the United States were concentrated.

Having taken the presidency, Roosevelt immediately, on March 6 (the 5th was Sunday), introduced a state of emergency and closed all banks. Congress met on March 9 approved the Emergency Banking Act. On March 10, a step was taken to establish state control over gold, which made it possible to decree the gold content of the dollar. Already on March 13, banks were opened in 12 cities of the country,

where the centers of the US Federal Reserve were located, on March 14 - in another 250 cities, and on the 15th - all the rest. The recovery of banks led to the fact that if in 1932 there were 6145 banks with 22.3 billion dollars of deposits, then in 1933 their number decreased to 4897 from 20.8 billion, and by 1939 it had grown to 5203 from 33.1 billion (Historical Statistics of the United States. Washington DC, 1961. P.626).

The Glass-Steagall Act, passed on June 16, 1933, separated the deposit and investment functions of banks, in other words, put a ban on the simultaneous ownership of a controlling stake in a bank and an industrial enterprise, which served as a barrier to speculative transactions and put an end to the power of "financial capital". At the same time, bank deposit insurance was established for up to \$2,500 (in 1934 the amount insured rose to \$5,000). By 1939, 14,219 national and local banks were covered by this insurance, with \$45 billion in deposits.

Under the Banking Act of 1935, the Fed's board of governors, appointed by the president, was given the power to determine the amount of reserve to be kept in banks by the Fed, which made it possible to facilitate or hinder access to credit and influence business. activity (*Bobrakov Yu.N.* USA: federal reserve system and economic regulation. M., 1971. P. 65).

The Rural Relief Act gave the President the right to reduce the gold content of the dollar or mint silver coin, Roosevelt chose the former. By redemption at a fixed price, all gold was finally nationalized, after which, relying on the Gold Reserve Act, Roosevelt on January 31, 1934 reduced the gold content of gold from 25.8 to 15.25 grains; the price of gold was set at \$35 per ounce. As a result, interest on government loans fell over 1932-

1940s from 3.76% to 2.39%, privately from 4.25% to 2.9% (*Blum I. From the Morgentau Diaries. Vol. 1. Boston, 1959. P.353*).

The Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, provided for the establishment of business associations that formulated (with subsequent approval by the president) "Codes of fair competition." "Codes" established production volumes, prices and other sales rules, prescribed working conditions for workers. The law was adopted for a period of two years, and in relation to the associations of entrepreneurs formed under it, the effect of antitrust legislation was suspended. In total, 557 basic and 189 additional codes were drawn up, uniting 95% of industrial workers at the enterprises covered by them.

On May 12, 1933, a law was passed to help farmers. The law set the task of returning the parity of industrial and agricultural prices to the level of 1909-1914. The Ministry of Agriculture received the right to reward those farmers who voluntarily agreed to reduce production, as well as the right to negotiate with enterprises engaged in the processing of agricultural products and with farmers. In order to eliminate the crisis of overproduction, 10.5 million acres of cotton were plowed over, 6.5 million pigs were destroyed, and so on. According to the law of February 16, 1938 "On the regulation of agriculture", the surpluses were no longer subject to destruction, as was customary since the Great Depression, but to storage, with the condition that farmers were paid money for goods that they had not yet sold (*Zolotukhin V.P. Farmers and Washington, Moscow, 1968, p. 89*).

From May 1933 to October 1937, the land banks lent \$2.2 billion to 540,000 farms, and the banks assumed 37 percent of the farmers' debt. As a result, the number of bankruptcies

among farmers by 1939 decreased by 71%, the amount of their debt - by \$ 2 billion, although the price parity of 1909-1914. was never achieved.

The new crisis of 1937 caused a new rise in unemployment, which fell to 7.7 million in 1937, to 10.4 million by 1938 (*Perking F. P.* 182.). All this caused a new increase in banknotes to help the unemployed. As early as May 12, 1933, 500 million dollars were allocated for benefits. In total, up to 1939, 4 billion were spent on benefits (*Malkov V.P.* Harry Hopkins: pages on political biography / Modern and recent history).

1979. No. 2. S. 34).

In April 1933, forest camps were set up for unemployed youth, where young people lived fully provided for and received \$30 a month in addition, with the condition that they send 25 of them to their families. For 1933-1939 2 million people passed through such camps. (FDR. Public papers. 1934 vol. P.250). In addition, for 4.5 months in the autumn and winter of 1933-1934. 4.5 million people went through civil work specially organized to solve the problem of unemployment. (Ibid. - R.456-459).

Under Roosevelt, for the first time in the United States, the transfer of workers to pensions began. In August 1935, old age and unemployment insurance funds were created. The pension funds took special taxes from both entrepreneurs and workers, which amounted to 1%, and by 1949 were to increase to 3%. By June 30, 1937, all states had adopted pension statutes. These statutes were still very imperfect, for example, agricultural workers or servants did not receive pensions, but the initiative was made. Initially, the beginning of the payment of pensions was provided for from January 1, 1942, but then it was moved to January 1, 1940, and in the event of the death of a pensioner, the pension continued to be paid to those who were dependent on him

relatives (United States Department of Labor.

Growth of Labor Law in the United States. Washington DC, 1967. P.276).

Finally, on July 27, 1933, the Re-Employment Act was passed, limiting the workweek to 40 hours (and Roosevelt recommended 35 hours) at a minimum wage of 30 cents an hour. Adopted in 1936, the Wallace-Healy law established one and a half times overtime pay (more than 40 hours per week) for work. This law prohibited the employment of boys under the age of 16 and girls under the age of 18.

The result of Roosevelt's reforms, which went down in history as the "New Deal", was an almost twofold increase in industrial production by 1939 compared with 1932.

But the transformations were much more

meaning: they marked the end of the "classic ka

capitalism" and the beginning of what we today call the "social market economy". Of course, at that time, the results were modest; after the war, Europe far surpassed the United States in terms of sociality (and vacations in the United States are still not paid, while in France, for example, paid vacations were introduced even before the war, in 1936).). However, Roosevelt did. And the US economy, which has become dominant in the world for many decades, practically still works according to the canons that were created 70 years ago.

The main thing is that the Comintern's plan for the coming to power of left-wing radicals in the USA was thwarted. This country, instead of putting its powerful economy at the service of world communism, will become its main opponent in the future.

In 1944, when World War II was virtually won by the United States, Roosevelt would say in his fourth election campaign that in 1933 there was a real threat of America being conquered by alien ideas, communist or fascist. But American democracy has endured. "The American people did not demand infringement, but race

I have achieved the expansion of democracy," Roosevelt said (*Sherwood R. Roosevelt and Hopkins. M., 1958. Vol. 1. P. 120*).

Stalin lost the battle for America. And now it was necessary to act in a different way - "ice Kolny".

Chapter VI

FOR WHOM THE PACT OF MOLOTOV - RIBBENTROP WAS FORCED?

So, "world revolution" (a communist euphemism for the term "world slave counterrevolution") still did not work out. And then it was decided to unleash a world war, but by proxy, in order to avoid fighting the whole world.

Who could in the specific situation of the 1920s. to serve as a tool in the hands of the Bolsheviks to unleash a new world war?

Britain and France, the victors in the First World War, reaping its main fruits, clearly did not need a new war. The United States, which made Britain, France and all other European countries financially dependent on itself and then returned to the policy of isolationism, even more so. Italy and Japan, who, although they were among the victors, but felt left out, would not mind reconsidering the results of the war, but did not have enough strength to do it on their own. Germany remained.

How the USSR concluded military agreements with Germany, how it helped Germany to create tank, aviation and other types of troops prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles, how German military personnel were trained on the territory of the USSR - more than enough has been written about all this (in Russian, for the most details, see : *Dyakov Yu.L., Bushueva T.S. Fa*

the shist sword was forged in the USSR. M., 1992). By the way, when in March 1935 Germany openly refused to comply with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and introduced universal conscription, starting to prepare for war already at home, Stalin, in a conversation with British Foreign Minister A. Eden on March 2 1935 expressed not only understanding, but also approval of this step (*Nekrich AM* 1941, June 22, M., 1995, p. 22).

Much has also been written about how Stalin, by banning the German communists at the end of 1932 from creating a left bloc with the Social Democrats, cleared the road to power for Hitler. It is also written that, although Nazism was sharply anti-communist in its orientation, the USSR again and again looked for ways of rapprochement with Germany both in 1933-1934 and in 1936-1937, moreover, that the specific circumstances of the conclusion The non-aggression pact was discussed at a meeting in Berlin in July 1936 between the adviser of the Soviet embassy (embassy) and high-ranking officials of the German Foreign Ministry (*Ibid.* pp. 14-18, 24, etc.; Conquest R. Great Terror . Florence , 1974. S. 409-411). Well, it seems that only the lazy did not write about the fact that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact allowed the Nazis to seize all of Europe in 1939-1941.

Stalin's apologists, however, unequivocally assert: the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was a necessary measure for the USSR, our country, they say, needed to win some more time in order to at least a little better prepare the country for war. From this statement it follows that in 1939 the USSR would have accepted the battle with Germany under conditions less favorable than in June 1941.

However, there are more than enough objections to this point of view. They have been repeated many times, but here are just a few that can be considered more or less new and original.

In the first place, the simple consideration never occurs to anyone: was it really easier to deal with Germany in 1941, for which the industry of all Europe worked, than with Germany in 1939?

Secondly, here is another simple consideration: if Hitler felt strong enough to crush the USSR already in 1939, then why didn't he? Would he really sign a pact with the USSR in such a situation? Hitler himself already in November of the same 1939 declared that treaties are respected as long as they are profitable! Actually, this reason is enough; here you can remember a joke about the general who explains to his superiors the reasons for the defeat, of which there are seven: "The first reason: they didn't bring cartridges" - "To hell with the other six! - answers the commander in chief. "One is enough." However, the "other six reasons" deserve our attention.

Thirdly, it is reliably known (and was known then) that until July 21, 1940, when Hitler ordered the preparation of the Barbarossa plan, the question of a war against the USSR in the foreseeable future was not raised even theoretically.

Fourthly, in September 1939, Germany had stocks of mines and shells for 12-18 days, tank shells for 6 (six!) days, howitzer shells for 60 days (Muller-*Hillebrand B. Das Heer, 1933- 1945.* Frankfurt / M., 1954. Bd.III.6).

Fifthly, it is known that in 1941, having started the war against the USSR on June 22, Hitler was unable to finish it before the autumn thaw, which was fatal for German equipment with its low cross-country ability not designed for Russian impassability. In 1939, Hitler, having spent three weeks to defeat Poland, could attack the USSR on September 22 at best. Need comments?

Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, Hitler had no strategic raw material. All Anglo

the French plan for the war against Germany was based on the fact that, without wasting soldiers' lives, strangle the aggressor with a blockade, which by the spring of 1940 was supposed to bring the Third Reich to its knees. It is precisely this, and not at all the unwillingness of the Western allies to fight, that explains the "strange war" in the West. The plan did not work only because the USSR, after signing the pact, began an uninterrupted supply of Germany with all the necessary raw materials.

The objections could go on and on. Let us add Viktor Suvorov's considerations: Britain and France could hardly have allowed Hitler, having defeated (let us assume that he had succeeded in doing so) the USSR, to become the master in Europe. If only for this reason, Hitler had to first put an end to France, for which 1940 should have gone (and left). So

1940 also fell away. Well, in 1941, Hitler, simply for weather reasons, could not attack the USSR before May (*Suvorov V. Holy deed. M., 2008. P. 138-140*).

But let us finally ask the most important question: for whom was the pact forced? Obviously, not for the one who dictated the conditions, but for the one to whom they were dictated! If the pact with Germany was a forced matter for Stalin, then, probably, the conditions should have been dictated by Germany. And how was it really? To answer this question, let us turn to the well-known author A.P. Parshev.

Historians have such a thing - unintentional evidence. This is a situation when a witness (or a historian-analyst) asserts one thing, but something else emerges between the lines against his will. And this other thing is true.

Parshev proves to us that the pact with Germany was a purely forced measure for Stalin. As confirmation, he cites data, for example, that at the time of the signing of the pact there was a battle at Khalkhin Gol, not something comparable to the Polish Kamen

Hitler's panic, but also surpassing it in scale (! Honestly, I'm not lying! - *Parshev A.P. Why Russia is not America.* M., 2000. P. 172). In fact, on Khalkhin Gol, on both sides, twenty times fewer troops acted (see, for example, volumes 2 and 3 of the History of the Second World War). But now the author—an economist, or at least pretending to be one—turns to the economic aspects of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and the whole theory he has built up that the pact is “forced” for the USSR is coming apart at the seams.

So, when Germany on August 15, 1939 turned to the USSR with a proposal to conclude a nonaggression pact, the head of the Soviet government V.M. Molotov replied that "the first step towards improving relations between the USSR and Germany could be a trade and credit agreement." Let us pay attention, continues Parshev, that the participation of the USSR in a major European war is not yet expected, and Germany is about to start it. It is Germany, which sends its workers to the army, and urgently needs a loan - the participation of workers from other countries... And it would be logical if Germany asked for a loan from the USSR, and not vice versa. A. Molotov ... demands that the German workers take part in strengthening the defense capacity of the USSR, he directly indicates that without this "first step" he will not take the second step. Two days later, the Germans provide a loan to the USSR. If the USSR were able to take a loan from future allies - the USA and England, then this would already be a feat. And taking a loan from a completely obvious adversary is unbelievable, Parshev sums up (*Why Russia is not America*, pp. 332-336). Gold words! But for whom, then, was the pact forced?

And here is another concrete fact: in May 1940, when the superiority of the British fleet over the German one was clearly indicated, Hitler sold Stalin unfinished, i.e. the newest cruiser "Lützow". The reason is simple: Germany is running out of

strategic raw materials that Hitler could buy only from Stalin or through the territory of the USSR in third countries. In exchange, one has to sell technology and military equipment, including the latest aircraft, guns, ships, communications and fire control equipment, and so on. (*Suvorov V. Den-M. S. 82-83*). So who dictated the terms to whom?

And now the word again to Parshev. He gives a list of machine tools and other equipment that the USSR purchased from Germany, adding: the main cost of the equipment is the labor of engineers, technicians and highly skilled workers. In the USSR at that time there were no opportunities for the manufacture of such equipment (Why Russia is not America. P. 350).

There are other facts as well. Throughout the war and many years after it, a unique press from the Shleman company with a force of 15,000 tons worked in the Urals. This press greatly increased the possibilities for the production of tanks in the USSR, and it was installed at a time when Germany was at war against all of Europe, and the USSR remained "neutral". And coastal batteries in the Baltic were built with the help of German floating cranes firm "Deshimag" (*Suvorov V. Den-M. S. 300-301*).

And here - this is again from Parshev - a list of what the USSR supplied to Germany. Practically one raw material. Except for oil products and oils, none of the items delivered even passed primary processing. What was dug out of the ground or what fell from the chicken before the chicken was plucked and put into soup was sold to the Germans. Not a single pair of German workers was saved for the Germans. As a result, in order to supply the USSR with goods worth, say, 1000 marks, the Germans needed the labor of five skilled workers; The USSR needed the labor of one worker, and then unskilled, to supply a similar amount.

Well, that's not all. Subsequently, new trade agreements were concluded, and in them our

the Mersants became even more emboldened. For example, the Germans were supplied with ore with such a low iron content that they had to enrich it, but we still could not put it into our blast furnaces. The Germans tried to quarrel about this, but Stalin shortened them, adds Parshev (Why Russia is not America, pp. 351-352).

I want to shout: how did Germany agree to such conditions!? And it's very simple: where was it to go? Europe does not have the necessary raw materials, sea routes are blocked by the British fleet, and strategic raw materials vital for war can only be obtained from the USSR or through the territory of the USSR.

Stalin knew that Germany could not take raw materials for war anywhere except from him, and he supplied them to Germany so that she would fight in Europe. But he dictated the conditions, not Hitler. Without these trade agreements, Hitler would have had nothing to fight with.

And now Parshev (and many others) rants about the "forced" nature of the pact with Hitler for Stalin. And now Parshev assures that "Germany would have received raw materials even without the USSR, through the allies." Interestingly, from whom and in what ways?

Chapter VII

ABOUT WARS JUST AND UNJUST

When a neighbor steals my wife, it's bad.

When I steal the neighbor's wife, that's good.

*(Hottentot proverb,
became a symbol of double morality)*

Lenin's definition of wars, just and unjust, given even before 1917, differed little from the generally accepted in the civilized world. The leader of the world proletariat defined a just war as a war waged for the defense of one's territory or for the liberation of one's territory,

not captured by the enemy, but as unfair he qualified the war for the seizure of foreign territory or the retention of previously captured foreign territory.

The definition was created before 1917, when the Bolsheviks were still pretending to be democrats who opposed tsarism with its remnants of the Middle Ages - real and imaginary. I don't know if Lenin was going to change this definition after 1917. Perhaps he was going to, but he just didn't have time. Let me remind you that attempts to export the "world revolution" from 1917 to 1933, despite individual successes, ended in failure on the whole. And after any failure, it became obvious that, as they say now, the world community would not accept such communist expansion and would oppose it. And then it was decided to unleash a world war, but by proxy, in order to avoid fighting the whole world.

How this plan was realized, more than enough has been written even without me. For us, it is important that Lenin, and then Stalin, considered it necessary not to change the definition of wars, just and unjust, so as not to irritate this very world community.

The situation changed by the end of 1938. The "icebreaker" grown by that time - Hitler so loudly announced his expansionist plans, and partly already began to implement them (Austria, the Sudetenland), public opinion in the West was so excited by this that on Against this backdrop, the change in the definition of a just war given in the Short Course on the History of the CPSU(b) went completely unnoticed.

Moreover, the change was seemingly insignificant: in addition to those indicated by Lenin, the list of just wars included those that "are waged with the aim of liberating this or that country from capitalist slavery." Although in reality

this "minor" change is almost complete

stuy unleashed the hands of the USSR, especially given the fact that

what else XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) (January 26 - February 10 1934) authorized the Central Committee of the party "at any moment to break all alliances and peace treaties with the imperialist and bourgeois states, as well as declare war on them" (Resolution of the XVII Congress, cited by: Suvorov V. Ledokol. M., 2002 . S. 44). This resolution, by the way, was never repealed.

Considering that at that time all countries except the USSR and Mongolia, were considered in our country to be "bourgeois and imperialist" and "in capitalist slavery," then this resolution, coupled with the definition of the "Short Course," gave the USSR practically unlimited opportunities for unleashing wars: attack anyone you want, even Papua New Guinea, just don't forget to announce that you are going to "liberate it from capitalist slavery", so this war will be "just".

By the way, the "liberation campaigns" of the Red Army in 1939-1940. fit the Leninist definition of a just war without great exaggeration: with the exception of Finland, which Soviet Russia itself gave independence on December 31, 1917, and Galicia, which never belonged to Russia, then all the territories that the USSR annexed in these years were torn away from Russia in 1918-1920. without her consent. How the population of these territories treated the "liberation" campaigns is another question and a topic for a separate conversation. I will only note that this relationship, undoubtedly, was greatly worsened by the fact that the lost territories were returned not to Russia, but to the totalitarian USSR.

One way or another, it is obvious that the Stalinist definition of "just war" was invented not for these campaigns, but for some other wars for other territories that never belonged to Russia ...

But a little more than two years passed, the Second World War broke out, the "icebreaker" - Hitler crushed almost all of Europe under him, and soon, according to the plans of

Veteran architects of the war, a time was to come when "the war-weary peoples of the world will turn their gaze to the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, the main bulwark of the world." That is, to put it simply, the time of the "great liberation campaign" was approaching. There is already "liberation from capitalist slavery" as a criterion for justice.

it was not very good for frivolity: the Soviet agitators themselves

Tori did a lot of work to explain to the population that in Germany, if not the same as ours, not quite correct, but still socialism.

In general, the definition of a just war had to be urgently changed. And Stalin changed him. Changed ingeniously simply. At the beginning of March 1941, it was announced that "any war waged by the Soviet Union is just" (Bunich *I.L. Groza*, p. 427). In the situation at the beginning of 1941, Stalin could afford such an "adjustment": for obvious reasons, the world simply did not notice it. And those who figured out Stalin's plan (Roosevelt and Churchill) pretended not to notice and did not focus on the definitions, but tried to prevent the "liberation campaign" from being thwarted by Hitler's preventive strike and never taking place (about how are things elk, we will go further). And after that, will it really matter which war is considered fair in Stalin's definition?

However, Soviet practice has so far lagged behind theory. In reality, the USSR, not content with the "noble goal of liberation from capitalist slavery", invented various plausible pretexts for aggression. Thus, Poland was invaded in order to "eliminate the danger of chaos in its eastern regions" after this "ugly offspring of the Treaty of Versailles" collapsed under the blows of Germany. The Finns were accused of shelling Soviet territory with cannons - exactly after the Red Army had completed its concentration on Finnish civilians.

nitsakh, and its highest command staff - the reconnaissance of the Finnish border territory, which was carried out from January 1939 (*Suvorov V. Ledokol. P. 282*).

What was the purpose of Stalin's "correction" of the definition of a just war? For Operation Thunderstorm, which was to begin on July 6, 1941? Or did they also come up with another justification for it - in the form of the doctrine of the immediate transition of the Red Army to the offensive after the attack of the enemy? Say, the Germans will attack, but we will immediately reject them and go to smash "in the enemy's land with little bloodshed." How this is done in practice was shown by the beginning of the Korean War of 1950: it was announced that the south was not attacked, but the northerners immediately threw them back, on the first day before lunch they marched 10 kilometers through the territory of the enemy, and on the fourth day of the war they already took whether Seoul. Perhaps something similar - on an immeasurably large scale, of course - was being prepared in Europe for the summer of 1941.

Or maybe everything was much simpler: "Stalin's definitions" of a just war - for its own population, plausible pretexts and explanations - for the outside world?

One way or another, it is obvious that the propaganda apparatus of the USSR in 1938-1941. also worked on the ideological formulation of the war, moreover, the war was all general and aggressive.

Chapter VIII

WHO FIRST UNDERSTAND STALIN'S PLAN

Neither in Moscow nor in Berlin did anyone take Roosevelt seriously.

(I. Bunich. "Thunderstorm").

Stalin's plan was thwarted by a sudden German strike on June 22, 1941. Did it happen by chance? Or someone managed to unravel the Stalinist deputies

sat down and confronted him with your plan? And if so, then who?

It is generally accepted that Trotsky (back in 1936-1938) was the first to unravel the idea of Stal. V. Suvorov quotes his statements relating to 1936, 1938 and 1939 (*Suvorov V. Icebreaker*, p. 23).

But, if Trotsky guessed Stalin's plan, then how could he prevent him? This could be done only by a person endowed with this or that state power, and in one of the great powers of that time. And such a person was found; but to understand how and when he figured out Stalin's plan, one has to go back to the late 1930s.

Thus, it is known that in the autumn of 1938 the USSR offered assistance to Czechoslovakia in its struggle against the threat of German conquest. Soviet historians write about this and accuse the bourgeois rulers of Czechoslovakia of betraying their country because of their unwillingness to cooperate with the USSR, but they "forget" to add that Stalin publicly declared: if Soviet troops enter Czechoslovakia (and into the one that separated the USSR as from Czechoslovakia, and from Germany to Poland), then they will not come out of there. The frightened Czechs and Poles refused Stalin's "help", not wanting to "change the needle for soap" and instead of Hitler's occupation fall under Stalin's (*Avtorkhanov A. Kremlin Empire*. Vilnius, 1990, p. 115).

There is nothing surprising in the fact that Stalin had no intention of withdrawing troops from Poland and Czechoslovakia if he could manage to bring them in there. Another thing is strange - why did he announce this to the whole world? If he hadn't announced it, look, the Poles and Czechs would have agreed, and there it would have been possible to get their hands on them without too much noise. But no, Stalin made it so that the Czechs refused his "help" and were occupied by Hitler. For what?

In addition, contrary to popular belief, in the most critical days of the Munich crisis, the USSR, which

who had previously sworn and sworn to help Czechoslovakia, suddenly fell silent. The Czechoslovak ambassador sought meetings, the Soviet leaders evaded her, even Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, said he was ill. And only on the night of October 2-3, 1938, 2.5 days after Czechoslovakia accepted Hitler's demands in Munich, the USSR declared: you should have surrendered in vain, you had to hold on, we would have helped you (Suvorov V. Holy case, pp. 88-90)! In the people it is called - after a fight, wave your fists.

So, in the light of V. Suvorov's concept, Stalin's behavior is understandable: it was too early to stop Hitler, he had to be allowed to seize all of Europe, so that later he would have someone to "liberate" it from.

But it is interesting that Roosevelt tried to mediate in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, wanting to keep Hitler from further conquests. On September 26, 1938, Roosevelt in a personal message called on Hitler to "refrain from ultimatums" and resolve controversial issues at a pan-European peace conference (*A.I. Utkin, Frankli's Diplomacy on Roosevelt. Sverdlovsk, 1990, p. 74*). Subsequently, Roosevelt acted (at the end of August 1939) with attempts to mediate between Germany and Poland, writing appropriate letters to Hitler, the President of Poland and the Italian king (*Ibid., p. 77*). Roosevelt tried and later to reconcile Germany with England and France (*Ibid., pp. 96-100*), in a personal message dated May 26, 1940, he tried to dissuade Musso or to speak on the side of Hitler (*Utkin, p. 108*)

etc.

The question is, what does Roosevelt care about the war in Europe, especially (in 1938-1939) in Eastern Europe? It is known that no one considered the German-Polish war of 1939 the beginning of a world war, even after Britain and France declared war on Hitler; the same USA on September 5, 1939 declared their neutrality in the German-Polish war (*Suvorov V. Den-M. M.,*

2002. S. 186-187). Moreover, no one thought about the world war in the Munich days. And in general, everyone knows that American public opinion in 1938-1939 was of the opinion that the policy of isolationism was the most correct one, and only since 1940 began to lean towards the idea that America should also enter the war (and even then the Americans were largely "pushed" to this step by the Axis powers, themselves attacked them). Why was Roosevelt so alarmed in 1938-1939?

Isn't his behavior connected precisely with the fact that he unraveled the Stalinist plan and tried to thwart it, having achieved an end to the outbreak of the Second World War as such? And is it not this circumstance that explains Roosevelt's "foreboding" that the war would end badly for England and France (in the winter of 1940, when no one could even dream in a nightmare that France would be defeated by the Wehrmacht in six weeks) (Utkin A.I. *The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt*, pp. 82-83, 86-87, 92, etc.)?

Sometimes history seems to deliberately oppose one political or military genius - a contender for world domination - with another who opposes him and ultimately frustrates all his plans. Thus, history opposed the greatest commander, Napoleon, to the greatest naval commander, Nelson. After the Battle of Trafalgar, Napoleon's cause was already lost - unable to strike at Britain protected by its seas, he was forced to subjugate all the countries of Europe and dream of conquering Asia in order to strangle Britain with a continental blockade; on this path Napoleon was bound to break his neck. The two most terrible wars that destroyed Napoleon - the Spanish and the Russian - were caused by the unwillingness of Spain and Russia to observe the continental blockade. Yes, and the rest of Europe rebelled in 1813 against Napo

Leon, again mainly because of the hardships of the continental blockade.

History opposed Roosevelt to Stalin. Indeed, classical 19th-century capitalism became obsolete after the Great Depression of 1929-1933. We had to create something else. Stalin (and to a lesser extent Hitler in Germany) created a totalitarian alternative to classical capitalism with a regime of total lack of freedom and complete subordination of all economic, social and personal life to the state. Roosevelt, on the other hand, created a democratic and market-based alternative to classical capitalism—what we now call a “socially oriented market economy.”

Naturally, two worlds and two systems must were to face. And they collided in 1938, 1939, 1940s. History put the question squarely: either one or the other system will win, and the defeated system will be (albeit not immediately) completely destroyed.

Chapter IX

WHEN THE TURNING POINT IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

This is not the end or even the beginning
end. But this is the end of the beginning.

(W. Churchill)

The classic Soviet answer to this question is between the transition of the Soviet armies to the offensive near Stalingrad and the end of the Battle of Kursk. There are, however, other points of view: some historians consider December 1941 a turning point - they say, after the battle near Moscow, Hitler could no longer impose the initiative on his opponents, and even the attack on Stalingrad was just an attempt to correct the results of the defeat near Moscow (*Bunin A.N., Yakov*

lion N.N. 170,000 kilometers with G.K. Zhukov. M., 1994. P. 49, *Melnikov D.E., Chernaya L.B.* Offender number 1.M., 1982. S. 367-368).

Western historians give other turning points, but none of them is dated earlier than the end of 1941. Meanwhile, from the point of view of the concept of V. Suvorov, the turning point in the war came on June 22 1941: from that time on, no matter how further events developed, the war could no longer end with the conquest of the whole world by the communists (*Suvorov V.* Cleansing. M., 2001. P. 341-345).

We will return to this issue later. In the meantime, let's try to prove that the turning point in World War II as a geopolitical confrontation between the USSR and the USA did not even come on June 22, 1941, but gradually during the year between the end of June 1940 and June 22 1941 But first, I will describe how I personally see the Roosevelt plan.

It is likely that Roosevelt was interested from the outset in surrendering all of continental Europe to Hitler. Then, since the further route to the west and south will be closed by the seas dominated by the English fleet, Hitler will have no choice but to turn east against Stalin. In Washington, as well as in London and Paris, they firmly understood that the union of two dictators is a temporary phenomenon, that two predators of this magnitude cannot coexist together on our small planet (and even more so in small Europe). So a fight between them is inevitable.

Indeed, the fact that Stalin's plans for began to break down, had to admit already on May 20 1941 formal head of the Soviet state M.I. Kalinin, who made a report that day at the Komsomol meeting of workers of the apparatus of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Kalinin expressed his indignation at the fact that England and France were "bad at war" and that therefore

the concept of "mutual attrition of the warring hundred
ron" does not work. But it was on this concept that the long-term foreign policy
strategy of the Bolsheviks, inherited from Lenin, was based. "And all of a
sudden ... everything is not going the way it did, say, in the First Imperialist War
and contrary to the decisions of the party congresses and the Comintern."
Further, in Kalinin's speech, there are clear hints that it is necessary to "take
advantage of the situation and expand communism" (Nekrich *AM Decree*.
work. P. 128-131) (it is clear how. -D. V.), however, it is obvious that at least in
one Stalin has already lost: the serious mutual exhaustion of Hitler and his
Western pro

there are no enemies.

But back to the summer of 1940. The problem is that Stalin is also preparing
a blow. If he strikes first, it could thwart all of Roosevelt's plans. Then the whole
of Europe will quickly turn "red" much earlier than the United States will gather
forces to land in Europe themselves and help Britain do it. This means that the
matter is small: to do everything possible for the Americans so that Germany
becomes the attacking side in the inevitable Soviet-German conflict. But in the
summer of 1940 it seemed, to put it mildly,

thread.

By the summer of 1940, Roosevelt's premonitions seemed to be justified.
Hitler has captured Western Europe and is preparing to land in Britain. At this
time, millions of Soviet soldiers, thousands of tanks and aircraft, tens of
thousands of guns were already concentrated on the eastern borders of
Germany and its only source of oil, apart from the USSR, - Romania. Dozens
of new Soviet divisions have already been formed, more new ones are being
formed, and the number of divisions being formed is moving from tens to
hundreds. It seems that Stalin's hordes are about to move into Romania, and
Germany will remain defenseless, if only because of the lack of fuel for its military
equipment. And all of Europe

theoretically, without serious resistance, Stalin will get it.

By the way, it was in the second half of 1940 that the USSR stopped the campaign against the US entry into the war in Europe (*Nekrich A.M.S.* 142). The reason for this turn in the propaganda policy of the USSR is understandable. Before the defeat of France, Stalin feared that the United States would have time to come to her aid (as in the First World War), and the French would be able to hold out before the USSR crushed Germany. Now it is clear to the Soviet rulers: anyway, the Americans will not have time to assemble their forces and land in Europe before the USSR carries out Operation Thunderstorm and subjugates all of Europe to the English Channel. So let them enter, anyway, but they are already late! So, at least, it seemed in the second half of 1940.

And suddenly everything changes. Stalin tramples on the new western borders of the USSR. Hitler has been moving his armies to the East for a whole year, but Stalin stubbornly refuses to see the threat of a German attack. Finally, on June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht delivers a preemptive strike, smashes the Soviet armies concentrated near the border, and withdraws far into the depths of Russia. The result of this turn is a protracted Soviet-German war, the mutual extermination of millions of Soviet and German soldiers. Hitler had to withdraw his armies from Europe, so that when the Allied armies arrived there in 1943-1944, they met with little resistance. The result of the war is the encirclement of the USSR by the Americans and their allies from all sides, that is, the implementation of the American geopolitical scenario.

What happened during the year before his Soviet-German war?

Viktor Suvorov says: Stalin's mistake was that in the summer of 1940 he captured only Bessarabia, leaving Romania proper to Hitler with its non-oil reserves. Thus, he scared Hitler

and made him seriously think about a preventive strike (*Suvorov V. Ledokol. M., 1992. S. 46, 54*). Why he made this mistake, Suvorov does not explain; hypothetically, it can be assumed that Stalin was unsettled for some time by the too lightning defeat of France by the Nazis. Suvorov himself admits that Stalin did not expect this (*Suvorov V.*

Cleansing. S. 241). Many other authors are even more categorical: "When the capture of Paris by the Germans was announced, Stalin ... having dripped Bestuzhev's drops for himself ... without saying a word ... left for a nearby dacha, where the Kogan brothers, the constant life-guards, were urgently summoned. the leader's physicians. There is even information about a heart attack or a severe heart attack in Stalin (*Bunich I. Groza. M., 1997. S. 101-102*).

So be it, but the mistake was easy to fix. Stalin had a whole year in reserve (until Hitler crushed the Soviet armies gathered against him in Byelorussia and the Baltics with sudden blows), during which he could occupy Romania at any moment convenient for him, and Hitler would not be able to do anything. It is one thing to declare "Romania's transfer of the Ploiesti oil basin under German protection," which was done on September 2, 1940 (*Ibid., p. 150*), and another thing to actually protect Romanian oil from a Soviet invasion. Suffice it to say that even at the beginning of 1941, Hitler had only 450,000 soldiers in Romania, and the Soviet troops destined to attack Romania outnumbered the German group by almost three times in terms of the number of troops and almost four times in terms of the number of aircraft. - and this is not counting two more Soviet armies that were preparing to be transferred from the North Caucasus (*Ibid., p. 414*).

As for the tanks, Hitler did not have them in Romania at all even by June 22, 1941. All Hitler's tanks were assembled into four tank groups: the first - General Kleist, the second - General Gu

Derian, the third - General Goth and the fourth - General Goepner, and the southernmost of them - the first - was concentrated in the Lublin region, and the rest of the Wehrmacht had no tanks at all (Suvorov V. *Suicide. M.*, 2000. S. 304). The USSR, on the other hand, had 3725 tanks in the Romanian direction (13 vehicles more than the entire Wehrmacht in the East at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa), which were opposed by 60 Romanian FT-17 tanks. For those who don't know: FT-17 are French tanks made by

1917, with one machine gun and 16 mm armor (V. *Suvorov, The Last Republic*, pp. 321, 347).

Moreover, if (let us agree for a moment with this point of view) Stalin was confused by the lightning defeat of France, it was necessary to occupy the Ploiesti oil basin as quickly as possible before Hitler transferred the Wehrmacht to the east. Moreover, just in the last days of June 1940, when Hitler was smashing France, Stalin set his troops on a "frantic pace" of advancing to the west: from 15 to

June 21 - "proletarian revolutions in the Baltic states, and already on June 26 the USSR presented an ultimatum to Romania demanding to give up not only Bessarabia (which was provided for by the secret articles of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), but also Bukovina, which had never belonged to Russia before; it was the latter, by the way, that frightened Hitler the most (*Bunich I. Storm*, pp. 106-110).

But this is not all: it was in the summer of 1940 that the USSR seriously revised its plans for a "liberation" march to Europe: the direction of the main attack was shifted from the west (Poland and Germany) to the Balkans (*Ibid.*, pp. 134-135). Somehow it doesn't look like the behavior of a frightened person!

Yes, and the same authors admit that Stalin was not so frightened by the defeat of France. On the contrary, he very quickly realized that now the situation had become even more favorable for him: for a complete

wars in Europe, it is enough to defeat only the *Vermacht* (except for the armies of several small countries, it is true) (*Ibid.*, p. 103).

Moreover, if before October 1940 Hitler had no troops in Romania at all, then in the summer of 1940 and in general in the East there were 10 infantry divisions without a single tank (*Suvorov V. Den-MS 305*). Then, naturally, the question arises: why did Stalin give Hitler a whole year to gather troops?

But the fact is that Stalin was waiting for the next stage of the Nazi blitzkrieg - the beginning of Operation Sea Lion. Simply put, the landings of the Wehrmacht in England. Operation Thunderstorm was not supposed to start on July 6, 1941, but on the day D + Z, where D is the day the Germans landed in England. However, as of the beginning of June 1941, this expected date did not differ much from that given by V. Suvorov - the beginning of the operation "Sea Lion" was expected between July 4 and 10 (*Bunich I. Groza*, pp. 528, 552). Of course, Stalin did not just wait, but also pushed Hitler to land. For example, on 23 August 1940, the anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, *Pravda* published an editorial which stated, in part, that "this pact also gave Germany a huge advantage, since it could be completely I am sure of calm on my eastern borders. Everything is clear: land, Comrade Hitler, in England and do not be afraid of anything.

But Hitler was afraid. And he made every effort to ensure that Stalin was confident that no plan "Barbarossa" was being developed, or at least its implementation was not envisaged before the landing operation against England was carried out, and the concentration of German troops near the borders of the USSR - just a measure to disinform the British (and to reorganize troops in areas inaccessible to British aircraft). And this was true not only of Poland. Pe

transfer of German troops to Finland from September

The year 1940 was presented as a stop on their way further, to Norway, also against the British (Ibid., pp. 157-158). And the German troops in Romania - also to counter the English plans in the Balkans (Ibid. p. 188) and even to be transferred to Palestine and Syria - also, of course, against the British (Vishlev O.V. "Maybe *the* question it will still be settled peacefully" // World War II. Actual Problems. M., 1995. P. 45). This is exactly what Hitler wrote about in his personal letter to Stalin dated December 31

1940: they say that from about March, troops from Poland will begin to be transferred to the west, and partly to Romania and Bulgaria, in order to force the British out of Greece. At the same time, Hitler added that some of the rumors about the upcoming German attack on the USSR were spread by the Germans themselves in order to disorient England (*Bunich* I. Groza, pp. 356-358).

Approximately the same thing was said in March 1941 to the Soviet Ambassador V. Dekanozov by the chief of foreign intelligence of the SS-SD V. Schellenberg (Ibid., p. 445).

Hitler, in a new personal letter to Stalin dated May 15, 1941, no longer mentioned March (like Schellenberg), but promised to begin the transfer of troops from the Soviet borders to t

1941 (*Simonov K.M.* Through the eyes of a man of my generation. P. 350-351). Therefore, Stalin was not surprised either by the departure of German ships from Soviet ports in mid-June 1941, or by the recall to Germany of sailors from the German naval attache.

embassies (*Bunich* I. Groza. S. 539, 552).

Actually, already on July 13, 1940, a secret meeting of the top leaders of the Third City Reich and its army and intelligence (but not the fleet!), took place, at which it was decided to divert Stalin's attention with imaginary preparations for a landing in Britain, while continuing to prepare an invasion in the USSR (Ibid., pp. 119-120). But one German "misinformation", perhaps, would not be enough to convince

Stalin. Especially risky was the autumn of 1940, when (September 19) Hitler gave the official order to postpone Operation Sea Lion until the spring of 1941. landings in England? In the east, Germany had only 25 divisions by the end of September, including three armored and motorized, one cavalry, and the rest were infantry (Ibid., pp. 158-161).

However, Hitler was not alone. Churchill and, in fact, Roosevelt, who had already become his ally at that time, made efforts in the same direction. Anglo-American cooperation at the level of intelligence began already in July 1940, when W. Donovan, then still a private individual, and later the head of the Office of Strategic Intelligence, visited London (*Malkov B. Allied Intelligence during the War // Second World War. Actual problems*, p. 184). And this is understandable: if before the defeat of France, the West was interested only in the very fact of the war between the two

contenders for world domination, then after the summer

In 1940, it was in the interests of the United States and Britain that Hitler start the war. Then (taking into account the fact that the Stalinist armies are gathered at the very border) Hitler will quickly defeat them, then go far into the depths of Russia. these, where it gets stuck.

For two or three years, the forces of Hitler and Stalin will be bound by war, and during this time much can be done to implement the American geopolitical doctrine. Both Roosevelt and Churchill did everything in their power to ensure that the war proceeded exactly according to this scenario. A grandiose campaign was launched to disinform the Kremlin. Despite the war, the Allied special services actually acted in the same vein as the German ones. In August 1940, German intelligence in Britain obtained information from I.M. Maysky circles that "Stalin

will not start hostilities against Germany until the landing of the Wehrmacht in England " (Bunich *I. Groza*, p. 140). Was it not a disinterested help from the side of the British special services?

Among other things, the campaign of disinformation included the dissemination of information (already from the same August 1940) about the supposedly hopeless situation of Britain, which was waiting for a German invasion like a boa rabbit, about panic, about the demoralization of the population by German bombing, about fatigue (and the army, the readiness of the royal family, the government, the most important politicians and businessmen to flee to Canada, and even (December 1940) about "preparation for a guerrilla war in the mountains of Scotland", about a common spirit without reliability, hovering over the British Isles. It was written about the inability of the British fleet to protect sea lanes and about many other things. It was also written about the allegedly inevitable German invasion in the summer of 1941 (*Ibid.*, pp. 138,175, 319). And Stalin could not have been unaware of all this... Churchill's letter to Roosevelt, written sometime in late November or early December 1940 and written in approximately the same spirit, hit Stalin's desk before it reached the addressee (There same, pp. 249-250). Well, the American newspapers also wrote articles about the supposedly hopeless situation of Britain from time to time (*Ibid.*, pp. 523-524).

It is interesting that Churchill himself received accurate information from the Americans that the Germans were not going to seriously land in Britain, and all their measures in this direction were just steps to disinform the USSR, only in October 1940 (*Ibid.* C .173).

However, the matter was not limited to disinformation. Winter 1940-1941 the British almost completely defeated the Italian armies in Libya; German help (Rommel's armies) is clearly late

shaft. However, at the last moment (February 1941), Churchill gave the order to stop the offensive, go on the defensive, and transfer all the liberated troops to Greece. This allowed the Germans to pull up their armies to Libya and go on the offensive on March 31, 1941 (Ibid., pp. 398-399)

But even in Greece, the British behaved somehow strangely: they handed over the island of Crete to the Germans, although, having an overwhelming advantage at sea, they could well have defended it. But the English fleet simply went to Egypt. The retreat of the British from Greece, by the way, came as a surprise to Stalin as well (Ibid., pp. 461-463, 513).

Why did the British not involve Hitler in protracted battles in the Balkans and create problems for him in North Africa? Is it not to distract him from Russia? Some historians consider Churchill's mistake to stop the offensive in Africa. If the British had extended their offensive for another three months, systematically pushing the Italians to Tripoli, and Hitler, stuck in the Soviet Union, would not have been able to start his Italian campaign, and the allies would not have to fight for another two years to finally establish themselves in all of North Africa. In this bold hypothesis, only one question hangs in the air: would there have been an attack by Hitler on the USSR if the Italian empire in Africa had collapsed not at the beginning of 1943, but at the beginning of 1941 (Ibid., p. 398- 399) or if the Germans were, say, stuck in Greece or Crete for a long time. The new US Ambassador to Britain, J. Wynant, who was appointed at the beginning of March 1941, advised Churchill precisely this - to stop "mouse fussing in the Balkans, to engage in the implementation of truly global plans, that is, not to distract Hitler from the invasion of the USSR (Ibid., p. 424).

Leaving Crete practically without a fight, the British also pursued another goal - to make it clear to Stalin that

the landing in Britain he is waiting for is technically quite feasible: if the Germans captured Crete, which is separated from the European mainland by at least twice as much water as Britain, and where there is almost no fog for which the English Channel is famous, capable of hiding the crossing troops from the enemy fleet, then they will even be able to capture Britain! So come on, Stalin, don't listen to those who argue that this is impossible, wait and get ready! This is exactly how Stalin understood everything (Ibid., p. 522).

Interestingly, on June 13, 1941. in Germany, a copy of the *Völkischer Beobachter* was confiscated with the article "Crete as an example", which stated that the landing on Crete was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England. Rumors spread throughout Berlin that the article allegedly aroused Hitler's terrible wrath as revealing to the enemies the secret plans of the German command. In fact, this was also disinformation (O. V. Vitlee, "Maybe the issue will be settled peacefully." P. 49).

Finally, the records of secret interrogations of Rudolf Hess, who had flown to Britain on May 10, 1941, fell into Stalin's hands (through Kim Philby, which will be discussed in more detail later). intended for his ears, he had every reason to believe what Hess was saying. And Hess suggested that England surrender before it was too late, otherwise it would be defeated in the summer of 1941. Hess called "freedom of hands for Germany in Europe" one of the peace conditions, while making it clear that he did not include the USSR in Europe (Ibid. pp. 489-491).

For Roosevelt, however, the most important task was different: how to get America into the war at all. As you know, Stalin made strategic decisions at his nearby dacha. Roosevelt made decisions that determined the further course of the Second World War.

war, during a sea cruise on the cruiser "Tuscaloosa" in the Caribbean in the first half of December 1940 (formally, he went to rest and fish). Here are the main ones.

1. Continue disinforming Stalin about the operation "Sea Lion" that Hitler is preparing for the summer of 1941, so that the invasion of Stalin's armies into Europe does not take place before it starts (that is, never takes place!) and that Hitler strikes the first blow.

2. Consider how to pass through Congress a law on lend-lease, that is, on the provision of temporary use of American equipment and weapons to all countries that are at war with the Axis powers.

3. The hardest part is getting your country to join into the war. Although, as already mentioned, American public opinion was gradually leaning towards war, this process was much slower than required. And in December 1940, Roosevelt gave the order: for the winter of 1940-1941. (and then the next) The US Pacific Fleet does not return to San Francisco, but remains in Pearl Harbor (Ibid., pp. 263-266). Purpose: to irritate Japan, so that the Japanese samurai could not stand the nerves, he drew his sword and was killed with an arrow at point-blank range (Ibid., p. 389).

It was not possible to immediately kill the Japanese samurai with a point-blank shot, he managed to wave his sword pretty well, but Roosevelt's long-term calculation was fully justified.

One way or another, on June 22, 1941, the first part of the Second World War, which followed the scenario of Stalin, ended. Part two began - according to the scenario of Roosevelt and Churchill. Roosevelt managed to deploy the "ice stake" against its creator. If earlier Hitler "crushed Western democracies from Norway to Libya, clearing the way for world communism" (Suvo Icebreaker. 2002, p. 11), now he rushed to destroy the Soviet Union, clearing the way for the American-British democracies.

WHO AND WHY WARNED STALIN

Viktor Suvorov partially refuted the point of view that Churchill twice warned Stalin about the impending German attack (Icebreaker 2002, pp. 295-300, etc.), but only partially. Yes, there were no warnings from Churchill either in June 1940 or April 1941, but there were many others coming from various sources connected with the American and British ruling circles. The question is: why are they, these warnings, if both London and Washington were interested in the suddenness of Hitler's attack on the USSR?

Paradoxically, this was done as part of yet another campaign unleashed by Roosevelt and Churchill. You can't hide an awl in a bag, and both leaders of the Anglo-Saxon powers understood that Soviet intelligence was very powerful! - sooner or later learns about the German plans. And in fact, already on November 18, 1940, that is, a month before Hitler approved the Barbarossa plan, the first encryption of Richard Sorge came from Tokyo about the impending German attack on the USSR (Bunich I. Groza . S. 219-220). And for Roosevelt and Churchill, the question arose: how to make sure that Stalin did not believe this (and other) reports?

As is known, Stalin's tactics in most cases were ingeniously simple. Victor Suvorov writes: Stalin never, by and large, concealed his plans, he spoke about them directly, so no one believed them. In fact, you can't blurt out your plans like that ... Approximately the same way later, after the war, I.A. explained Stalin's frank behavior. Ilyin (in "Our Tasks"): who, they say, will believe a robber who announces in advance what time he will come to rob and which door he will climb into! Iron logic! So the aggressive plans of the USSR are not

no one believed, since the Soviet leaders openly said (at least until the mid-1930s, when the USSR began the struggle for "collective security" and, accordingly, to improve the image, such conversations stopped): "Let the imperialists quarrel among themselves, and then we will destroy them all!"

Now Roosevelt went the same way: he and Churchill directly and openly warned Stalin about the impending German attack on the USSR, but, since in 1940-1941. The United States and Britain were the most interested countries in the world for this to happen, it is natural that Stalin did not believe them. Who will warn about an event in which he is interested, so that it will take you by surprise ... The logic is ironclad again! At the same time, similar reports were discredited from other sources, not connected with the Anglo-Americans. And it is difficult to condemn Stalin for not believing these sincere warnings either.

Thus, Stalin's numerous warnings about Hitler's impending attack on him organically fit into the disinformation campaign. The first such "warning" came in early December 1940 from Kim Philby; it said that the MI5 stations on the European continent, as well as the British embassies in Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria, as well as in many countries of South America and Asia, were instructed to exaggerate the rumor in every possible way about the upcoming war between The USSR and Germany, and, depending on the sympathies of the local population and the press, the attacking side in the coming conflict could represent both Germany and the USSR (*Bunich I. Groza*, pp. 250-251).

Meanwhile, Kim Philby was in fact a double agent, extradited to the British in 1940 by Walter Krivitsky, who has been supplying the USSR ever since.

disinformation pleasing to the allies (Ibid., p. 489).

And yet Philby's direct warnings should not have had the desired effect: in Moscow, they did not know that Philby had been exposed by British counterintelligence! Therefore, other measures were taken. A little later, the same Philby directly reported the information thrown to him about a conspiracy drawn up in the "ruling circles" of Britain in order to set the USSR and Germany against each other (Ibid., pp. 312-313).

There were also direct warnings from sources connected with Anglo-American intelligence. Thus, at the end of December 1940, a group of German defectors connected with British intelligence, led by Rudolf Rossler, warned the Soviet intelligence group headed by the famous Sandor Rado about the impending German attack (Ibid., p. 363). On March 17, 1941, the USSR was warned by the Americans through the Soviet ambassador Umansky (*Nekrich* A. M. S. 167-161). Employees of the American embassy in Berlin also hinted about this to the employees of the Soviet embassy (*Bunich I. Storm*. S. 439).

Naturally, everything was done so that Stalin perceived such warnings as provocations (which was what the Western allies were counting on). And it is difficult to blame him for this, especially considering the newspaper writings inspired by Churchill himself and the rumors about Britain's supposedly hopeless situation: it was the USA and Britain that were interested in 1940-1941. in the German-Soviet conflict; taking into account the fact that both personal letters from Churchill were sent to Stalin at the most difficult moments for Britain - at the end of June 1940, immediately after the defeat of France, and in April 1941, on the eve of the defeat of Greece. What reason did Steel have for believing their warnings? After several months of some doubts, March 20, 1941 on

At a conference at Stalin's with the participation of the military and intelligence officers, it was finally decided to consider all warnings about the war as Anglo-American disinformation - "consider them as fakes ..." (Ibid., p. 447).

But the allies continued to work. Throughout April, the British Ambassador Cripps tried to obtain an appointment with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov; Stalin did not accept it and forbade Molotov to accept it as well - let Vyshinsky deal with them (Ibid., p. 463).

But on June 19, just before the war, a certain American journalist told an employee of her embassy (and somehow suspiciously quickly Stalin found out about this) that she was met by the second secretary of the German embassy and said that he was mistaken about the timing of the German attack on USSR - it will take place, they say, not on June 17, but on June 21. "Everyone is already tired of warning the Russians," the American added. Stalin, when he was informed, said irritably: "Let them warn their English friends better than they should, so that they better prepare for a fight for their islands" (Ibid., pp. 548-549). Well, in time, the American fussed, there is nothing to say: just now,

June 15, Sorge reported to Moscow that the Germans would attack June 22 (before that, for example, on April 11, he informed that Hitler would not attack before the end of the war in the West) (Icebreaker. S. 310-311).

And a little earlier, on June 10, the Soviet Ambassador Maisky was received and warned by the British Deputy Foreign Minister (*Bunich. I. Groza*, p. 526). Victor Suvorov considers this appeal by Cripps a sincere request for help, since, in his opinion, Britain was on the verge of defeat. However, Suvorov refutes himself a little further: on May 27, 1941, the British sank the best German battleship Bismarck, and from that moment on, the conquest of complete dominance by Britain at sea became a matter of time.

neither. And indeed, if on the whole in the first half of 1941 the Germans sank four British cargo ships daily, then in June 1941 only two (The Last Republic, pp. 166, 461).

Ten years later, in a new book, Suvorov refutes talk of imminent British defeat much more forcefully. He quotes the British press in the spring of 1941, talking about the leitmotif of the newspaper articles of that time - "we stand, and let Hitler not swagger and nostrils do not flare!" - and believes that this is not bragging. He quotes contemporaries of those events: Hitler's position is "bleak and hopeless" (I take my words back.

tighter...

pp. 131-132).

Taking into account these factors, and equally if we assume that the British knew that the USSR would not start a war before the landing of the Wehrmacht in Britain, and the Germans in Britain were not going to land, then this whole story with Cripps' appeal to Stalin, Molotov and Vyshinsky becomes somewhat different from tenok.

How could the British know this? More on that in a chapter.

Chapter XI

ABOUT STUPID GERMAN INTELLIGENCE

What is it - stupidity or treason?

(P. N. Milyukov, 1916)

There is a very widespread opinion that the Barbarossa plan failed. It is not clear what the supporters of this point of view rely on. Recall that the original version of the Barbarossa plan provided for the lightning-fast defeat of the Soviet armies concentrated near the western border of the USSR. The Germans succeeded brilliantly, after which F. Halder had good reasons to

to publish his famous note of July 3, 1941, that the campaign against Russia had already been "won in 14 days." True, it is not clear where he got this term from - after all, July 3 was only the twelfth day of the war. Or, perhaps, Halder brilliantly foresaw that the Russians would be able to turn the course of the war in their favor for another two days, and only then - to no avail?

But we will not find fault with such typos. The main thing is true - the German command believed that with the defeat of the Soviet armies of the First Strategic Echelon, the war had already been won. That is why, and not at all because of the stupidity of the German planners, as V. Suvorov believes (*The Last Republic*, pp. 138-139), it was supposed to move deep into Russia in three divergent directions: if the enemy is already defeated, why follow the rules operating when there are still large enemy forces in front of your front? By the way, not the least reason why the Soviet leadership did not believe in the authenticity of the Barbarossa plan was precisely these three divergent directions along which it was supposed to attack (*Bunich I. Groza*, p. 411). The fact that German intelligence did not know about other (except the First Echelon) Soviet troops, ours, obviously, did not believe.

It was not possible to defeat the USSR because, in addition to the troops concentrated near the border, the USSR had two more strategic echelons. The meeting with the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon was a complete surprise for the German command (*Suvorov V. Ledokol*. 2002, pp. 239-240, etc.); and after all, it was they—these troops—that after July 10 slowed down the victorious march of the Wehrmacht across Russia. But these claims are no longer against the generals who made the plan "Barbarossa", but to intelligence, which did not notice any troops from the USSR, except for the First Echelon. Let's talk about exploration.

How much is written by the same V. Suvorov about the stupidity of German intelligence before June 22, 1941 - as they say, neither in a fairy tale can be said nor described with a pen. The last work ("Suicide") is literally stuffed with facts that speak of the Abwehr's amazing, anecdotal ignorance of the Soviet Union. And according to German intelligence, there are very few paratroopers in the USSR (entry in the diary of F. Halder dated February 22, 1941, cited from: P. 236) - and there were at least a million of them, at that time - in 200 times more than the rest of the world combined (Icebreaker. S. 112-113), and his artillery is "outdated" and "according to the experience of fighting in Finland, unsuitable for conducting effective fire to kill" (record in the diary of F. Halder dated February 2, 1941, quoted from: Suicide, p. 232) - in fact, it was the newest, produced in 1938-1941 (Den-M. S. 143), and in Finland it showed themselves, like the entire Red Army as a whole, not from the worst side (The Last Republic. S. 198-231), and the Urals are connected to Moscow with just one single-track railway (this is the head of the Abwehr V. Canaris told V Schellenberg, cited in: Suicide, p. 216), and the Urals is "the last industrial region" (in the sense that there is no industry further east) (as it is written in the "Barbarossa" plan, cited in: There. P. 207) - although the USSR did not hide the presence of huge production capacities in Siberia, beyond the Urals. Well, and so on.

In The Purification, V. Suvorov adds a few more fragments illustrating the amazing ignorance of the leadership of the Third Reich regarding the USSR - this time from the diaries of Dr. Goebbels in 1940-1941. - for example, a note dated April 29, 1941 about "the incredible amateurishness shown by the Russians in Finland", dated May 4 that "the Russians are trying to influence us with the help of fantastic digital data about themselves" and that

This is why they are "poor creatures who have lost their minds!" (quoted from: pp. 298-304). German intelligence showed such nonsense in World War II, sums up V. Suvorov, which is worthy of a multi-volume description in the spirit of *The Adventures of the Good Soldier Schweik*. She knew nothing at all about the Soviet Union" (Ibid., p. 261). As for the destruction of military personnel in the USSR, the Germans were sure that the USSR would need at least four years to prepare for war, and even at least 20 years "to reach its former height" (until 1937 - D.V.) (*Nekrich A. M. S. 66*). It is widely known that Hitler did not know at all about the presence in the USSR of the latest T-34 and KV tanks (Ibid., pp. 85-86).

However, even if we imagine that the Abwehr gathered idiots from all over Germany according to the principle "the dumber the better", and make an adjustment for labor Since the recruitment of agents in the USSR is quite understandable for reasons that are quite understandable, even then it is not clear how the Germans managed not to see the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, which Stalin showed to the whole world, for example, at the parade on May 1, 1941, did not include them in leaflets published at the beginning of June 1941 for German soldiers with the designation of the silhouettes of Soviet military equipment and learned about their existence, only faced with them on the battlefield (Suicide. S. 220-230); moreover, at this last Soviet military parade before the war on May 1, 1941, only T-34 and KV tanks were presented - no more (*Bunich I. Groza, p. 462*).

This is all the more strange because after June 22, 1941, German intelligence began, as if by magic, to give absolutely accurate and correct information about the forces at Stalin's disposal. But Hitler no longer believed this information.

It is completely inexplicable that even before June 22 quite reliable data about the strength of the Red Army were received, but they were not reported to anyone, as, for example, a radiogram dated March 11, 1941, sent

naya Canaris from the intelligence of the headquarters of Army Group Center in Poznan, which spoke of the presence of the USSR 250 divisions, 17,000 tanks, 15,000 aircraft, 40,000 guns. As it turned out later, this information was somewhat underestimated, but instead of them, completely ridiculous information was reported: for example, in August 1940 - that the USSR had only 183 rifle and cavalry divisions and 38 motorized brigades, in November of the same year - that the USSR has 125 divisions and 50 motorized brigades, while the entire USSR can field 209 divisions (Ibid., p. 464) and 96 motorized brigades; at the same time, "the decisive superiority of the Germans, especially in artillery and aviation" was emphasized (Ibid., pp. 303-306); who actually had superiority in tanks, artillery, and aircraft can be found in the table I provide at the beginning of the eighth chapter.

However, Hitler did not believe in the deliberately underestimated data that were reported to him. Thus, German intelligence reported that the USSR had 5,000 combat aircraft. Hitler did not believe this: too much. I did not believe it, but, as Halder recalls, he was embarrassed by such a figure. He kept asking if the scouts had made a mistake (*Suvorov V. Suicide*, p. 235). In general, Schellenberg testifies that if the material collected by the intelligence services did not fit into the concept of military planning agencies (read, obviously: if he represented reality not as it seemed to Hitler), then he was simply ignored (Nekrich A. M. S. 87).

In fact, the USSR had on June 22, 1941. 255 rifle, motorized rifle and motorized divisions (and 60 more under formation), 61 tank divisions (with at least 50 more under formation), and 79 air divisions (and it is still unknown how many are under formation; it is known for certain that

near Smolensk, the 81st aviation division was formed by the beginning of the war, but hardly, except for the 79 already existing, only two were formed) (*Suvorov V. Den-MS 247*). How many concrete soldiers, tanks, guns and aircraft were in these divisions, we will see a little further from the same table. During June 22-28, another 96 divisions were formed (*Ibid.*, p. 156), and only in the summer of 1941 - 324 divisions (*Bunich, I. Groza, p. 306*).

The state of affairs, however, immediately becomes clear if we remember: the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, was associated with British and American intelligence. Having gone to the service of Hitler as a person capable of pulling Germany out of the "Weimar quagmire" and reviving it as a great power, Canaris soon became disillusioned with Hitler even more than in the Weimar Republic, and embarked on the path of a direct state treason.

By the way, Stalin and the Soviet leadership in general did not believe the reports about the Barbarossa plan, also because such details that were reported by Soviet agents (and she learned all this from high-ranking Western spies at the very top of the German leadership) could not be found out by anyone. one scout. Hence the conclusion was drawn: the source of such messages is a completely obvious provocateur (*Ibid.*, p. 364). Moscow did not believe that enemy agents could penetrate such hiding places of the German General Staff.

So, by the end of 1939, the Abwehr was working for the Western allies - the latter, in particular, were issued plans for Hitler's Norwegian operation, and then plans for an offensive in the West (*Ibid.*, pp. 274-277). True, then it did not help the allies, but this is the subject of a separate discussion. The fact is that in 1939-1940. Britain and France fought against Hitler, where "classical capitalism" was still living out its days, unable due to the fact that

he has outlived his own, to provide an effective rebuff to the enemy.

In the second half of 1940, however, the situation changed. America entered the game, which, unlike the countries of Western Europe, who lived out their lives under "classical capitalism", as already mentioned, carried out a "post-capitalist revolution Roosevelt's conception" and began building what would later be called the "social market economy." The new system means new strength, new dynamism, confidence and assertiveness. Roosevelt began energetically correcting the mistakes made by his Western European allies, and, first of all, he began to search for such a scenario for the further course of the war, which should lead to the defeat of both Hitler and, in the long term, Stalin.

What scenario of the course of the war suited the United States and Britain, we have just discussed. It suited Canaris as well, who believed that Hitler must be defeated, not by Stalin, but by the Western allies (Ibid., p. 299). Meanwhile, Canaris reasonably feared that, having learned the truth about the strength of Stalin's army, Hitler would be afraid to attack him, hesitate, but try, for example, to start negotiations with Stalin in order to delay the start of the war, and he himself would fall under Stalin's blow, which was inevitable. will lead to the Soviet occupation of all of Europe (Ibid., pp. 286-290, 302). By the way, Hitler's numerous statements that he would not have attacked if he knew that the Russians had so many forces - for example, dated June 27 (*Yakovlev N.N.* Marshal Zhukov // Roman newspaper. 1986. No. 1.S. 16) and August 4 (*Suvorov V.* Suicide. S. 220, 231) 1941 - clearly confirm the justification of Kanris' fears.

So, with the blessing of his Anglo-American masters, he fed his Fuhrer with "misinformation" that the Soviet Union could be defeated by one

sudden preemptive strike. So Canaris "refused" to believe that Soviet heavy industry was at a high level,

in particular, he "refused" to share Schellenberg's convictions that the Soviet Union produced better types of tanks than the Germans (*Nekrich A.M.*

S. 87). So Halder wrote (also like the chief of the General Staff, who, of course, read Canaris's fake intelligence reports) in his diary that Soviet artillery was outdated, there were few paratroopers, and beyond the Urals the Soviets had no industry.

And after June 22, the need for disinformation disappeared, and the Abwehr began to report the truth to the top. The job has already been done! I don't know if German intelligence succeeded in decapitating the Red Army with the hands of Stalin, but my contribution to mutual blindness and, as a result, to mutual weakening in the bloody war of Stalin and Hitler, through the hands of Roos she contributed. And a lot.

However, even after that the truth was not always communicated to Hitler. The captive German Lieutenant Colonel G. Zoldan testifies, who in May 1945 was interrogated by the Smershevites of the 1st Guards Tank Army. The captured German cites another confession of Hitler from the series "if I knew that Russia is so well armed, it would be much more difficult for me to decide on this campaign", and then adds: "And yet the German military press, drawing information from well-informed American (emphasized by me. - *D.V.*) sources, continued to underestimate the strength of Russia" ("Krasnaya Zvezda". 1991. May 9, cited by: *Suvorov V.* Suicide. P. 231). What kind of "well-informed American sources" these are, I do not know, but in the context of everything that is written above, the confession looks very interesting.

It is likely that one of these "well informed American sources"

Dit "Red Star" dated June 19, 1993. We are talking about US military intelligence data on the Red Army: "The leadership consists of uneducated and even ignorant people... on the whole is characterized in the same way... The soldier is not resourceful and quick-witted enough..." and so on. (quoted from: *Suvorov V. The Last Republic*. S. 426). It is not clear for whom this "valuable information" was intended, but I would not be surprised if it was for the leadership of the Wehrmacht.

...

However, things can be much simpler. V. Suvorov devotes two chapters of "Suicide" to an explanation of what criteria in Nuremberg Stalin insisted (and insisted) on the death penalty for the leaders of the Third Reich: they hanged those (military and civilian) who did not give up their

words about the preventive nature of Hitler's oud
ra in the USSR. The rest of the generals and other leaders (those who were not tried at Nuremberg at all) were given to understand: there is enough compromising evidence on all of you to hang. If you write too much in your memoirs, we will give these materials a go. Write memoirs like this: the Russians are fools, they did not prepare for any attack on us and could not prepare (Samoo murder. S. 286-290, 293-297). So Schellenberg wrote that Canaris informed him that the Urals were connected to Moscow by only one single-track railway. Yes, and Halder, perhaps, corrected his diaries after the war. And our translators helped him (*Ibid.*, p. 200). However, there are hints of Halder's connections with Western intelligence services, for example, participation in the anti-Hitler conspiracy almost as early as 1939 (*Bunich I. Groza*, pp. 283-288).

Chapter XII

HOW ARE US?

...Agen criminal gang turned out to be in power
that of Beria's international imperialism.

*(From the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the cult of personality
I. V. Stalin" dated June 30, 1956)*

On June 26, 1953, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was arrested. According to some sources (at least that's what Khrushchev told foreign communists in 1961), he was killed right there on the spot; according to the official version, Beria was shot on December 23, 1953 on many charges, among which was the following: an English spy.

During the years of "perestroika", this accusation brought against a loyal Stalinist comrade-in-arms was recalled once again, laughed at and forgotten. And they laughed, it seems, in vain.

In fact, during these years (from 1938 to 1953) none other than Lavrenty Pavlovich was the supreme curator of Soviet intelligence. In 1940-1941. including.

So, already in the autumn of 1939, the Anglo-French allies somehow became aware of Stalin's plans regarding the outbreak of World War II - to push Germany against the West with their foreheads, wait for the mutual exhaustion of the warring parties and then, having entered the war last, defeat all. Stalin was forced (in Pravda of November 30, 1939) to "refute" this "lie, fabricated by cafe-chantant politicians from the French agency GAVAS" (cited in: Ledokol. 2002, pp. 51-52). Why this information did not help the Anglo-French, we discussed in the previous chapter, but how it got to the West is an interesting question.

We said above that from the autumn of 1938 to May 1940, Roosevelt tried several times to reconcile Hitler with his opponents, explaining these attempts by the fact that the US President unraveled Stalin's "icebreaking"

intent. And perhaps he reported it to the British and French leadership. In any case, it is difficult to explain otherwise the desire of England and France to help Finland in the winter of 1939-1940. Germany's fears are understandable: through Finland, the USSR could get very close to the only noteworthy source of iron ore for Germany - in northern Sweden. Timber was also delivered to Germany mainly from Sweden and Finland. And if there is no forest, there is no coal and no sleepers for railroads. Germany needed to supply 6 million tons of wood annually. Nickel Germany also received from Finland, it was mined in Petsamo (now Pechenga in the Murmansk region, until 1944 belonged to Finland) - at the very Soviet border. In short, when Finland was captured by Stalin, Germany could end up in Stalin's hands simply because the USSR could at any moment deprive it of vital sources of iron, nickel and timber (Suvorov V. Shadow of Victory, pp. 50-51) .

Naturally, the prospect of Germany falling under Stalin's rule did not delight the rulers of Britain and France. Therefore, they hastened to support Finland. Stalin, who at that moment did not need to get involved in a conflict with the West, gave in, confining himself to seizing the Karelian Isthmus. So, did Britain and France themselves think to do this? Or was Roosevelt, who guessed Stalin's plan, prompted them the course of action? But one way or another, did they themselves (Britain, USA) figure it out?

When Hitler invaded France in the summer of 1940, Stalin directly asked the then chief of the GRU, I. Proskurov, how real the landing of the Wehrmacht in Britain was. Proskurov also directly answered that it was impossible, if only because the British had an enormous superiority at sea. Proskurov was immediately removed from his post, transferred to

the post of commander of strategic aviation - which was actually a demotion, since Stalin did not attach much importance to strategic aviation in the upcoming aggressive war (Den-M.S. 38), - a few months later (in April 1941) he was arrested, six months later he beaten and tortured in Beria's dungeons, and in October 1941 they were shot.

It is clear that immediately after Hitler's lightning-fast defeat of France, Stalin had reason not to believe Proskurov's calculations and to tell him: "Quite recently, Comrade Proskurov, you assured us with your figures and data that the German offensive in the West would lead to a protracted and bloody war. Now you are assuring us in the same way, trying to assure us that a landing in England is impossible. Thus, you are misleading the Politburo of the Central Committee." But the following year showed (to a large extent even before June 22, 1941) that Proskurov was right. Why did Stalin continue to pursue him until he finally shot him?

The very first report of the new head of the GRU F.I. Golikov argued that the Wehrmacht's invasion of Britain was not only possible, but could take place in any battle the next day (although only the mobilization of vehicles to cross the English Channel, if Hitler had them, would have taken at least three months, which, given the weather conditions on the English Channel, automatically postponed the landing of Wehrmacht for a period not earlier than summer 1941) (*Bunich I. Groza. S. 124-125*).

On August 12, 1940, the famous air "Battle for England" began. In the first three days of air combat, the Luftwaffe lost 47 aircraft and the RAF 13. However, Stalin received a report based on German data that the Germans had lost 34 aircraft, and the British - 134. Naturally, with such a ratio of losses, Stalin and his entourage had every reason to believe that soon German

tsy will defeat British aviation (Ibid., p. 144), and there complete victory over Britain is not far off. And we ask: who and why presented Stalin with non-German data as an indisputable truth? Why didn't they compare it with British, American data, with press reports from neutral countries? Who needed all this?

Already in October, Soviet intelligence established that German troops were not being transferred through Finland to Norway, but were dissolving in the Finnish forests (Ibid., p. 170). Has anyone in the GRU really decided that here, too, Hitler was simply "regrouping troops away from British reconnaissance aircraft and bombers"?

On December 18, 1940, Hitler approved the Barba Rossa plan. After 11 days, the plan became known to Soviet intelligence, and then there were almost dozens of warnings about Hitler's impending fall. But Stalin stubbornly refused to believe them.

They say that Stalin (and Golikov) did not see Hitler's preparations for war, because there was no preparation - warm clothes and winter grades of fuel and lubricants for war were not stocked up in winter (Ledokol. 1992. P. 311-314; Suicide. S. 366-370), and in general there was little fuel ... (Purification. S. 320-324; Suicide. S. 306, 335, etc.). Let it be so, but the German troops were assembled and deployed in such a way that they were clearly intended for the offensive. And the GRU regularly received information about this. But don't believe it. More precisely, they simply did not perceive information of this nature. Moreover, the head of the GRU F.I. Golikov removed about a third of the German divisions from the reports of the Information Department of the GRU and reported to Stalin in this form: for example, at the end of December 1940, he reported on 72 German divisions on our border instead of 110 (Bunich I. Groza. S. 254 , 316). According to other sources, Golikov "cut off" 15 divisions in his report (*Nekrich A.M.* S. 157), although in 1964 in

Krychu said that by the end of 1940 he had no doubts that Germany was going to attack the USSR (Ibid., p. 69).

Why, in December 1941, some in the Soviet military leadership, even in April 1941, leaned towards the same figures. Even G.K. Zhukov in "Memoirs and Reflections" reports that on April 4, 1941, there were 72-73 German divisions on our borders (13th edition. M., 2002. Vol. 1. S. 239). By the beginning of May 1941, the Germans already had up to 170 divisions, and Golikov reported 120 (*Bunich I.*

Storm. pp. 502, 505).

But intelligence reported not just about the concentration of troops, they reported the numbers of divisions, the names of their commanders and all senior officers, as well as a number of personal data about many of them (Ibid. P. 313) - It was also reported that the Soviet camouflaged borders already existed (at the end of February 1941) for at least two front-line headquarters and at least two headquarters for tank groups (Ibid., p. 412).

Yes, it was clear to everyone that Germany was afraid of a war on two fronts, but the USSR was preparing an attack. It could have been assumed that Hitler had figured out Stalin's plan and was preparing a preemptive strike; one could understand that this was the only way for him to prolong his existence, and he still had nothing to lose! Didn't Stalin realize that he had driven Hitler into a dead end?! It has long been known that a cornered rat (or cat) can attack a person. And any living being, including a person, in a hopeless situation is capable of a reckless act. Why didn't they believe so stubbornly?!

Further, as early as the beginning of November 1940, Golikov assured Stalin that "the British hope that the United States would enter the war is unlikely" (Ibid., p. 177), and just a month later, at a meeting with the heads of the GRU departments, he stated that the United States "for the sake of saving the British Empire and the entire world capitalist system from c

th collapse ... will inevitably enter the war against Germany" (Ibid., p. 252). Has something radically changed in the world this month, or did Golikov suddenly see the light?

And here it is necessary to recall again that all Soviet intelligence was in one way or another led by L.P. Beria. So, maybe it's not so absurd to talk about the fact that he worked for British intelligence? A very pathological disbelief in the very possibility of an attack by Hitler contributed to the implementation of the Roosevelt-Churchillian war scenario!

And further. Above, I assumed that the British somehow could have known that the USSR would not invade Europe before the landing of the Wehrmacht in Britain. So, how could they know this?

However, even with our intelligence, everything could be much simpler. Just after the massacre of Proskurov, the GRU employees realized that Stalin was pleased to hear, and they were engaged in disinformation of the leader in order to save their own heads, "perhaps without being aware of their actions, but simply wanting to survive, they began to adjust intelligence ... to fit Stalinist scheme" (Ibid., p. 252). Objecting to one of his subordinates, who argued that Hitler was preparing an attack on the USSR, Golikov, setting out his point of view, directly adds: "The Boss also thinks so" (i.e., Stalin) (Ibid., p. 315). That's all! So, it cannot be otherwise!

Here, at the end of October 1940, the new head of the GRU F.I. Golikov makes a report to Stalin. The essence of the report is yes: the landing of the Germans in Britain is inevitable, but it will only take place in the spring. The fact that until recently he spoke about the possibility of a German landing in Britain "at any moment", Golikov, of course, no longer recalls (Ibid., pp. 176-177). But it is interesting that Stalin does not remember either. Why? Perhaps the answer is simple: we are all human beings, we are all human beings, all of us, even the great leaders, "what you want, you believe

the landing of the Germans in Britain cannot fail to take place ... Perhaps, in order to please this Stalinist conviction, the number of German divisions on the Soviet border was cut off in Golikov's reports?

The head of the information department of the GRU, Colonel Novobranets, who stubbornly insisted on the possibility of an attack by Hitler, was saved from the fate of Proskurov only by the fact that at the beginning of June 1941 he went on vacation (more precisely, he was forced to leave and go to a special rest home, where he was sent those scouts whose future fate has not yet been decided. Sometimes they returned from there, but more often they disappeared without a trace). The recruit was lucky, they forgot about him, and he was "out of breath" before the start of the war. Well, after June 22, he was no longer repressed (Ibid., pp. 508-510).

Hitler, by the way, when preparing the plan "Barbarossa" (and not only) preferred to listen to the reassuring data of Canaris, which underestimated the strength of the enemy, and not the "cowardly" calculations of A. Jodl, who tried to challenge these data. All the generals who spoke about this were either accused of superficial data analysis or simply declared alarmists (Ibid., pp. 288, 302). Such is the nature of any totalitarian regime: deceiving its subjects, sooner or later it begins to engage in self-deception. Management is told not what is, but what they would like to hear...

Even such military leaders as G.K. Zhukov, in such a situation, they were forced to engage in eyewash. We have already spoken about 72-73 German divisions on our border at the beginning of April 1941, which lie was also confirmed by Zhukov, but further we will see more examples of forced eyewash.

on the part of this, on the whole, certainly an outstanding commander. So it was in the Stalinist USSR, and in Nazi Germany, although in the Stalinist USSR, let's be fair, it was much less.

Chapter XIII

COULD IT BE OTHERWISE?

Tukhachevsky predicted uprisings in the bourgeois rear, but for some reason they flared up in the rear of the proletarian state.

(V. Suvorov, "Purification")

The balance of forces of the parties by June 22, 1941

	Germany and her allies	USSR
living force	3 300 000 1	5 500 000 2
Tanks	3712	23 1064
Guns and mortars	3 47	148 000
Aircraft	200	28 000 5
Warships	4950 301	350

1. Including 2,850,000 Germans; according to other sources - 4,500,000.

2. According to other sources - 8,000,000; after the announcement of "Day-M" it was planned (and was carried out) within a week to call on another 5,300,000 people.

3. Including 3360 German.

4. Another 60 tank divisions were formed with 22,000 tanks.

5. Soviet industry could produce any aircraft in any quantity; after the announcement of "Day-M" it was planned to produce 100,000-150,000 Su-2 attack aircraft alone ("Ivanov").

So, by the summer of 1941, everything was ready for the "liberation" campaign in Europe. According to V. Suvorov, the "liberation" campaign was thwarted by Hitler's preventive strike at the last moment. And we ask ourselves the question: could it be otherwise? After all, it could not have been Hitler ahead of Stalin by a couple of weeks, but vice versa! In search of an answer, let us turn to some figures and facts. Let's start with a table characterizing the balance of forces of the parties on June 22, 1941 (compiled by me according to the "Thunderstorm" by I. Bunich, the works of V. Suvorov, as well as the following works: Conquest R. The Great

Florence, 1978; *Hoffman I.* Preparation of the Soviet Union for an offensive war. 1941 // Domestic History. 1993. No. 4).

In addition to the overwhelming quantitative, the Red Army also had a huge qualitative superiority. Some facts are simply amazing - for example, on June 23, 1941, near the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai, one KV tank held back the 4th German tank group of Colonel General Hoepner (i.e., a quarter of all German armored forces) for a day. Yes, and there are enough other facts - for example, our troops found one lined KV, and around - ten destroyed German tanks; KV met with a group of German tanks, received more than 70 rows of shells, but not one of them penetrated his armor; KV destroyed eight German tanks, he himself received more than 30 shells, but remained unharmed (cited in: *Suvorov V.* The Last Republic. S. 356-358). Or here's another: one KV tank resisted for several days 50 German tanks, supported by infantry, artillery, etc. (*Yakovlev N.N.* Marshal Zhukov. P. 15).

In the first days of the war, Soviet tank armadas counterattacked the troops of the 1st Panzer Group Kleist in Ukraine. It was there (and not near Prokhorovka two years later) that the largest tank battle of World War II unfolded. 5,000 Soviet tanks (that is, more than Hitler had) dealt such blows to the enemy that already on June 26, F. Halder writes in his diary about this battle: "Let's trust in God." The German prisoners taken in this battle looked depressed and were close to panic; again, our commanders will observe a similar psychological state of the Germans very, very not soon - only after Stalingrad and Kursk (*Yakovlev N.N.* Marshal Zhukov. P. 25).

And this was not only in the tank troops. Here entries from the diary of F. Halder. August 1: "To the reserve

ve of the High Command of divisions - 0 "(this is on the 41st day of the war!). August 7: "With the current situation with fuel, it is impossible to carry out large-scale operations" (this is in a month and a half. But how could they not prepare for a howl - I want to exclaim after V. Suvorov). August 16: "Ammunition consumption. Since August 1, the amount of ammunition provided for by the entire Barbarossa plan has been delivered (quoted from: *Suvorov V. Cleansing*, p. 324). And so on - only V. Suvorov cites similar quotations from Halder's diary (and not only from him) in batches.

Further more. An entry from the same Halder's diary dated August 10: "The exhausted German infantry will not be able to oppose decisive offensive actions to these enemy attempts." August 11: "What we are now undertaking is the last and at the same time dubious attempt to prevent the transition to trench warfare. The command has extremely limited means ... Our last forces are thrown into the battle. August 22: "... In the afternoon, our disputes and discussions were interrupted by a telephone conversation with Field Marshal von Bock (commander-in-chief of Army Group Center), who again emphasized that his troops were at the line that they had reached in counting on an attack on Moscow, they will not be able to defend themselves for a long time. It's not about coming. Not about blitzkrieg. Not up to fat, as if captured to keep (Suicide. S. 342-343).

The question arises: how, with all this, did the Germans manage to advance so far into the depths of Russia? How could they, having already been stopped by the end of the summer, and having suffered a defeat at Yelnya in early September, start again on September 30 an offensive against Moscow? This cannot be explained by a single sudden blow. Perhaps, I. Bunich is right, who believes that with the existing balance of forces, by July 1 at the latest, the Germans, despite all the tacti

the suddenness of their strike, had to be stopped, and then quickly defeated. Let me remind you once again that the Barbarossa plan as such was based on the premise that all the troops available to Stalin were concentrated at the very border, and after the defeat of these troops, the campaign can be considered won. The troops of the Second and subsequent strategic echelons, unforeseen by the German plans, will inevitably had to stop and defeat the Germans, not ready to fight them. By the way, this is exactly how Zhukov reassured Stalin when he nevertheless expressed fears that the Germans would take and attack (according to I. Bunich): even if the Germans themselves attack us, we, with our superiority in strength, will immediately stop them, surround them and destroy (Thunderstorm. S. 549). This is what would have happened, I. Bunich continues, if the Red Army had offered resistance (Ibid., pp. 556-557).

And here we come to the phenomenon that almost all independent Russian authors of various views and beliefs write about - from I.A. Ilyin and I. Solonevich to M.S. Voslensky and A. Avtorkhanov. But for this it is necessary first to recall some aspects of the country's internal history from 1917 to 1941.

Chapter XIV

"EXAMINATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE"

The Second World War was started by the communists in 1930 against the peasants of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. In 1939 this war spread to neighboring countries.

(Viktor Suvorov. *"The Last Republic"*)

It should not be forgotten that in order to implement global plans, it was first of all necessary to prepare the appropriate conditions within the country.

The NEP restored the economy destroyed by the Civil War. But this was not enough. First of all, a powerful heavy industry was required, capable of financially supporting the global ambitions of the Bolsheviks. In the speeches and articles of the Soviet leaders, gradually and over the years, the idea begins to emerge more and more clearly that heavy industry is needed first of all, "otherwise we will be crushed." Almost immediately after Lenin's death, in December 1925, the XIV Congress of the CPSU(b) set a course for the "socialist industrialization" of the USSR.

This was the beginning of the end of the NEP, although at that time few people understood it. Events soon showed that Stalinist industrialization meant an unprecedented militarization of the Soviet economy. The main emphasis was on heavy industry. However, industrialization needed funds. Some of our means, having exported everything that could be used - from the collections of Moscow and Leningrad museums to timber, caviar and furs. But these funds were not enough, much more were required. Where was they to get, if not in the village? In short, the countryside had to be driven into collective farms in order to be able to select for the needs of the "world revolution" all or almost all of what it had produced.

There was another reason for carrying out "complete collectivization." It was necessary to eliminate all opposition to the course of "world revolution" within the country. The Civil War showed that, despite all the incantations of Soviet propaganda, the majority of the people did not support the Bolsheviks with their "war communism" and other charms. In general, this topic - the alignment of forces in the Civil War - is so important that it deserves a separate serious study. I will only briefly highlight the main points here.

It has already been said above where the leaders of the "white" and "red" camps came from. Like

However, our opponents might argue that it does not matter where the leaders of the Bolshevik movement came from, it is important that the national outskirts resisted the Bolsheviks, and within the boundaries of present-day Russia, only Siberia and the Cossack regions, where the people differed significantly in their mentality, actively resisted. from European Great Russia.

It seems to be so. However, here is an interesting figure: in the spring of 1919, the Red Army, according to generally accepted Soviet data, numbered 1 million people. But at the same time, there were only 382.76 thousand people on the fronts. (Military bloc policy of imperialism. Edited by *P.A. Zhilin* and *R. Brul*. M., 1980. P. 66.). Where were the rest?

The answer is the same Solzhenitsyn. "There is no number of peasant unrest and uprisings from the 18th to the 21st year, although they did not decorate the color sheets of the "History of the Civil War", no one photographed or filmed in the cinema ... "(Gulag Archipelago. Ch. 1. Chapter 8). It seems that it is the official Soviet history of the Civil War that guides those who speak of the absence of Great Russia's resistance to the communists.

But the Chekist Latsis in his book-report of 1920 records 344 peasant uprisings only in 1918 - the first half of 1919 (*Latsis M. Ya*. Two years of struggle on the internal front. M., 1920. P. 75). At the same time, it must be taken into account that the indicated time is by no means the peak of peasant uprisings. To understand this, you just need to highlight the stages of the Civil War in terms of changing the mood of the people.

Let's start with the fact that the "Reds" were supported by about 15-20% of the population of Russia, the "Whites" - a little less, 10-15%. The remaining approximately 70% (that is, all the peasantry except the poorest) were not for the "Reds" and not for the "Whites", but for themselves. And the political orientation of these 70% at different stages of the Civil War changed at least three times.

The first stage of the Civil War lasted from March 1917 to the early summer of 1918. At that time, a nationwide revolution took place against the old order, identified with tsarism, landownership, corporal punishment for peasants, the Jewish Pale of Settlement, and other remnants of the Middle Ages. It was in this way, and not at all as "socialist", that the people perceived the revolution. The October Revolution was interpreted simply as the replacement of one provisional government by another, and the Decree on Land (taken by the first Soviet government from the Socialist-Revolutionaries) ensured the support of these same 70% of the vacillators for the new government and, as a result, the notorious "triumphal march of Soviet power".

In the second stage (summer-winter 1918), the Bolsheviks came into conflict with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, which led to the expulsion of the latter from the Soviets and the establishment of a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship. This circumstance, coupled with the policy of "war communism", led to a sharp turn in the mood of the mentioned 70% of the population. The "triumphant march of Soviet power" turned into an equally "triumphant" overthrow of the communist dictatorship in the space from Murmansk to Ashgabat and from the Volga and Kuban to Vladivostok.

The third stage (1919-1920) was marked by the transfer of leadership of the White movement from democratic leaders (including Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) to former tsarist generals. These latter never carried out an agrarian reform, which in the eyes of the peasantry lost to the Bolsheviks with their Decree on Land. It was not until 1920 that Wrangel in the Crimea gave orders to transfer all the land to the peasants, but it was too late. The people "white" no longer believed.

Finally, in 1921-1922, after the "whites" left, the peasantry refused to tolerate war communism any longer. The country was seething with peasant uprisings,

and Kronstadt showed that even the army was beginning to get out of control. To suppress the Kronstadt uprising, the Bolsheviks had to gather loyal units from all over the country - even from near Khabarovsk, since ordinary Red Army soldiers were unreliable. If at least one of the 16 Red Army armies revolted simultaneously with Kronstadt, then there would be nothing to crush it. I had to retreat and introduce the New Economic Policy.

With this outcome, the Bolsheviks had serious reasons not to consider themselves winners in the Civil War. It was necessary to subjugate the country for real, which they gradually, at first on a small scale, began to do.

The political "intellectual" and other opposition outside the Bolshevik Party, including all other parties, was finished during Lenin's lifetime, its remnants were sent to the Solovetsky special purpose camps created on May 25, 1923. The workers of the state enterprises were already sufficiently subjugated and organized, not to mention the fact that it was they, the workers of large-scale industry, who were precisely the main support of the Bolsheviks. The "NEP Mans" were finished in 1928-1929.

However, an independent village remained. Her independence needed to be eliminated more than anyone else's. After all, it was the free peasantry (who by 1929 accounted for more than 80% of the total population of the country) "would have resisted the Sovietization of Ethiopia and Antarctica, because the peasant must pay for the Comintern and its adventures and shed blood for the peasant" (Suvorov V. *The Last Republic* . S. 77).

What was done with the peasantry in 1929-1933. I know, I won't repeat myself. I will only note that collectivization cost the Russian village 15-20 million lives, including the famine of 1933, caused by the resistance of collectivization from

side of the peasantry. Recalcitrant peasants were simply blacked out.

The next step was to "put things in order" in the country as a whole. Before the introduction of the draconian wartime decrees, which were implemented in 1940, on the prohibition of workers from changing their place of work of their own free will of June 26, 1940, and on the forced transfer from one place of work to another of October 19 By the same 1940, it was necessary to create such an atmosphere in society that "no one would utter a word" when these measures would be implemented (*Suvorov V.*

Day-M pp. 220-221). Well, when we conclude a pact with yesterday's sworn enemies - the fascists - also so that no one speaks out. And in general, so that no one speaks out, no matter what the authorities do. We'll tell you tomorrow what we're going to hang up so that they only ask, "Bring your own ropes or the trade union committee will provide"!

From December 1, 1934 to June 22, 1941, 18.86 million people were arrested, of which 7 million were shot. Of the rest, only 200 thousand survived to the "Khrushchev thaw."

Stalin's thesis about "the sharpening of the class struggle as we move towards socialism", also condemned under Khrushchev, thus unexpectedly turns out to be correct in principle, albeit with two reservations. Firstly, by "socialism" one should understand what Stalin understood - total lack of freedom and total subordination of all aspects of economic, social and personal life to a totalitarian state. And secondly, the "class struggle" is not the resistance of the "undercut bourgeois" and other "unfinished exploiting classes", but the resistance of the people as a whole to this process. It took many millions of victims to break him.

TURN THE WAR INTO A CIVIL!

It is not surprising that in such a situation the slogan "Turn the German war into a civil war" must at first meet with very tangible support, so that at the beginning of the war the Soviet people simply did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime in large part. And indeed, few people understood what Hitler was and what he was bringing to Russia, since there was no personal experience yet, while in relation to Stalin there was their own experience - murderous collectivization, the great Ukrainian (as well as South Russian and Kazakhstani) famine of 1933., 1937, decrees of 1940 on the prohibition of unauthorized change of place of work (June 26) and on the right of the state to transfer a worker to another enterprise without his consent (October 19), in fact turning industrial workers into slaves (and the peasants were turned in serfs even earlier).

For those who went through it, it was natural to think this way: the arrival of a foreign army means the overthrow of Bolshevism, and what distinguishes Hitler from Roosevelt and Churchill, the Soviet collective farmer, for example, had a bad idea: not every village has one literate person, and all these Zhang Tso-Lins, Macdonalds and Hitlers were strangers, equal and unnecessary gobblers to the Russian village " (Solzhenitsyn *A.I. Gulag Archipelago*. Part V. Chapter 1).

Yes, even if the collective farmers were properly treated by Soviet propaganda (as the urban population), then after all, "fed up hateful agitation according to the system "who is not with us is against us" never distinguished the positions of Maria Spiridonova from Nicholas II, Leon Blum from Hitler, the English Parliament from the German Reichstag. So why

But these people had to “fantastic-looking stories about book fires in German squares, about the resurrection of some ancient Teutonic atrocity (I remind you that Russian newspapers in the First World War pretty much came up about the atrocities of the Teutons) to be distinguished as true in German Nazism, scolded in the same extreme terms as earlier by Poincaré, Pilsudski and the English conservatives, to recognize a four-legged worthy one that for a quarter of a century has been quite real and in the flesh has been clawing at the city, and the village, and the Archipelago, and themselves (ibid.).

An English historian carefully remarks on this subject: “How effective Soviet propaganda was outside the politically active minority is a big question” (J. pp. 448). A word again to Solzhenitsyn: boundless faith “was by no means the property of the whole people, but only of the party, the Komsomol, urban student youth, the Soviet intelligentsia, and partly the workers; “in part” - because the decrees of 1940 did not recruit supporters either. (I’ll add on my own: the intelligentsia are also “partially”, since people of mental labor are obliged to think at least sometimes in their work).

It is not surprising that the usual reaction, for example, of the peasants to the outbreak of war was this (described by the same Solzhenitsyn (Gulag Archipelago. Part V. Chapter 1) using the example of the Ryazan village): as soon as Stalin pronounces (July 3, 1941) his famous “ brothers and sisters”, one man, to the approving laughter of the others, shows an obscene gesture to the loudspeaker and says with obscene abuse: “But I didn’t want to!”

It is not surprising after that and the fact that already on July 16 1941, a top secret Stalin order No. 0019 is issued, in which there are the following words: “At all

fronts there are numerous elements that even run towards the enemy and at the first collision with him drop their weapons. The last (or one of the last) in time transition to the side of the Germans of an entire regiment, together with officers, was recorded as early as August 22, 1941 (436th rifle regiment of Major Kononov) (Ibid.).

You can find a lot of cases of betrayal of **officers** if you wish, but here's a better fact: in the first days of the war it was officially restored (and until October 1942) institute of military commissars. Let me remind you: without the signature of the commissar, not a single order of the commander was valid, that is, one-man command was actually destroyed. Let me also remind you that until now the institution of military commissars in the Red Army crashed only twice.

The first time - in 1917 and until 1924. But then this measure was understandable: most of the commanders were "class alien" specialists, officers of the old Russian Army. As they say, an eye and an eye is needed! Yes, and their own, "proletarian" commanders have not yet got used to discipline, and you never know what they could do (and did).

The second time this was done in 1937. It is also understandable: you never know what the military could do, seeing how their comrades were repressed one after another and expecting the same for themselves! But in 1941, why? Obviously, Comrade Stalin did not trust his commanders!

In total, during the summer of 1941, 1.5 million soldiers went over to the side of the Germans, 2.5 million surrendered or were captured, 1 million deserted, etc. (*Bunich I. Groza*, pp. 564-565). In a word, Stalin had good reasons in his famous order of August 1941 to declare that "the Germans have no Soviet prisoners of war, there are only traitors."

These figures are indirectly confirmed by both Soviet (and official post-Soviet) statistics. So, only in Belarus by July 9, 1941, the Red Army lost 341,000 people, of which 287,700 were captured

mi (*Myagkov M. Yu.* The battle for Moscow in the documents of the Army Group Center // World War II. Actual problems. S. 248-266). In total, on June 22, 1941, the Red Army numbered 5.5 million people; during the first 10 days of the war, as planned, another 5.3 million were called up, that is, the total was 10.8 million, not counting those called up in the next two months. Where did all this mass of people go if only 800 thousand were killed and wounded by September 1941? Why did the official Soviet history of the war call the loss of 1,850 aircraft in the first two days of the war a disaster when there were 28,000 of them? Losing 600 tanks when they were 23,000? And so on. With the monstrous number of troops that Stalin had, even the deliberately inflated figures of Soviet losses — 2.5 million soldiers, 5,000 tanks, 12,000 aircraft — officially announced by Goebbels' propaganda in mid-July, would not have been lethal for the USSR, respectively. tell them reality.

However, those who saw the Germans as liberators were severely disappointed. The Wehrmacht was followed by the SS units, which began to implement a policy of enslavement (and partly extermination) of the population. Soviet soldiers who surrendered were disarmed and thrown into German concentration camps, and the few who were allowed to remain in the ranks of the Wehrmacht were distributed in small groups among German units. Hitler directly stated that he did not care who ruled Russia - the tsars or the Bolsheviks, he did not free Russia from anyone, he conquered it, and the Germans needed the peoples of Russia only as working cattle. The peoples of Russia also soon realized this and began to fight the enemy - not for Stalin and the CPSU(b), but for themselves. Stalin, by the way, also understood this and this is exactly what he admitted to the American Ambassador A. Harriman in a moment of frankness: "The people are fighting, as before, for their Fatherland, and not for us" (Mc. Neal A. Stalin. Man and Ruler Basingstore, 1988, p. 140).

A modern Russian historian writes that one of the miscalculations of the German command was that it did not expect mass resistance in the occupied Soviet territories due to the repressions and collectivization carried out by the Stalinist regime before the war. You don't know what to say here. If the Nazi leaders, waging a war against the peoples of Russia for genocide and not hiding it at all (and even, on the contrary, advertising it in every possible way), at the same time "did not expect resistance", this simply speaks of their idiocy.

It is not surprising that by the autumn of 1941 the mood of the people had become completely different. A national war began, which the Germans could not but lose sooner or later. By the end of 1941, up to 2000 partisan detachments were operating (*Basov A. V.* Historical science. New interpretations of the causes and course of the Great Patriotic War // Russia in the XX century. Historians of the world argue. P. 464). However, the behavior of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1941 did not go unnoticed: the initial successes allowed the Germans to win almost the entire year of 1941 against the USSR on the stocks seized from the Red Army, and only from the beginning of 1942 did the German economy begin to give the front a sufficient amount of its own ammunition for waging war against Russia.

At the same time, we have reason to believe that the Anglo-American allies and their German agents foresaw just such a scenario and had nothing against it, since the unwillingness of the Soviet soldiers to fight at the first stage would allow the Wehrmacht to go deep into Russia and get stuck in it, which will greatly facilitate the task of the United States and Britain on their fronts (*Bunich I. Groza*, p. 300).

All these data are suggestive: could it be otherwise? Could the Red Army, having hit the Germans first, win the whole war and still achieve the world domination of the communist regime?

Suppose they conquered Europe and reached the English Channel (in an offensive war it is easier to force an army to obey, even if it does not want to; the Finnish war clearly demonstrated this). Then, one way or another, it is necessary to fight with the United States and Britain, and these countries cannot be conquered by blitzkrieg, and the war with them, by definition, turned into a protracted one. How would the Red Army behave in such a situation?

However, we will talk in more detail about the prospects for a war between the USSR and the Anglo-Americans below, but for now we recall again that treason has settled in the top leadership of the Wehrmacht. The nature of the totalitarian system is such that it leads very many people to the paradoxical conclusion that when totalitarians rule their country, treason is the highest manifestation of patriotism. And it is precisely in this (not only in this, of course) that the dead end of totalitarianism lies (*Bunich I. Groza*, pp. 290-293, 364).

Chapter XVI

FORTY-FIRST: DID STALIN CONSIDER EVERYTHING LOST AFTER JUNE 22?

Who fights can lose.

Those who don't fight have already lost.

(*aphorism*)

But even after the terrible losses in the first days of the war, the USSR was incredibly strong. And he could have been even stronger if he had gone on the defensive from the very beginning. However, the disruption of Stalin's plans forced the latter to try again and again to throw troops into the offensive.

So, on June 22, 1941, Hitler invaded Russia. At 7.15 am, almost 4 hours after the German attack, Moscow gives the order to attack the enemy and destroy him where he crossed the Soviet border, but the border itself until further notice

do not cross. Only at noon did Stalin finally believe that this was not a provocation, but an attack, and the order was given to start Operation Thunderstorm (according to other sources, at 21.35) (*Bunich I. Groza. S. 558-560; 30. S. 456*).

During the week, Stalin tries to improve the situation, again and again throwing troops into the offensive. There are individual successes - individual divisions advance, sometimes 20-25 km deep into enemy territory. Thus, the 41st Rifle Division of the 6th Rifle Corps of the 6th Army, without an order from above, according to pre-war plans, crossed the state border in the area of Rava-Russkaya. The commander of the Northwestern Front, Colonel General F. Kuznetsov - also without an order from Moscow - gave the order to attack Tilsit (*Ledokol. 2002. p. 332*), etc. In the Danube Delta, they even managed to capture the city of Kiliya: on June 25, warships of the Danube Flotilla, under the cover of coastal batteries and the 14th Rifle Corps, landed troops on the Romanian coast, and the next day the red flag was raised over the central cathedral of this city (*Ibid. C .128*).

From June 23 to June 29, 1941, a gigantic tank battle takes place in the area of Lutsk-Brody-Rovno, which has already been mentioned. Above, I wrote that 5000 of ours acted against 1000 German tanks.

V. Suvorov gives other data. 799 German tanks (Kleist's 1st Panzer Group), among which there were no heavy, amphibious, diesel engines, with anti-shell armor, with long-barreled guns of caliber 75 mm and above, with wide tracks, were opposed by 8069 tanks of the Kievsky and Odessa districts (including 4809 in Western Ukraine), among which were 747 of the latest T-34s and KVs. "Thirty-fours" are considered by today's military historians as medium tanks, however, given the fact that in 1941 the best foreign tanks - the German T-III and T-IV - weighed (in different wa

riants) from 19.8 to 22.3 tons (The Last Republic ka. S. 428-432), T-34 by the standards of that time can be considered heavy. At the same time, the T-34 and KV combined all of the above advantages, except, of course, the ability to swim.

The T-35 also belonged to the category of heavy tanks (there were 51 of them at the disposal of the two districts), armed with three cannons and 6-7 machine guns (Ibid., pp. 346-347).

There were 876 amphibious tanks (669 T-37s, 123 T-38s, 84 T-40s). With diesel engines, in addition to the T-34 and KV, there were also 370 BT-7M (what engines did the amphibious tanks have - diesel or gasoline - I just don't know, but I believe that at least the newest T-40 has an engine was diesel).

The battle ended in the defeat of the Soviet troops, and V. Suvorov, contradicting his previous books, blames the "talentless" Zhukov for this in "Shadow of Victory" (Suvorov V. Shadow of Victory. M., 2002. S. 189-192). But Zhukov was not directly responsible for this offensive. He left here, to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, on June 22, although the decision to do so was made on the 21st, even before the start of the war, when the Politburo decided to secretly deploy fronts in place of the border military districts. Army General I.V. was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front. Tyulenev, Zhukov was sent to coordinate the actions of this front with the South.

Zhukov flew out on June 22, after the German attack, but the decision was made BEFORE him (Suvorov V. Den-MS 261). And most importantly, instead of an offensive, they had to defend themselves, which confused all the cards for Zhukov, Tyulen, and the entire Red Army, who were not ready for such a turn. In addition, Zhukov was recalled from the Southwestern Front on June 26, recalled as Chief of the General Staff, due to the critical situation in Belarus, where the Germans were delivering the main blow. And only after his departure, on June 28,

the Germans managed to turn the tide of the battle in their favor (Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov, p. 15).

And finally, this is still the end of June 1941. Even Stalin himself - in the conditions of a sudden attack by the enemy, in the conditions of enemy dominance in the air - drives troops on the offensive, trying to seize the initiative. The reaction of the Red Army to Hitler's attack is not that of a bristling hedgehog, but of a huge crocodile that received a sudden, super-powerful blow at the moment when it was sneaking towards the victim. "Bleeding out, the crocodile tries to attack... It doesn't know how to do anything more, and it doesn't change its intention" (Icebreaker, 2002, p. 332).

But in general, the Soviet troops, unprepared for defense, are forced to rapidly retreat with huge losses. V. Suvorov asks: what would happen if Zhukov had not 10 mechanized corps, but only two, like F. Kuznetsov? What would happen if there were not one tank group against him, but two, as against Pavlov (2nd and 3rd, 1967 tanks) (Shadow of Victory, p. 192). And you compare the pace of advancement of the Germans on the northern fronts and on the southern ones! On June 28, the Germans in Belorussia occupy Minsk; on June 30, they occupy Riga in the Baltic states. And in Ukraine, only on June 30 they enter Lviv. On July 9, the 4th Panzer Group Göttera takes Pskov, but in Ukraine they have not yet reached the approaches to Kyiv. On July 16, the Germans occupy Smolensk, and in the south - only Kishinev.

Finally, on the eighth day, throwing out the well-known phrase: "If we asked for Lenin's cause, everything is lost!" Stalin leaves for his dacha and does not make himself known for two days. Only on July 1 did his comrades-in-arms manage to persuade him to return to work.

V. Suvorov explains this behavior of Stalin simply: no matter how the war goes on, it will no longer be possible to end it with what it was started for - the capture of all Europe and all European colonies; it means that the war is lost, and the leader's life's work -

Same. From that moment on, the USSR lost the war completely and was sooner or later doomed to disintegration and death (Cleansing, pp. 341-345).

Let me, however, disagree with this. In my opinion, there were at least several Stalinist attempts to change the course of the war and achieve victory in it.

In fact, V. Suvorov himself writes that even on July 7, Stalin personally ordered the commander of the Southern Front, General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev to hold Bessarabia as a springboard for an attack on the oil fields of Romania (Ledokol. 2002, pp. 130-131). By the way, it is interesting that Hitler's directive to the Romanian dictator Antonescu dated June 18, 1941, speaks only of defense: German and Romanian troops must "hold the Romanian territory", especially it is important to "ensure the safety of the oil regions, the harbor in Constanta and the bridges across the Danube from air raids, paratroopers and saboteurs" (Nekrich A. M. S. 91).

And in the future - advance, advance, advance! From July 6 to July 10, a counterattack by the 20th Army of General PA was launched. Kurochkin near Lepel (History of the Second World War in 12 volumes. Vol. 4. P. 46). In mid-July, the 19th army of Lieutenant General Konev is trying to recapture Vitebsk from the Germans (Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's debt. M., 1984. P. 24). From July 14 to July 18, a counterattack of the 11th Army of General B.I. Morozov against the German 56th motorized corps near Soltsy (halfway between Nov Gorod and Pskov). The blow, delivered to a depth of 40 km, delayed the German offensive on Leningrad for almost a month (History of the Second World War. Vol. 4. C. 65). Only on July 16, on the proposal of the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, Colonel General N.D. Yakovlev, Zhukov ordered the artillery of the reserves of the High Command of high and special power to be withdrawn from the front, since "ha

The character of hostilities developing on the fronts (i.e., probably the need to defend instead of invading enemy territory, it is difficult to think of another explanation. - V.K.), it is not possible to effectively use these units in battles (*Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov*, p. 17).

This is followed by a series of attacks on the Smolensk direction, as a result of which, at the end of July, the Soviet armies recapture Yartsevo from the Germans (*Rokossovsky K.K.* pp. 29-35). Attempts at offensives in the Smolensk region continue in August as well (*Ibid.*, pp. 38-42). And in the Leningrad direction, the 34th Army strikes from Staraya Russa 60 km from the river. Lovat, threatening the rear of the German troops advancing on Leningrad (*Suvorov V. I take my words back*. S. 333-334).

Then offensive battles begin near Yelnya, occupied by the Germans on July 19th. The fighting continues until September 6, when Yelnya is released. V. Suvorov cites the memoirs of front-line generals, from which it is clear that even in the autumn of 1941, when the Wehrmacht stood at the gates of Moscow and it was not at all a foregone conclusion that the capital could be defended, defense was considered as a secondary task, and the offensive continued to be considered the main one. , and only the offensive: "At the same time, it was thought: we will not always be on the defensive. Retreat is a forced matter... Defense has never been considered and is not considered the main type of combat operations... This means that it is necessary to prepare troops for offensive battles," wrote, for example, Lieutenant General of the SA. Kalinin (cited in: *Icebreaker*, 2002, p. 251). If the Soviet generals thought so when the Wehrmacht stood at the walls of Moscow, then what can we say about the time of the battles near Yelnya!

At the end of September, a counterattack was launched near Leningrad (*Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov*. S. 24-25) and in the Sumy region in Ukraine - near Konotop. So it was by no means in July that the Soviet generals came to the conclusion that "the crocodile cannot advance." Or maybe

Perhaps in July-September they also attacked because in offensive battles there is less danger of surrender and betrayal of soldiers? And in October, the mood of the army and the people was already different, the army was already burning with desire to fight.

However, the mood of the people was different, but the command was the same. They tried to advance further: on October 5, in the midst of the German operation "Typhoon", the 1b Army of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky received an order to launch a counterattack near Yukhnov (*Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty*. P. 49). As soon as the German offensive began to subside a little, on October 13, Soviet tanks launched a counterattack near Borovsk, and the Germans managed to stop it only with the help of aviation (*Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov*.

S. 28). From November 11 to November 16, the 16th army of Rokossovsky strikes at Volokolamsk (*Rokossovsky*, pp. 70-73).

On November 12, the Red Army begins an offensive near Rostov, on November 17 - near Tikhvin. On November 17-18, a new counterattack is delivered near Volokolamsk, on November 24-25 - near Solnechnogorsk (*Ibid.*, pp. 79-87). So long before the Stalinist order from

On January 7, 1942, the Red Army tried to advance along the entire front. Why? Let us try to analyze the situation in the world as a whole, since an analysis of the situation on the Soviet-German front clearly does not answer the question.

Chapter XVII

WHY DID THEY ATTACK AMERICA?

All Japanese are communists at heart.

(*Matsuoka to Stalin, March 23, 1941*)

"The alliance with Japan," writes Viktor Suvorov, "had no positive consequences for Hitler, only negative ones. Japan, in fact, dragged Hitler into the howl

Well, against the USA. So it was better for Hitler not to have Japan as an ally. It would have been cheaper" (The Last Republic, pp. 160-162).

Let's figure it out. To begin with, let's answer the question: why did Japan attack America?

The USSR made great efforts to transform Japan in the "Far Eastern icebreaker". Since 1926 Japan The Institute was repeatedly asked to conclude an agreement on friendship and cooperation, similar to the Rapallo treaty with Germany (*Slavinsky B.N.* Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan: a diplomatic history, 1941-1945, M., 1995. P. 40). As of 1931, a non-aggression pact was also proposed (*Ibid.*, pp. 41-42). The activity of R. Sorge in the creation of the "Far Eastern icebreaker" was investigated in 1951 by a special commission of the US Congress. Already at the end of 1935, Sorge created a powerful intelligence organization in Tokyo, which had access to the most secret Japanese documents. (Hearings on American Aspects of the Richard Sorge Spy Case. House of Representatives. 82nd

Congress. first session. August 9, 22 and 23. Washington, 1951. Op. by: Icebreaker. 2002, p. 312).

Soviet intelligence in 1936 came to the conclusion that Japan would aim precisely at Southeast Asia, where there are large reserves of oil, which is relatively easy to extract (*Suvorov V.I.*).

Day-M S. 86). The defeat at Khalkhin Gol, by the way, also did not add to the desire to attack the USSR to the Japanese, especially since immediately after it, Ribbentrop advised the Japanese ambassador in Berlin "to normalize relations with the USSR for the period of the war with the West" (*Slavinsky B.N.* S. 47).

In light of this, it is interesting that as early as 1937 the USSR decided to create a powerful industrial base in the Asian part of the USSR. In the light of what was said and will be said about the Soviet plans for a war in Europe, it was hardly foreseen even then that it would be necessary to evacuate enterprises here from the west.

other regions of the USSR - if so, it would be easier initially not to build 85% of military-industrial enterprises in the territories in 1941-1942. Germans who fell under the occupation (as Suvorov writes about). Rather, it was foreseen that against Japan - the "Far Eastern icebreaker" - it was necessary to create a powerful industrial base so that when Den-M arrived in the Far East, everything needed for the war would not be brought from very far (Felshtinsky Yu.G. Reading the books "Icebreaker" and "Day-M" by Viktor Suvorov // Pravda Viktor Suvorov, p. 146).

June 22, 1940 under pressure from the German armies France capitulated. Three months later, 22- On September 27, Japan captured the northern part of French Indochina, expanding beyond the borders of China, with which it had been at war since 1937. Japan's actions are understandable: to continue the war, oil was needed, which could be obtained in Southeast Asia, more precisely , in Indonesia (a colony of Holland defeated by Hitler) and in Malaysia (a colony of Britain).

For its part, the US administration, led by Roosevelt, sought to draw the US into a war for world domination, but in such a way that the US would be, or at least look like, the defending side in this war. Therefore, various sanctions were applied against Japan. In addition to the already mentioned order of Roosevelt to leave the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, economic methods of influence were also used. After the Japanese occupation of Indochina and the signing of the tripartite German-Italian-Japanese pact on September 27, 1940, and especially after the occupation of South Indochina in July 1941, the sanctions were tightened (*Bunich I.* Attracted by fate. S. 50, 95-96). For example, on September 26, 1940, an embargo was imposed on the supply of scrap metal to Japan (*Utkin A.I.* Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt, p. 136).

As for intelligence, was the activity of the USSR in Japan limited to one Richard Sorge? In general, it is here that it seems expedient to talk about others who had nothing to do with official intelligence, who had nothing to do with "fighters of the invisible front."

Let's start, however, with the fact that Japan is the third country after Russia and Germany in the plans of the "slave counter-revolutionaries", at least Dugin himself. Like Russia and Germany, Japan belongs to the "second tier" of capitalism. The history of Japan is also in many respects synchronous with the German one, and especially the Russian one. Thus, the forcible "opening" of Japan by the Americans in 1853, which hastened the Meiji Revolution of 1867-1869, is comparable to Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, which hastened the Great Reforms of the 1860s. And at the beginning of the XX century. Japan, like Russia, experienced a period of "liberal reforms from above" (1912-1926). The Japanese "slave counter-revolutionaries" naturally did not like this.

And now here's what. In 1927, the well-known physician Professor Bekhterev died suddenly and unexpectedly. According to the official (adopted during the years of "perestroika") version, Bekhterev was invited to Stalin's to examine him for incipient dry-handedness. However, having examined a high-ranking patient, Bekhterev unexpectedly discovered signs of paranoia in him. At that time, not everyone in the USSR had learned to keep their mouths shut, and the same evening the scientist let it slip that he "examined one dry-handed paranoid." A few days later, Bekhterev died, and there are serious reasons to think that he was poisoned.

However, there is no reason to believe that Stalin was paranoid. All his actions in the struggle for power over the country and the world are the iron logically consistent actions of a smart, cunning, insidious politician. But if not disclosure

information about Stalin's paranoia, then what was Bekhterev guilty of then? Maybe, like Pokrovsky and the French agency GAVAS, he divulged something that Stalin would like to keep secret?

And now let us recall that A.V. Barchenko (1881-1938) - a well-known figure of the Martinists (*Shishkin O.A. The Battle for the Himalayas. M., 1999 - P. 43*). The Martinists were a Masonic organization, but a Masonic organization of a very special type. I make a reservation right away: I am a convinced materialist, and when I talk about Freemasons, Martinists and others, I am not at all interested in occultism, esotericism and other mysticism. For me, only connections between people who were members of certain organizations or close to them are important.

A member of the Martinist lodge in the Bolshevik and near-Bolshevik circles in Russia was, for example, the future court sculptor of Stalin, S. Merkurov. Already at the beginning of the XX century. Merkurov was distinguished by his extreme leftist views, was friends with Stepan Shaumyan, and in 1911 Merkurov introduced his cousin G.I. Gurdjieff (*Shishkin O.A. Battle for the Himalayas. pp. 24-26*). Meanwhile, Gurdjieff himself, in his youth, studied at the same seminary with Stalin, and then participated in the activities of the Stalinist "fighting group" ("expropriators?" - D.V.) (*Vinogradov A. Secret battles of the XX century. P. 186*

In 1909, the future prominent Chekist G.I. Boki, and A.V. recommended him there. Barchenko. Another high-ranking Chekist, I.M., was also a member of the lodge. Moskvina (not to be confused with the full namesake - the artist) (*Shishkin O.A. S. 19, 24-26*). Finally, N.K. was a Martinist. Roerich, whose connections with the OGPU-NKVD are well known. So, back in 1912, Roerich met the second secretary of the Japanese embassy in St. Petersburg, Yosuke Matsuoka, who had connections with the Japanese

"Society of the Black Dragon" and "Society of the foundations of the throne" (Shishkin O.A. Battle for the Himalayas. S. 25). In December 1924, in Egypt, Matsuoka again found himself in the same company with Roerich. The future Japanese ambassador to Moscow also ended up in the same company (diplomatic relations with the USSR were established by Japan a couple of months later) Togo, through Matsuoka and Togo, Roerich maintained ties with the heads of the Black Dragon Society Mitsuro Toyama and the Black Ocean Society Rihei Usida. In all these contacts, the journalist Tatsumi, the former secretary of the head of the Japanese socialists, Sen Katayama, played a rather prominent role (Ibid., pp. 118,123-124).

And many years later, in March 1941, Matsuoka, already the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, visited Moscow on his way to Berlin. In a conversation with Stalin, he expressed sympathy for Soviet totalitarianism, uttering, in particular, the words put in the epigraph to this chapter, cursed democracy and liberalism, which divert people to all sorts of personal interests instead of performing important state tasks, but this is not the main thing. .

The main thing is that on the way back from Berlin, Matsuoka again stopped by Moscow and signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR on April 13, 1941 (*Bunich IL*. Storm. SPb., 1997. S. 447-450, 460). Let us pay attention: Matsuoka did not go to Moscow, but to Berlin via Moscow. In Berlin, Matsuoka did not inform Hitler of his preliminary talks with Stalin. And after the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact was signed, Ribbentrop instructed his ambassador in Tokyo to demand an explanation (*Suvorov V. I take my words back*. Donetsk, 2005, p. 132).

And here is an entry in the diary of the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder for January 28, 1941: "By the end of February, our rubber reserves will be exhausted. 25,000 tons were purchased by the French (obviously by the Vichy government in Indochina - YES!), but

the Japanese do not allow its export (quoted by: *Suvorov V. Cleansing. M.*, 2001. S. 321).

True, Germany also signed an agreement with the USSR August 23, 1939, in the midst of the victorious offensive of Zhukov's troops on Khalkhin Gol. And this also displeased Japan. Yet it is difficult to shake off the idea that Japan's actions in 1939-1941, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, were dictated more by its role as Stalin's "Far Eastern icebreaker" than by Hitler's Axis ally. V. Suvorov also wrote about this (*Icebreaker*, 2002, p. 312; *The Last Republic*, p. 160-162).

But let's continue about the US-Japanese confrontation. On July 26, 1941, Japanese assets in the US were frozen, leaving Japan without oil; the accumulated oil reserves should have been enough for two years (*Utkin A.I.* S. 136). This could not but push Japan into Southeast Asia, where there was oil. However, on August 10, the United States and Britain warned Japan that "further expansion on the part of Japan will cause American and British measures, including military ones" (Driven by fate, pp. 100-101).

Thus, even then, the Japanese leadership made a fundamental decision: to fight against America, to strike the first blow at the American and British fleets. On October 4, 1941, R. Sorge reported to Moscow that 3,000 railway workers serving the trains of the Kwantung Army had disappeared to no one knows where (*Ibid.*, p. 157). This clearly indicated that Japan was not going to start a war against the USSR.

Yes, Stalin understood this before. Back in the beginning In 1941, Soviet intelligence established that a detailed model of the Philippine Islands was being developed at the Japanese General Staff and that maps of these islands were planned to be produced on a mass scale. headquarters. The conclusions suggested themselves (*V. Suvorov, The Last Republic*, p. 294). Yes, and the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact on April 13, 1941 instilled in Steel the confidence that Hitler was not going to attack

on the USSR, otherwise he would not have allowed the signing of this pact (*Bunich* I. Drawn by fate. S. 66-67). Here, it is true, Stalin overestimated the coordination of the actions of Germany and Japan...

And here we turn to the second part of the question: why Did Hitler declare war on the US? Although Japan needed to attack Pearl Harbor, but after June 22

1941 did not declare war on the USSR, despite the existence of a pact on September 27, 1940 - so Hitler could well not declare war on the United States. However, he did. Why?

Well, firstly, the American Lend-Lease policy irritated Germany no less than the American economic sanctions against Japan. And most importantly, the matter was not limited to lend-lease. Already from the end of 1940, American strategic bombers with American crews were transferred to Britain (*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40). But that was not all: March 30

1941, all German and Italian ships in American ports were confiscated (which in itself is almost an act of war), on April 24, the United States announced its intention to sink all German ships west of 30 degrees W, on June 14, the all German and Italian property in the USA,

On June 16 the German and Italian consulates are closed. In a word, the United States was actually already a non-belligerent ally of Britain, and the prefix "not" could disappear at any moment (*Suvorov* V. Murder itself. S. 255-257). But still, I think it was

not only in this.

On November 29, 1941, Hitler told Todt that the war was lost (*Den-M.* S. 89; *Suicide.* S. 348-349). In fact, this was clear even before, we have already quoted Hitler's numerous statements about how he underestimated the strength of the Red Army. Therefore, the point of view of S. Haffner deserves attention that Hitler declared war on the United States in order to provoke the Americans to come to Europe and at least in this way take revenge on Steel who deceived him.

well, having taken from the latter by American hands a significant part of the fruits of victory. True, I personally do not share the point of view of S. Haffner that Hitler believed that despite all the disagreements with the Western powers, the West and Germany should still jointly oppose the USSR (Haffner S. Suicide of the *German* Empire. M., 1972. C 66-67). Suffice it to say that in the event of a victory over Britain, Hitler planned to take all British men from 17 to 50 years old to camps on the European continent. However, the very motivation behind Hitler's declaration of war on America is quite real. Not to mention the fact that Hitler could well have been pushed to such a decision by some intelligence leaders associated with Western intelligence services ...

So, from December 7 to 11, 1941, Germany, Italy and Japan attacked America. Stalin was preparing an aggressive war, he had to defend himself against his will. Roosevelt, having bound Stalin and Hitler in a mutual war of extermination, now, when America was not threatened by anything, arranged so that America entered the struggle for world domination as an offended, peace-loving and democratic country subjected to a sudden and unprovoked attack. Is this not the work of a genius?

Chapter XVIII

AND AGAIN AIRDRESSING, OR GROZA-2

Let's chop up the German during
the winter so that in the spring he
can't get up! (*Pravda* editorial, January 16, 1942)

So, in 1941, Stalin failed to turn the tide in his favor. But he did not despair. I was just waiting for the right opportunity. And the moment came when it seemed to him that he had waited for him.

By the beginning of winter, Hitler had almost reached Moscow, Leningrad, and Rostov-on-Don. Having recovered from the first German blows, the Red Army in late November - early December 1941 goes on the offensive, first near Rostov and Tikhvin, and then on December 5-6 - near Moscow. It was on the offensive, and not on the counter-offensive, that the Germans had already received (December 4) the order to go over to the defensive. If Zhukov had been on the offensive for another week, he would have had to face the well-organized defense of the Germans (*Simonov K.M. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. S. 329-330*).

After a month of offensive battles, the German armies advancing on Moscow were defeated. The generals (primarily Zhukov) advise Stalin not to scatter his forces, but to continue to drive the Germans in the direction of Smolensk. According to Western historians (Fuller, for example), if this advice had been adopted, then the Wehrmacht near Smolensk would have suffered an even more terrible catastrophe than Napoleon's army in 1812 (*Fuller J. World War II. M., 1956. S.*

However, on January 7, 1942, Stalin gave the order to launch a general offensive along the entire front. But even before that, as already mentioned, they were advancing not only near Moscow. In addition, on December 26, 1941, an offensive operation with amphibious assault began in Kerch, and on January 3-4, 1942, in Evpatoria. Directions are given to drive the Germans from Soviet soil continuously, and there is even talk of the defeat of Germany in the same 1942.

Much has been written by Viktor Suvorov about the Soviet airborne corps, about their training since 1930, and about the fact that paratroopers can only be assigned to offensive operations. (*Icebreaker. 2002. S. 113-119, The Last Republic S. 326-339, 359-386, etc.*). As we remember from these books, in April 1941 five airborne corps were formed. June 12 in the Red Army was

the Directorate of the Airborne Forces was created, and in August 1941 five more airborne corps were formed and another five separate brigades (Icebreaker, p. 116; The Last Republic, p. 371).

But a third series of airborne corps was also formed, one of them tried to parachute as early as 1943 (we will talk about 1943 ahead). Why these corps were created before June 22, 1941 is understandable. But why after? Viktor Suvorov explains this by saying that "they did not have time to stop the already wound up mechanism" (The Last Republic, p. 370). And maybe also for the offensive? Suvorov himself speaks in The Icebreaker about offensive moods in the Red Army even in October 1941, when the enemy was near Moscow.

In the light of all that has been said, the answer to the question appears in a different form: why did Stalin order in January 1942 to advance along the entire front?

The standard Soviet answer to this question is: mistakes, mistakes, mistakes... Part of the mistake actually took place. Military Historical Journal (1991. No. 2. P. 24) publishes data on a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on December 31, 1941. On the eve of the meeting, Zhukov and Bulganin reported to Stalin that the troops of the Western Front had defeated 12, 13, 20, The 43rd, 53rd, 57th German Army Corps, consisting of 15 infantry divisions, the 19th Panzer Division and the 2nd SS Brigade, airlifted from Krakow. The enemy, under blows from the troops of the front, continues to retreat in a westerly direction, leaving behind the wounded, artillery, guns and property in the battles and along the way of retreat. In fact, continues the Military Historical Journal, all of the above formations were not defeated and still

resisted the Soviet troops for several years.

Viktor Suvorov, citing this evidence, accuses Zhukov of lying and holds him responsible

for Stalin's decision to go on the offensive along the entire front under the impression of such an exaggerated report of successes (*Suvorov V. The Shadow of Victory*, pp. 213-214). We will put the question differently: we are again talking about "forced eyewash", when the totalitarian leader is told not what is, but what he would like to hear. But the question is: why did Stalin want to hear exactly this? Why was he so eager to launch a clearly premature offensive along the entire front? If we look at the situation on a global scale and remember who started the Second World War and why, then Stalin's behavior will seem by no means erroneous, and certainly not stupid.

Recall that on December 7-8, 1941. The United States finally entered World War II. This circumstance not only strengthened the anti-Hitler coalition, but also radically changed the balance of forces within it in favor of Western democracies.

True, the beginning of the war was for the United States, to put it mildly, not the most successful: after the disaster of the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, the Japanese captured Southeast Asia and a number of islands in the western Pacific Ocean in six months. However, one did not have to have the mind of Stalin to understand that the failures of the Americans are a temporary phenomenon, caused by their complete unpreparedness for war (we still let's talk in more detail), and in the long term, America is able to deploy huge military forces and achieve great military successes.

If the Americans are given time for this, then one will have to forget about a single-handed victory over Germany and Japan and the "liberation" of all the territories they seized - a significant part of these territories will be occupied by the Americans and the British.

Conclusion: it is necessary at all costs to put an end to Germany earlier, and then strike at

Japan. Obviously, the airborne corps, which were mentioned above, were prepared in the hope that in the near future it would be possible to turn the tide and use the "winged infantry" in offensive battles. Stalin could not help but know that Hitler's offensive was running out of steam, and he hoped to win in Europe before the Americans achieved a turning point in the war with Japan.

By the way, about Japan. When the Japanese landed in the Philippines in December 1941 and met more stubborn than expected resistance from the Americans and Filipinos, the Japanese commander, General Homma, requested reinforcements from the Kwantung Army. This was refused to him (*Yakovlev N.N.* September 3, 1945 // *Selected Works. M.*, 1990. P. 537). Why?

The answer to the question is simple, and it was given by the American General MacArthur (at that time in command of the US troops in the Philippines): "Reliable information obtained here shows that the enemy is most afraid of Russia's entry into the war" (*Ibid.*, p. 5).

The Soviet-Japanese treaty of April 13, 1941 caused a negative reaction both in Germany and Italy, and in the USA, Britain and China (up to American economic sanctions against the USSR and a hostile attitude towards our military advisers in China), however, the Soviet the ambassador then assured the Chinese leadership that "the troops against the Kwantung Army, on the contrary, would be strengthened" (*Slavinsky*, pp. 109-113).

Indeed, the reinforcement of the Soviet Far East Front continued. For the first half

In 1941, for example, the 35th (!) Army, the 235th mechanized and 59th tank (that is, newly formed) divisions, the fifth strategic aviation corps, etc. were transferred there. (*History of the Second World War in 12 volumes. Vol. 3. P. 436*). It is not surprising that Japan, having decided on July 2, 1941, to go to war

against the USA and Britain, on the same day decided to strengthen the Kwantung Army from 300 to 600 thousand people. (Ibid. T. 4. S. 20-21,252).

Up until the summer of 1942, Soviet troops in the Far East outnumbered the Japanese Kwantung Army almost twice, with an incomparably better defense.

ruzhenie: in the spring of 1941, the Kwantung Army had 12 divisions with a total number of 300-400 thousand people. (Ibidzha. S. 20-21), in autumn - 600-700 thousand people. against 1,343,000 from the USSR (Ibid., p. 252). In 1942 alone, 16 Soviet divisions were transferred from the Far East to the front against Germany (Ibid., vol. 5, p. 338), i.e. in the same proportion, at least half a million people; before that, there were 47 divisions and three brigades against Japan (that is, a million and a half).

For all that, the transfer of Soviet armies from the Far East to the German front did not in the least mean a decrease in the number of troops on the Far Eastern Front. The fact is that the commander of the Far Eastern Front, General of the Army I.R. Apanasenko immediately replaced those transferred to the west with newly mobilized ones: at his own peril and risk, without asking anyone, he announced the mobilization of all ages up to 55 years, and also began the release of prisoners from the camps. As a result, having transferred against Germany for the first year of the Great Patriotic

22 divisions, Apanasenko did not reduce the number of troops stationed against Japan. Moreover, until the summer of 1942, the number of these troops grew. By the way, on this basis, there were serious skirmishes between the allies on the "Axis": German intelligence insisted that the USSR was transferring troops against Germany, while the Japanese replied that not a single Soviet division had left its deployment sites (Suvorov V. Cleansing pp. 282-283). Obviously, this circumstance could not but inspire fear in the Japanese, especially after the Red Army had driven the Germans away from Moscow.

Moreover, at the time of the greatest initial successes of Japanese weapons (winter 1942), some representatives of the American establishment lost heart and themselves appealed to the USSR for help against Japan. The same MacArthur, for example, did this on February 23, 1942, timing his speech on the radio to coincide with the 24th anniversary of the Red Army (*Yakovlev N.N.* September 3, 1945, p. 538,543) - So, the Americans themselves invite Stalin use the Japanese "icebreaker" for your own purposes! The situation is unique, which - and this was clear to Stalin then - will never happen again. It is clear that, having recovered from the initial shock caused by the Japanese attack, the Allies will never show such weakness again. And Stalin could afford not to take advantage of this?! But first, it was necessary to smash Germany as quickly as possible ...

But in order to attack with the use of airborne assault, air supremacy is necessary. In summer

In 1941, while preparing Operation Thunderstorm, they hoped to achieve this by a surprise attack on German airfields. And six months later, what did you expect?

And here's what. Even according to official Soviet data, by December 1941 the Germans had 600 aircraft near Moscow against 850 Soviet ones. While advancing, the Germans kept them, presumably, not very far from the front line, and Zhukov could well count on destroying them right on the airfields with a surprise counteroffensive. As he had already succeeded once, in August 1939 at Khalkhin Gol.

However, unexpectedly, the "counteroffensive", which, as is known, began on December 5-6, 1941, turned into a mere offensive. On the eve of December 4, the Wehrmacht troops received an order to go on the defensive. From the point of view of a defensive war, the beginning of the offensive was a success: if the Red Army had held out with the transition to the offensive for another week, it would have had to face a well-prepared defense.

enemy. So a quarter of a century later, Zhukov will tell K. Simonov (*Simonov K.* Through the eyes of a man of my generation. S. 329-330).

Yes, in terms of a defensive war it was a success. But from the point of view of the operation "Thunderstorm" No. 2 - a failure. Clear the sky with a surprise strike against nearby enemy airfields

didn't work out, that's why massive use

paratroopers failed. And where they were used, for example, the 4th airborne corps near Vyazma in February 1942 (more precisely, the 8th, 9th and 214th brigades of the 4th and 211th brigade of the 1st corps - The Last Republic, p. 383), turned out to be a failure.

Meanwhile, the spring of 1942 sets in. The Japanese offensive in the Pacific is gradually fizzling out, American troops arrive in Britain, American aircraft begin to take part

in the bombing of Germany. And Stalin continues his desperate attempts to break through the German front: in February, for example, Rokossovsky's 16th army receives an order to advance from Sukhinichi and "exhaust and weaken the enemy" with a direct ban on going on the defensive (Rokossovsky K.K Soldier's duty . S. 109-114); in February-March, offensive operations are underway near Vyazma using, as already mentioned, units of the 1st and 4th airborne corps, in March-June - on the Volkhov. At the end of May and in June, attempts were made to advance near Zhizdra (*Ibid.*, pp. 119-122). All these attempts end in failure.

On June 4-6, 1942, the Americans smash at about. Midu hey Japanese fleet trying to capture the Hawaiian Islands. This is a turning point in the Pacific War. If the Japanese had won this battle, the front would have moved to the very Pacific coast of America. There is a point of view that the Americans would have to spend several months, if not years, on the return of the Hawaiian Islands. The author of this

True, it is true that the hypothetical capture of the Hawaiian Islands links the hypothetical capture of the Hawaiian Islands not with June 1942, but with the first days, if not hours, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, but in any case, the consequences would be most unpleasant for the United States. He also adds that in this situation, the Japanese could create even more trouble for the Americans, for example, with shipping in the Panama Canal (*Khramchikhin A.A. World War II: subjunctive // Znamya. 2005. No. 5. P. 187*).

One way or another, it is unlikely that in this situation, by August 1945, the Americans would have approached the very Japanese islands. Then the lightning defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet troops would have given Stalin not only Manchuria and half of Korea ...

Some American historians consider the Battle of Midway to be a turning point in the course of the entire Second World War. Soviet historians, of course, called this approach falsified, but in the light of our discussions about the nature of the war as a geopolitical confrontation between the USSR and the United

say...

On June 28, 1942, the Wehrmacht begins a general offensive against Stalingrad. Two months later, the Germans are already standing on the banks of the Volga and in the foothills of the Caucasus. And the Americans in the Pacific Ocean are already pushing the Japanese - on August 7, they landed on the island of Guadalcanal and began its liberation (however, it dragged on until February 1943).

It was at this time that Stalin's hope for a sole victory over Germany and Japan was finally buried, that all the territories they seized would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union. Now it could only be about a common victory with the allies, and the longer the war dragged on, the less after the end of the war the USSR should have got and the more the United States and Britain. Apparently, realizing this,

Stalin began in the summer of 1942 what he had not done even in the autumn of 1941, when the Germans were standing near Moscow, he began to reduce the Soviet armies in the Far East, opposing the Kwantung Army (by the summer of 1942 they reached 1,446,000 soldiers and officers). If earlier Apanasenko formed new divisions to replace those transferred to the west, now this was not done. Again, Soviet troops in the Far East will begin to build up only in the spring of 1945.

That is why it was in the summer of 1942 that Stalin finally and irrevocably lost the Second World War.

Chapter XIX

THE MYSTERY OF KHARKOV

It was not Hitler's strategy that determined the course of hostilities, but the course of operations of the Soviet troops increasingly determined fascist strategy. It became a strategy involuntarily.

*(D.E. Melnikov, L.B. Chernaya.
Criminal number 1)*

So, in the spring of 1942, going on a general offensive and inflicting a decisive defeat on Germany before the United States recovers from its first setbacks in the Pacific and begins to deploy forces is clearly not possible. The attempts of the Soviet offensive against Germany with the aim of "defeating in the same 1942" are frustrated one after another. And on May 12, 1942, another offensive begins - near Kharkov. What happened next is well known. Let's give the floor to an official source (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Brief History. M., 1965 (hereinafter - VOV-KI), pp. 162-163).

"On May 23, the German 6th Army, advancing from the north, and the troops of the Kleist group, advancing from the south, united in the area south of Balakleya. Troops 6th, 57th ar

miy and the group of General L.V. Bobkin were surrounded. From May 24 to May 29, they fought a hard fight against superior enemy forces with complete air supremacy... Attempts by Soviet soldiers to break through the encirclement came to nothing... Thus, the successfully launched Kharkov operation ended in a major defeat of our troops, the Southwestern and Southern fronts suffered heavy losses in people and military equipment ...

As a result of our failures in the Kharkov area, the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front changed radically in favor of the enemy. Having cut off the Barvenkovsky ledge, the German troops took advantageous starting positions for a long-range our offensive."

And now get ready for long quotes from an unofficial historian - Keistut Zakoretsky (December 6, 1941 - A radical strategic turning point // ZHISTORY website on the Internet). The point of view offered by this author fits incredibly well into my concept of the course of hostilities in 1942. Even more: it was Zakoretsky who helped me resolve the logical contradiction between the "definitely lost war" and the "last chance" to win it. In short, I consider it necessary to present Zakoretsky's text with minor amendments. So, Keistut For Koretsky, you have the floor.

Historians do not like to remember the Kharkov battle of 1942. Not only because it was lost with great losses, but also because attempts to logically

to explain the reasons for certain actions of the Soviet command, they stumble upon a number of unanswered questions and strange illogicalities. Ultimately, the blame for this defeat is attributed to two people to Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, who was the head of the committee of the South-West direction, and on the

I.V. Stalin, who was then the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Tymoshenko is blamed for the fact that he overestimated his own strength, underestimated the enemy, did not take into account some intelligence data and trusted too much in others, did not show the necessary efficiency in a timely manner. giving the required orders, constantly reinsured himself with the Supreme, etc.

The battle plan itself is also strange. You need a map to appreciate it. The most detailed is in the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" (T. 8. S. 365). It is officially accepted that the main goal of the Soviet plan was to encircle the German troops near Kharkov, liberate this city, and then attack from the northeast it was planned to liberate Dnepropetrovsk and Sinelnikovo, thereby depriving the enemy of the most important crossing over the Dnieper and the railway junction of Sinelnikovo. However, the offensive to the west from the operational "sack", which was the Barvenkovo-Lozovsky ledge, not only did not level the front, but, on the contrary, took the Soviet troops even more into the Lozovsky "sack" of the German Army Group "South", which could be formed in the event that the resistance of the German troops did not allow uniting with the advancing north of the 29th Army. Especially since, based on the configuration of the front, the option of liquidating the Balakliya salient of the Germans by converging strikes along the Zmiev-Chuguev line was seen as more realistic and important.

The strangeness of this plan can also be attributed to the fact that by the time it was developed, the Soviet command had intelligence data on the plans of the enemy (in general, quite a lot has been written about how quickly the most secret German plans got on the Stalinist table. - D.V .), which, it turns out, were almost not taken into account. Stalin's attitude towards the top commanders who allowed such a tragedy is also strange - he did not at all use the punisher on them.

measures such as those taken against the command of the Western Front in the summer of 1941.

And there is another oddity that almost no one wants to analyze. On the one hand, the plan of the operation was approved by the Headquarters, which practically removed the General Staff from control over its implementation, ordering it to consider this operation an internal affair of the direction itself (more precisely, this decision was made by Stalin himself). But when various difficulties and threats of defeat began to arise in its implementation, for some reason the required decisions were not made by the Commander-in-Chief of the direction (Timoshenko) without the consent of the Supreme Commander (Stalin). And for some reason the Supreme Commander showed a strange slowness. An amazing thing: if the operation is an "internal matter of the Commander-in-Chief" (which is strange in itself in the conditions of a sharp shortage of resources!), then why can't he make the necessary decisions in time, but is forced to ask someone for permission? In this case, whose "internal affair" was that operation - the Commander-in-Chief (Timoshenko) or the Supreme Commander (Stalin)?

Here, for example, is the opinion expressed in The History of the CPSU (M., 1962, p. 554): "The unsuccessful outcome of the Kharkov operation was mainly the result of the fact that Stalin did not take into account the correct and persistent proposals of the Military Council of the South Western Direction, did not allow the timely turn of the forces of the Soviet troops from the Kharkov direction to the southeast, from where the enemy struck.

Further, "on the evening of May 18, a member of the Military Council of the South-Western Direction (i.e., the highest political leader of this structure) N. S. Khrushchev, after telephone conversations with General AM. Vasilevsky and, on his recommendation, turned to I.V. Stalin with a request to prohibit the further conduct of the offensive in the Kharkov region. But the Supreme Command

The speaker confirmed his previous decision. And only on the evening of May 19, when there was a clear threat of encirclement The 6th, 57th armies and the group of General Bobkin, the commander-in-chief of the direction, decided to suspend the offensive ... This decision was approved by the Headquarters. But it was accepted with a great delay" (VOV-KI, p. 161).

(Here I interrupt the quotation of Zakoretsky in order to comment: in 1965, when a brief history of the Great Patriotic War was being compiled, Khrushchev already retired, so the wise decision is attributed not so much to him as to Vasilevsky. —D. V.) But the very fact is confirmed by Vasilevsky himself in his memoirs (Delo vse Zhizni. M., 1976, p. 214): than I first of all reported to the Supreme. At about 6 or 7 pm on the same day, N.S., a member of the military council of the South-Western direction, called me. Khrushchev. He briefly informed me about the situation on the Barvenkovsky ledge, said that I.V. Stalin rejected their proposals for an immediate cessation of the offensive and asked me to report back to the Supreme Commander on their request. I replied that I had already tried to convince the Supreme Commander of this more than once, and that, referring precisely to the opposite reports of the Military Council of the South-Western Direction, Stalin rejected my proposals. Therefore, I recommended N.S. Khrushchev, as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, to apply directly to the Supreme. Khrushchev soon informed me that the conversation with the Supreme Commander through G.M. Malenkov took place, that he confirmed the order to continue the offensive.

Strange affair! It cannot be assumed that the generals and the Supreme Commander did not have maps, that there were no reports about the development of the situation, that there were no intelligence data and no one drew conclusions. And the situation developed in such a way that it became clear even to the political commissar that "the case smells of kerosene"! And why

then it is not the Commander-in-Chief of the direction, not the General Staff, but, strictly speaking, the political assistant to the Commander-in-Chief is seeking permission from the Supreme Commander to save the situation?! And for some reason, the Supreme Commander, spitting on all the conclusions of the specialist generals, continues to insist on what is obviously the wrong decision!

Well, you can't assume that all the top bosses suddenly went crazy for a short time! But then what's the point?

However, the oddities don't end there. It turns out that the General Staff of the Red Army at that time also found itself without an official head! April 24 I.V. Stalin informed General Vasilevsky by telephone that the Stavka was compelled to release B.M. Shaposhnikov from work for health reasons, and temporarily assign the duties of the chief of the General Staff to him. And Vasilevsky, by the way, was still a lieutenant general at that time! He was promoted to the rank of colonel-general on April 26, 1942. But the final official order of the NPO to dismiss Shaposhnikov from the post of chief of the General Staff was announced for some reason "at the end of May." And throughout May-June 1942, Stalin begged (!?!). Vasilevsky to agree to accept this position. Vasilevsky refuses. But on June 26, 1942, he was approved on it by order of the Headquarters.

Strange situation. At the front, a fragile parity of forces with the enemy was barely established, which could be violated at any time. There are no serious strategic reserves yet. At this time, various offensive operations are being launched (Crimea, northwest, Kharkov) with not quite competent control. The conclusions of the General Staff are poorly taken into account. And his boss is generally removed from business, but they can't find a new one in any way, they beg Vasilevsky, he refuses for a long time. What's happening?

But this question cannot be answered by considering the situation only from the operational-tactical side.

(military). So historians cannot come to final conclusions. And the answers are up in the air. It turns out that in the first half of 1942 there was some kind of "eclipse" on the Supreme Commander and a number of marshals. But if we take the situation seriously, then this conclusion should be discarded. There must be a reason, and a perfectly logical one.

To begin with, it would be useful to remember that, in general, any war is a competition of reserves. In the 1970s, we were told that the regular army of the Land of Soviets was counted on for the first 3 (three) days of fighting, when a serious war began with the use of atomic weapons. At the same time, we asked a counter question: "What next?" Further allegedly assuming elk use stock.

So, in June 1941, the Soviet Union lost many strategic reserves in terms of materiel (first of all, ready-made weapons - tanks, aircraft, as well as ammunition and raw materials), and then a lot of means of their production (I remind you that, for example, Hitler got 85% of factories for the production of ammunition, because they were built with the expectation of an offensive war in the western regions of the USSR (*Suvorov V. Den-M . M., 2002. S. 118. -D.V.*). irrevocably, the other had to be urgently stopped and relocated over long distances to the East, with the subsequent restoration of production.

Here again I deviate a couple of lines from Zakoretsky's text. So, in the spring of 1942, it was not possible to launch a general offensive, but this was not enough: strategic reserves were used up in fruitless attempts. Until the evacuated industry comes into full operation, until new strategic reserves are created, it is impossible to carry out broad offensive operations. That is, following

no move to strategic defense. But this plan is unrealistic. Firstly, too much reinforced concrete will be required, which also somehow needs to be produced. And then, in the event of an offensive, all this will be aimlessly thrown. Secondly, continuous trenches in three rows thousands of kilometers long will not allow the situation on the ground. And the enemy will constantly try to find gaps on the flanks. Therefore, along the entire front, it will be necessary to keep mobile reserves, which are not yet available. And if it is not known in what place and with what forces the enemy will launch an offensive, then the task becomes generally unsolvable.

The citation of Zakoretsky is over for this chapter. I will add one more important circumstance from myself: Stalin has already entered into competition with the Western allies, who will occupy the territories occupied by Hitler more. And time is working against him. Well, for another year the Allies will not be able to carry out serious attack operations in Europe, and then? So, it is necessary to ensure that by that moment the Wehrmacht has suffered the largest possible defeat in the East, and the Red Army is capable of offensive operations over as long distances as possible. Ideally, it would be good to completely defeat Germany somewhere by the spring of 1943.

It remains to decide how to do it.

Chapter XX

HOW STALIN SEEKED "THE LAST CHANCE"

Everyone saw the Stalingrad trap
except Hitler and his generals.

(V. Grossman. *"Life and Fate"*)

And again, the word to Keistut Zakoretsky, but now I will interrupt him with my arguments and quotations from other authors much more often, therefore, instead of warning about each break in citing a quote

will have to be inverted. "Strange as it may sound, it would be better for the Soviet General Staff if it knew exactly in which directions the enemy would conduct active operations. Full clarity until May

The Soviet General Staff did not have 1942 on this score. As was said, there were no strategic reserves for a decisive offensive either - they could only be ready by autumn.

The plans of the Germans were known to Stalin. As early as April 5, 1942, Hitler decided to carry out the strongest offensive in the south. "But in addition, the Germans planned to attack near Leningrad, and "deal with" Sevastopol (it was possible), and they did not refuse the offensive on the Central Front. But in the south, Stalin and his military commanders saw an opportunity to create a huge strategic trap for the Wehrmacht in the North Caucasus, which, relying on impregnable defenses along the Volga and Don, could be turned into a giant "bag" in order to subsequently "cut off" it with strikes from flanks.

It remained to ensure that the Germans were guaranteed to get carried away by this sector, squander their reserves here, withdraw troops there from other fronts, thereby planning operations by the Soviet General Staff would become much calmer and more reliable. Moreover, if it succeeded, then the Stalingrad cauldron would serve only as a prelude to the gigantic encirclement of the Wehrmacht forces in the Caucasus - there should have been at least four Stalingrad cauldrons!

But Zakoretsky's trump card in favor of his point of view is "a photograph of the awarding of ALL command staff of the Soviet General Staff on May 26, 1942. The only case in the entire war! And this photo was published in various books, for example, in Shtemenko's book "The General Staff during the War Years" and in Vasilevsky's book "The Work of All Life". Can anyone notice that there is nothing special about this? Was it just awarded? Advance, right?

I propose to analyze. In order for officers to come to receive awards on some day, they had to learn about it at least the previous day (in this case, May 25). And in order for them to be informed about the award, an order must be issued, the passage of which through the authorities also requires at least a day (i.e. May 24). But an order on the General Staff can only be accepted by the Supreme Commander in connection with some event at the front that happened even earlier (that is, no later than the evening of May 23, 1942). It remains to be seen whether something important happened on the Soviet-German front on May 23, 1942?

Yes, it happened. On May 23, the German 6th Army, advancing from the north, and the troops of the Kleist group, advancing from the south, united in the area south of Balakleya. And no matter what they say, this operation took place under the direct control of the Supreme. I can imagine what state Stalin was in when, on the evening of May 23, 1942, he was informed that the German troops near Kharkov had [finally] united!

As Zhukov once correctly said to Stalin in one of the films: "I don't know how the Germans will act, but based on the situation, they should act this way and not otherwise." How should the Germans have acted, having made a breach in the front? That's right, drive the reserves here and drive them on the offensive.

In the light of all that has been said, one can reassess the Kerch operation in the same May 1942. As is known, a Soviet offensive was being prepared there, but the Germans managed to forestall the Soviet troops. So, I used to consider this offensive (like the Kharkov one) a continuation of the Soviet operations of the winter of 1942, which had the goal of defeating Germany in the same 1942. So I wrote in the first edition of this book. In the light of what has been said, K. Zakoretsky will probably have to reconsider his point of view and recognize the Kerch offensive as part of the operation to lure the Wehrmacht into the "Caucasian bag". What is here

unlike Kharkov, the Germans were ahead of us, from this point of view it does not play a big role.

Further, writes Zakoretsky, the Wehrmacht would inevitably fall into a geopolitical trap in the Caucasus. In short, the outcome of the war became clear to Stalin (more precisely, it seemed to Stalin so, but more on that below. - D.V.), and if so, why not mark such an event? So they awarded the entire General Staff on May 26, 1942 - for a trap brilliantly set up for enemies (and at the same time for overseas allies-rivals)! And the trap was prepared in advance: "the territory of the North Caucasus was prepared in advance and systematically for occupation. For example, the Grozny oil wells were mothballed "with a guarantee", so that after their release, instead of their restoration, new ones would be drilled.

The awards continued after that. January 18 1943 the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was awarded to G.K. Zhukov, who also made a serious contribution to all this, February 16, 1943 - A.M. Vasilevsky (only a month before this appropriation he looked like an army general), on March 6, 1943 - and to Stalin himself (we admit: there was a reason).

And for the last time, the floor is given to Keistut Zakoretsky: he reports that "at the end of November 1942, Churchill sent a message to Stalin in which he learned with admiration that the offensive at Stalingrad was developing even better than he was told in August, when he came to Moscow for a visit. This means that already in August there was a plan for an autumn counteroffensive. Right. The offensive plan for Stalingrad was drawn up on July 30, 1942, when the Germans were still far from Stalingrad, and even more so from the Greater Caucasus Range (Red Star. 1992, September 1; cited by: Suvorov V. Shadow of Victory. S. 249 -251).

The plan of the operation was drawn up by Colonel of the General Staff (later Lieutenant General) Potapov. This information appeared in 1992, but then it was pushed back again. Viktor Suvorov suggests that this

It happened because Potapov took away the glory of a hundred Leningrad winner from Zhukov, but I have a slightly different opinion on this matter.

Let us recall what happened on July 30, 1942. Just then (July 25), the Soviet troops left Rostov. The Germans are still very far from Stalingrad.

Two days later, Stalin's famous order

No. 227, the essence of which can be expressed in three words: "Not a step back!" And after that, I somehow can't believe that Potapov acted on his own initiative.

In this case, I think that the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Vasilevsky, would at least

asked if the comrade colonel had everything in

next to the head. Like, Comrade Stalin clearly said:

Not one step back! And you, such and such, are going to run to Stalingrad? Something tells me that the initiative did not even come from Vasilevsky, but from somewhere higher up. In this case, it is understandable why chose to forget. It must be thought that not only Zakoretsky guessed about the lure plan ...

It remains to answer the question: why did such a carefully planned operation not lead to the desired results for Stalin?

More on this later.

Chapter XXI

ABOUT THE DEFENSIVE PERIOD

The constant striving to attack at all costs led to incessant repetitions of choked attacks and to heavy losses.

(E. Middeldorf. Tactics in the Russian campaign)

So, on June 28, 1942, German troops launched an offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In August, the greatest successes were achieved - the Germans reached the Volga and the Caucasus. And what at this time

the Red Army makes me? And all the same - trying to step on.

In June - July, the Red Army is advancing near Volkhov (Oryol region) (*Bunin A.N., Yakov Lev N.N.* 170,000 kilometers with G.K. Zhukov. P. 52). At the same time, the 5th Panzer Army was advancing from Yelets north of Voronezh, although unsuccessfully, as a result of which the Germans managed to go on the offensive here too (*Rokossovsky K.K.* Soldier's duty. P. 127).

From July 30 to August 23, the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation takes place. However, from our point of view, it is so important that it deserves a separate analysis; about her speech ahead.

Around the same days, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin tries several times to recapture Voronezh with the forces of his Southwestern Front (*Ibid.*, p. 131). From August 27 to October 6, Soviet troops advance near Leningrad. As soon as the German offensive was exhausted, a counterattack was launched from September 5 to September 11 north of Stalingrad (*Yakovlev N.N.* Marshal Zhukov. P. 42). Offensive operations continue in the Voronezh region (*Rokossovsky K.K.* S. 133).

Under the prevailing conditions in the summer of 1942, the Soviet government demanded that the Allies open a second front as soon as possible. But the allies are not in a hurry: let the Germans and Russians grind each other, and for now we will wait and accumulate strength. In a word, Roosevelt is doing to Hitler and Stalin exactly what Stalin wanted to do to Hitler and Western democracies when he started the Second World War: let them exhaust each other, while we accumulate strength. And there is nothing to be offended by for this. For those who accuse the allies of treachery and violation of their allied duty, I recommend remembering Stalin's position before June 1941 and his goals in the Second World War he started.

At the same time, just as Stalin in 1939-

1941 fueled Hitler with strategic resources to enable him to wage war against the West, just as Roosevelt is now feeding Stalin himself. Food, automotive equipment, locomotives, wagons, valuable strategic raw materials, means of communication, medicines and other things are not spared.

In addition to huge food aid (almost the entire Red Army ate American canned meat), the Allies met the needs of the USSR in aluminum - more than half, in aviation gasoline - by half (according to other sources - by a quarter), in gunpowder - by more than a third, in copper - almost half (*Sokolov B.* Victory, which was more terrible than many defeats // Knowledge is power. 2000. No. 5-6). According to other sources, the allies satisfied the needs of the USSR for aluminum almost to 100% (*Suvorov V.* The Last Republic, pp. 148-149), in cars - by 2/3 (they themselves produced 205,000 trucks, and received from the USA 427,000, and by 1945, American cars accounted for 70% of the USSR fleet (*Pozdeeva L.V.* Lend-Lease for the USSR: the discussion continues // Second World War. Actual Problems. P. 334)).

The needs of the USSR in armored personnel carriers were satisfied by American deliveries by 100% (7172 in the absence of their production in the USSR), in locomotives - by 22/23. G.K. Zhukov admitted that without American supplies, we would have nothing to carry artillery, and not only artillery, the situation with providing the army with gunpowder would have been much more difficult (*Simonov K.M.* Through the eyes of a man of my generation. P. 354). In general, the deliveries of the allies accounted for 20% of Soviet production and allowed the USSR to additionally send to the front 7-8 million men (*Harrison M.* Soviet production of 1941-1945. To reassessment // Russia in the XX century. P. 499). In terms of efficiency, it is much more than

the second front opened in 1944, where the Allies landed about 5 million soldiers.

The official Soviet figure for allied deliveries - 4% - takes into account only ready-made weapons deliveries, which were really not great. For example, deliveries of small arms and cartridges for them amounted to less than 1% of the USSR's own production, although deliveries of some other types of military equipment were significantly higher: for example, tanks - 12,755, while Soviet production was 109,100 (although a correction should be made for this that American tanks were significantly worse than Soviet ones), bombers - 3633 against 18,000, fighters - 13,857 against 60,000, anti-aircraft guns - 8218 against 38,000 (i.e. more than 20% of Soviet production!). Finally, the USSR received from the United States a whole fleet of 202 torpedo boats, 140 submarine hunters, 77 minesweepers, 28 frigates (*Zelinsky S. Lend-Lease is worth a lot // Arguments and Facts. 2004. No. 13*), 105 submarines, 3 icebreakers - a total of 595 ships (*Suvorov V. The Last Republic. S. 147*). If we take a figure of 4% in general, then, as the British say in such cases, "in order to prove that there are more Irish than Chinese, only redheads must be counted."

But they are in no hurry with the second front itself. In reply On August 22-23, 1942, the Allies undertake the Dieppe landing operation, doomed to failure due to the negligible forces involved in it (5,000 British and 1,000 Canadian soldiers), to the demands of the USSR for its opening. The raid on Dieppe was intended for both Hitler and Stalin. Hitler seemed to be told: we are weak, we can't do anything against you in Europe, so transfer troops to Stalingrad and don't be afraid of anything. And to Stalin: excuse me, for the time being you will have to fight alone. Dieppe raid (as well as generally undiscovered

tie of the second front) also had its consequences, which we will talk about later.

To sweeten the pill, allies in September 1942 sharply increased their deliveries to the USSR. In particular, the sending of northern convoys was resumed, which had been suspended in early July, after the death of the PQ-17 convoy (however, the northern convoys were not the main supply route - 80% of them went through Iran; in fact, that is why Iran was in August - September 1941 was occupied by Soviet and British troops, and this was not the last reason that a year later Hitler was so eager for the Caucasus).

In October, with the forces of three armies representing two fronts, the Red Army tries to advance on the Don (*Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty. S. 144-145*). From October 16 to 20, successful northern operations are carried out in the Caucasus - on the Sangarsky passes, and on November 6-11 a successful operation is carried out near Mozdok (North Ossetia): the 11th Guards Rifle Corps surrounds the German 23rd Tank Division (*History of World War II wars, vol.*

Soviet historians call the period from June 22 1941 to November 18, 1942 was the defensive period of the war. When describing this period, we cited very few sources, including the memoirs of only one front-line military leader - K.K. Ro Kossovsky. And they found a lot of information about continuous attempts to attack. If desired, I think, such quotations - about endless offensive operations - can be typed in many other generals and marshals' memoirs.

Let us once again take a look at these continuous attempts to attack (why it is not always successful is another question) and ask: where is he, the defensive one? Why they continuously tried to attack is more or less clear: it was necessary to turn the tide of the war in their favor as soon as possible, so that after it ended, the USSR would get more and the Allies would get less.

The longer the war dragged on, the less profitable the post-war division of what was captured by the Axis countries became for the USSR.

By the way, the Japanese acted approximately the same way in the second half of 1942. After Midway, Japan's offensive capabilities were exhausted, but attempts to "advance regardless of casualties" continued until December 31, 1942, when the Japanese finally went on the defensive, having achieved little in six months.

The only difference is that the USSR in the second half not 1942 could **yet** advance, but Japan **already**.

Chapter XXII

WHAT THE WINGED TANKS WERE INTENDED FOR

Surprise - win!

(A. V. Suvorov)

In *The Icebreaker*, Viktor Suvorov writes that the designer Oleg Antonov, before the war, was engaged in the construction of a "winged tank", which, towed by a powerful transport aircraft, was supposed to suddenly fall on the wings right on the head of the enemy. The control of the flying tank was carried out by turning the wings and tail stabilizers, which were set in motion by lifting the tank's cannon or turning the turret. When landing, the tank turned on the engine, accelerated the rotation of the tracks to maximum speed, and so landed. After that, the wings and tail were dropped, and the flying tank turned into a regular one.

Oleg Antonov was late with the creation of the winged tank, the Germans struck first, and the tank was no longer needed, like many other things prepared by Stalin for the first strike on Germany (*Suvorov V. Ledokol. M., 2002. P. 121*). However, in the light of everything said in this book, there is reason to believe that Stalin did not abandon his idea of a winged tank, but simply shelved it.

And this is confirmed by the author, who is trying not to leave stone unturned from the concept of the Icebreaker.

I mean the work of a certain "Viktor Surovov" "Icebreaker-2". I have serious to think that this creation was written by someone from secret supporters of Viktor Suvorov as a parody of his critics, because, as it seems to me, a mentally normal and not completely drunk (even if very stupid) person would not seriously write such a thing. In any case, if "Surov" set himself the goal of exposing the "Icebreaker", then the effect is obtained as in the well-known Soviet ditty: "They gave the radio the task of weaning everyone from drunkenness. The sober listened to the program and, out of frustration, began to drink.

This applies, among other things, to the flying tank - in Icebreaker-2 there is a special chapter "Tank-flyer and Rezun-lier". So, "Surovov" cites the Act on flight tests of an experimental AT glider, designed to transport the T-60 flying tank. At the same time, the characteristics of a flying tank are given: weight 5.8 tons, crew two people, gun caliber 20 mm does not do this). And he adds: "Oh yes, the eggheads, they scared Guderian with a 20 mm fluff!" (Icebreaker-2. Minsk, 2002. S. 182).

Well, you have to pay for everything, for the ability to swim and fly too. Tanks pay for this skill with their low weight and light armor - the T-34 or KV, like the "Tiger", cannot be forced to swim or fly. But there are situations, writes Viktor Suvorov, when a floating tank is simply indispensable. For example, it is necessary to cross a river, and to do this, capture a bridge. It is better to do this from the rear, so that the enemy does not expect a blow and does not have time to blow up the bridge. And this is where the price of light vehicles armed only with machine guns (such was the Soviet T-40 amphibious tank) rises sharply. He can for

siege the river and hit the guards of the bridge from where they don't expect it. Well, and as a cover for infantry floating across the river, at which the enemy, of course, shoots from everything that is possible, a floating tank is indispensable. Well, when the bridge was recaptured and heavy and medium tanks went across it, the amphibious light tank modestly gives way to them. By the way, the German T-I tank had approximately the same dimensions (weight, armor, armament) as our T-40, only it could not swim (*Suvorov V. Suicide. M., 2000. P. 182, 186*).

Here is a flying tank from the same breed. Imagine a strong enemy defense like the Mannerheim Line. It is not so easy to overcome it even with heavy-duty tanks. The winter war with Finland showed this. And here, behind enemy lines, it is not clear where the tanks come from, even if they are light, but they strike where they did not expect, and the enemy cannot understand: where did they come from, from the sky, or something? From the sky!

Two thousand years before A.V. Suvorov pro uttered the words in the epigraph, Alexander the Great adhered to the principle: to do what the enemy least of all expects from you. So the flying tanks that have fallen on the head of the enemy will in any case greatly facilitate the success of the main forces. By the way, the testers of the flying tank write that their appearance at a nearby airfield caused a shock - they were mistaken for some kind of monstrous enemy aircraft (*Surovov V. Ledokol-2. P. 183*)! Well, after taking the fortified line of the enemy, the flying tank will give way to more powerful ones, it will be taken to the rear and new wings will be prepared for it in anticipation of a new opportunity to come in handy. By the way, the German T-I had the same dimensions as our T-60, only without a gun, and the T-II was a little heavier (7.6 tons), but their guns were the same - 20 mm (*Suvorov V. Last republic, pp. 413-414*). But neither one nor the other knew how to fly.

And now the question is: what were the flying tanks intended for? "Viktor Surovov", in his usual

without referring to anyone, he says: for the partisans (Icebreaker-2, p. 183). Obviously, this author has no idea with what difficulties the air delivery of goods to the partisans was associated, how difficult it was to land aircraft in the partisan areas. As a rule, supplies for the partisans were simply dropped by parachute. People who were thrown into partisan areas, too.

Or here's another example. In the first years after the overthrow of Khrushchev, two tabloid newspapers published a "sensation" that supposedly Khrushchev's son, a pilot, became a traitor, served the Germans, then Stalin ordered the partisans to steal him, sent for him a plane that took him to Moscow, where he was shot. Say, because of this, Khrushchev exposed the "cult of personality" - in order to take revenge. The version has been refuted many times, and everything seems to be clear with it, but the following is important for us: one of the critics of the version emphasizes that, due to the difficulty of landing the aircraft of captured traitors of any rank, the traitors were ordered to be executed on the spot.

But let us assume that the partisans managed to drop a flying tank. So, what is next? Without fuel, he will not last long, and if he wants to capture him at a gas station, then the enemy will probably figure it out and send anti-tank artillery and everything necessary for destruction to all gas stations in advance. Does anyone need a lot of tank?

Finding fault "Suvorov" and other details - on for example, to the tank's flight control mechanism - in fact, they say, its wings were controlled through pedals and levers, and not through turns of the turret and gun. Or to the fact that the engine should not work during landing, otherwise the pistons and caterpillars will "fly" (Icebreaker-2. P. 183-184). But all this does not negate the main problem: what was it intended for?

Let's pay attention to the date of testing the tank: September 2, 1942 July 30, as we saw, Colonel Poe

Tapov presented to the Chief of the General Staff AM. Vasilevsky draft plan for the Stalingrad operation. In the course of August, the front took on the desired configuration—the gigantic Stalingrad-Caucasian sack was practically ready! The time has come to prepare everything necessary for the offensive. Here they are preparing.

However, it may be that the "winged tank" was being prepared for some future operations. One thing is clear: the use of such types of equipment (as well as airborne troops) is possible only under conditions of complete air supremacy. But the time of this domination during the Second World War never came. Although in the autumn of 1944 the situation was close to this; we'll talk about this later.

Chapter XXIII

HOW THE LAST CHANCE WAS LOST

If things continue like this for the Russians, there will be no need for a second front.

(F. Roosevelt, 1943)

Did Roosevelt guess Stalin's plan then, in May 1942? Don't know. But if he figured it out, how could he prevent its implementation? But when the Soviet troops in the winter of 1942-1943. created by their actions the threat of a quick and complete defeat of Germany, the allies reacted quickly and managed to thwart the Soviet plan to create a giant Caucasus pocket and, accordingly, deprive the USSR of the last chance for victory.

November 19, 1942 the Soviet offensive began near Stalingrad. On November 23, the encirclement closed around the 6th Army of Paulus. And on November 25, Zhukov launched an attack on Rzhev and Sychevka for the deputy of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. V. Suvorov writes (referring to the memoirs of a number of military leaders):

The Stalingrad operation was conceived as an auxiliary operation, and the Rzhev-Sychevsk one as the main one. Zhukov, they say, "failed ineptly" this operation, so it was retroactively lowered into the category of secondary and distracting (Shadow of Victory, pp. 233-235). However, we saw how Stalin lures the Wehrmacht into the Caucasian bag; after everything said by K. Zakoretsky, we have serious grounds for thinking that the main blow was nevertheless planned at Stalingrad.

But what about the offensive in the central directions? What about Zhukov near Rzhev and Sychevka? Let us pose the question: what if the plan was such - to carry out a distracting operation on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, but in such a way that the Germans would take it for the main one? Then everything becomes clear: both the earlier start of the offensive near Stalingrad than near Rzhev (it is customary to start a distraction operation earlier, and the Germans also understood this and should have drawn the appropriate conclusions), and the fact that Zhukov departed on November 16, 1942 from under Stalingrad and, not very disguised, was preparing an operation on the Rzhev-Sychevsky direction.

V. Suvorov himself writes: where Stalin is preparing an offensive, he hides Zhukov, where he is going to defend himself, he demonstrates Zhukov (Den-MS 260-261). Later, in 1944, during the preparation of the Bagration operation, Zhukov's special train remained in Western Ukraine and carried out intensive radio exchange, imitating staff work, while Zhukov himself was secretly in Belarus (Buchin A.N., Yakovlev N. .N. 170,000 kilometers with G.K. Zhukov, p. 93). The principle is the same.

Logically, where Stalin planned the main attack in 1942, he should have hidden Zhukov. Indeed, Zhukov's stay at Stalingrad was not advertised. And where a secondary strike was planned, masquerading as the main one, Stalin Zhukov was also supposed to demonstrate.

He did exactly that. Zhukov became Stalin's deputy on August 26, 1942, and only after that did he get the right to take an interest in the affairs of Stalingrad. Therefore, Stalin and Vasilevsky dedicated him to the plan of operation only on September 14, after he had been near Stalingrad and got acquainted with the situation. The fact that Zhukov was not at the origin of planning the offensive at Stalingrad does not automatically mean that he did not take part in its preparation. And having made his contribution, he departed on November 16 near Rzhev: firstly, so as not to be an eyesore to the Germans, and secondly, if a simple secondary blow can be entrusted to anyone, then a secondary one, masquerading as the main one, is only for a proven person!

And the Germans pecked! As he writes in his memoirs A.M. Vasilevsky, even in November 1942, German intelligence reported to Hitler that the main Russian attack was being prepared in the Smolensk direction, and a secondary one in the Don region, and the task of the latter was only to "push back" the German armies from Stalingrad (quoted from: *Melnikov D.E., Chernaya L.B.* Offender number 1. S. 371).

At a critical moment, however, Zhukov appeared near Stalingrad. It was in the twenties of December, when Manstein's grouping tried to deblock the Stalingrad grouping. Zhukov, according to his personal driver A.N. Buchin, came to the Southwestern Front to N.F. Vatutin and, together with him, struck at the flank of the Manstein group. Even the biographer Zhukov N.N. Yakovlev, having learned from Bucha about this trip, admitted that he knew nothing about Zhukov's stay on the Voronezh front. Having listed the military operations on this front - the defeat of the 8th Italian army, the bold raid of the 24th tank corps of V.M. Badanov to the German rear, and admitting that this is Zhukov's handwriting, he adds that he "did not recognize the lion by its claws."

As a result, the situation changed radically, Manstein abandoned attempts to unblock the Paulus group, but Zhukov kept his trip secret and did not mention it in the future, not wanting to take away the glory from N.F., who died in the spring of 1944. Watuti na (Ibid.).

As a result of the Stalingrad victory, it became possible to defeat the Germans as early as 1943. The possibilities were enormous. A blow to Rostov could have slammed the Germans in the Caucasus (and they simply did not have fuel at that moment to pull the troops 500-600 kilometers away). In the Caucasus, four German armies would have remained surrounded - more than a million soldiers, almost four Stalingrad cauldrons! Meanwhile, already in February, the Red Army approached Dnepropetrovsk. It was there that another attempt was made to use the airborne troops for their intended purpose (*Suvorov V. Shadow of Victory*, p. 2).

Already in 1943, many military leaders saw the possibility of victory. In particular, A.I. Eremenko proposed not to finish off the Paulus grouping, but to strangle it with a blockade (without food, warm winter clothing, ammunition, etc., it would not have survived for a long time), leaving a minimum of troops for this, and sending all the freed forces to the external front (*Su vorov V. The Shadow of Victory*, pp. 242-247). If this were done, then, perhaps, the Central, Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts would be able to carry out the directive set by them - on February 15 to strike in the direction of Gomel and Smolensk. K.K. Rokossovsky does not write directly, but hints that if Eremenko's proposal was implemented, this would be possible (*Soldier's debt*, pp. 186-187).

I myself believe that Paulus's army did not need to be finished off, that it was doomed anyway. In any case, I heard a lot of controversy on this topic and participated in them myself, but from supporters of the opposite point of view (including those who insisted on

At that time) there was not (at least, I do not know) not a single reasonable argument in favor of the fact that the Stalingrad group of Germans had to be finished off, losing, of course, their soldiers.

All this is true, but after all, the Soviet troops blockading Stalingrad did not greatly outnumber the 330,000-strong Paulus group. Could the transfer of part of these forces (hardly more than 100-150 thousand) to the external front radically strengthen the Red Army? There, on the external front, after all, the bill went to millions of soldiers. Moreover, as we had the opportunity to see, the Soviet command, most likely, planned the "Caucasian bag" in advance.

Maybe I'm wrong, but, in my opinion, in order to understand why the operation near Rostov (to encircle the Germans in the Caucasus) and Kharkov (to the exit to the Dnieper) failed, it is necessary to analyze the situation in the world as a whole.

So, the prospect of Germany's defeat emerged as early as 1943. At the beginning of 1943, the Allies were still fighting in North Africa against Rommel's troops. There was (again and again!) a real threat that the whole of Europe would fall under the rule of Stalin. The Anglo-Americans needed to do something urgently.

They did. In February 1943, the allies stop their offensive in Africa, which gives the Germans the opportunity to transfer either 27 or 36 divisions to the Eastern Front (*Utkin A.I. Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt. S. 312-313*). The result was the defeat of the Soviet troops near Kharkov and the stabilization of the Soviet-German front for three months.

They will object: the attack on Rostov was thwarted earlier, back in December 1942, during Manstein's counterattack near Kotelnikovo. May be so. Let's see what the allies did in December 1942. So, only the British, who drove him out of Egypt, took active steps against Rommel's armies. And the main Anglo-American forces that had just liberated

Algeria and Morocco, until March 1943, stood inactive on the Tunisian border. Which also contributed to the transfer of German armies to the East.

And now let's return to the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in the summer of 1942. Viktor Suvorov drew attention to the fact that, apparently, the documents of this operation have not yet been declassified, the plans in it were very far-reaching - it is possible to reach Minsk and Riga (Shadow of Victory. S. 229-230).

But let us imagine that this was the case, and that the plan succeeded. Take a look at the map and see where Minsk and Riga are and where in July-August 1942 the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was located. After this, it is not difficult to imagine what a catastrophe would have befallen the German troops if the operation had been successful. Perhaps then it would be possible to carry out the directive of the Headquarters of January 7, 1942 and defeat Germany in the same 1942.

Probably, the Western allies also understood this. It is hardly by chance that it was during the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation that Churchill, who arrived in Moscow, announced that the second front would not be opened in 1942. This contributed to the transfer of additional forces by the Germans from France, including to the Moscow direction. Well, the Dieppe landing of the allies, which was mentioned, took place just then.

By the way, was it by chance that Stalin appointed Zhukov, before that commander-in-chief of the Western direction, as his deputy precisely on August 26, 1942, that is, immediately after the failure of the Rzhev-Sychevsky offensive? Perhaps it was precisely this step that meant the abandonment of a large-scale offensive in the center and the final transition to the "Rostov sack" option. However, it is possible that in the winter of 1942/43. Stalin could return to the idea of six months ago; then Zhukov's offensive should still be recognized as the main one, and not secondary. It is possible that it is precisely because of waiting for the results of this operation

the defeat of Manstein near Kotelnikovo delayed a whole month with a blow to Rostov. And the appearance of Zhukov near Stalingrad in the twentieth of December just marked Stalin's refusal to break through the German front in the Center in favor of this blow.

By the way, about our defeat near Kharkov. According to the personal driver Zhukov A.N. Buchin, the retreat of our troops was reminiscent of 1941: "trucks rushing towards, full of soldiers, riding, mercilessly whipping horses, and dragging along the roadsides groups of soldiers covered in mud from head to toe" (170,000 kilometers with G.K. Zhukov. S. 70). So, the Voronezh Front, defeated by the Germans, was commanded by the same F.I. Golikov, head of the GRU before the war. Coincidence? Perhaps Golikov was now receiving some secret instructions from Beria? I'm not saying anything, but I think there is something to think about. Moreover, as soon as the situation in the east returned to normal, the allies again went on the offensive in Africa and on May 13 1943 forced Rommel's armies to capitulate.

In June 1943, the Allies made it clear to Stalin that this year the second front would not be opened either. Things got to the point that for some time the Soviet ambassadors were recalled from London and Washington (*Utkin* Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt. S. 342).

On July 5, 1943, having gathered huge forces in the East, the Wehrmacht launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. This again facilitates the success of the allies in southern Italy. On July 10, the Allies landed in Sicily and liberated it by August 17, and on September 3 operations began in southern Italy. The Allied offensive continued until October 1, when they liberated Naples, and then stopped again. Why?

Maybe because the Soviet offensive in the east was developing too rapidly? Having beaten the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the Red Army on July 12 went on the offensive itself. But before August 23 (liberation of Kharkov and official

date of the end of the Battle of Kursk) the offensive was local and not very fast. But then ... Let's list only the liberated cities.

So, August 23 - Kharkov, August 26 - Sevsk, August 30 - Taganrog, Rylsk, Yelnya. September 1 - Dorogobuzh, September 2 - Lisichansk, Sumy. September 4 - Merefa, September 8 - Donetsk (then - Stalino), September 10 - Mariupol, Barvenkovo.

September 13 - Lohvitsa, September 15 - Nizhyn; on the same day, the command of the Wehrmacht ordered the retreat of German troops beyond the Dnieper, on September 16 - Novgorod-Seversky and Novorossiysk, on September 17 - Bryansk and Bezhitsa. September 19 - Dukhovshchina, September 21 - Chernigov, September 23 - Poltava, September 25 - Smolensk, September 29 - Kremenchuk.

In a month, Soviet armies traveled 300-400 km and went to the Dnieper for 700 km, starting 22- On September 23, they crossed it and in a matter of days captured 23 bridgeheads on its right bank. This is about this time the poems of A.T. Tvardovsky about "a good time" ("a joke or something: a day - a city, two days - a regional one").

The allies were worried again. It was then, at a meeting in Quebec, that Roosevelt and Churchill expressed their concern about the coming Soviet hegemony in Europe (*Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov*, p. 60). And so, at the end of September - beginning of October 1943, the Allies stopped their offensive in Italy, giving the Germans the opportunity to transfer new forces to the East.

And the Germans made it. In September-October alone, 19 German divisions were transferred from Europe to the Eastern Front, including three tank divisions (*History of the Second World War. M., 1976. Vol. 7. P. 188*). From November 1 to November 19, only the German 1st Panzer Army (in total, in the Soviet offensive zone from Smolensk to the Black Sea, the Wehrmacht had nine armies at that time) received one panzer division transferred from France, and in addition, five infantry and two

the tank divisions, which had previously been reduced to "battle groups" due to heavy losses, were replenished and restored as divisions (Ibid., p. 267).

One way or another, from the end of September, all the bridgeheads on the Dnieper captured by the Soviet troops were "on fire": the Germans, regardless of losses, tried to throw our troops into the Dnieper. They did not succeed, but the Soviet offensive on the Dnieper stalled until the end of December, and then it was no longer along the entire front (as in September), but only in Ukraine.

Soviet historians call the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper "the completion of a radical change in the course of the war." To some extent, this is true. The failure of the offensives in the spring of 1942 and the failure of the plan to "defeat Germany in the same 1942" and then attacking Japan finally put an end to the "icebreaking" scenario, and by the end of 1943, Stalin missed the last chance to end the war by conquering ("liberating") at least the entire continental Europe. In 1944 it was already too late. The Allies have already landed in Europe themselves.

Chapter XXIV

SECOND FRONT

What are we going to have between the
white snows of Russia and the white rocks
of Dover?

(W. Churchill, 1944)

In the winter of 1943-1944 The Red Army rapidly moved to the borders of Europe. Naturally, the Soviet plans to establish a "happy life" in the countries of Europe from 1941 to 1944 were not canceled by anyone. The memorandums of the former Soviet ambassador in London, I.M. Maisky V.M. Molotov is told quite clearly about the European (and not only) plans of the USSR. So, in a note dated January 11, 1944 No.

Maisky speaks of the need to "create conditions in Europe for the whole of Europe to become socialist within the next 30-50 years" and, in addition, "to secure free routes through Iran to the Persian Gulf." It was supposed to create regimes of "people's democracy" in Europe, if necessary - through "intervention from outside" (read - from the USSR) (*Filippov AM* In the corridors of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs // World War II. Actual problems. S. 56-58).

It is not surprising that Roosevelt and Churchill, alarmed by this prospect, began to seriously prepare for the opening of a second front. It was necessary to prevent the seizure of Europe by Stalin, why on June 6 1944 the Allies finally landed in Normandy. By the way, German intelligence "missed" this landing - the Allied landing was expected not in Normandy, but in the area of the Pas de Calais. It was after this happened that Hitler finally removed Kahnris from his position as chief of German intelligence. As it turned out, it was for what ...

Again and again, the USSR tried to take more territory in Europe - for example, in October 1944, an entire airborne army was created with the aim of seizing all the territories that at that time were still controlled by Hitler. The army was created from reservist paratroopers, who had trained at least a million before 1941 with the aim of using them in the war for world domination to drop landings into Western Europe captured by Hitler, into the Balkans, into African colonies, etc.; paratroopers were not needed in a defensive war, and it was necessary to form selected infantry units from reservists of paratroopers (for example, they were given the title of guards in advance) and stop the German offensives with them. Now those of them who remained were finally planned to be used for their intended purpose (V. *Suvorov*, *The Last Republic*, pp. 326-338, 359-382).

And under the rule of Hitler were, in addition to the part of Eastern Europe not yet occupied by Soviet troops, all of Germany and Austria, Northern Italy, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. Note that from October

1944 to early March 1945 The front lines in Western Europe remained practically unchanged, which gave the USSR hope to put all these countries under its control. The then Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, in a note dated November 15, 1944, spoke of the need to include in the sphere of influence of the USSR, in addition to Eastern Europe, also Norway and even Turkey, which was neutral at that moment (with the uncertain status of Germany) (*Filippov AM* In the corridors of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, p. 59). But by and large, it was no longer possible to capture the whole of Europe.

By the way, here's another interesting fact. As is known, on December 16, 1944, the Wehrmacht launched an offensive against the Allies in the Ardennes. The offensive did not pose a serious threat - by January 5, it was almost everywhere stopped, and in some places on January 3, the allies themselves went on the offensive. Yes, and the Germans were able to start it only because the non-flying weather for some time paralyzed the Allied aviation, which had a sevenfold superiority over the Luftwaffe. As soon as the flying weather settled, the Germans were quickly stopped.

But on January 5, 1945, one of the high-ranking American generals writes in his diary: "We can still lose this war." What was he so afraid of? Is it really the dying Third Reich? Or is it someone else?

I offer my own explanation: the allies were afraid that Hitler would transfer all his aircraft to the West, clear the sky in the East, and the USSR would be able to use its paratroopers to implement the above scenario. And after that, the allies in their remaining France, Belgium, Central and Southern Italy will not be very comfortable.

By the way, why did the allies turn to Stalin with a request for help? Indeed, by January 6, 1945, when this appeal was made, the German offensive had already been stopped everywhere. Moreover, in some places the allies went on the offensive. Isn't this connected with the fears of the allies: that Stalin will take and even suffice all the territories occupied by Hitler with the help of a mass drop of paratroopers. And the Stalinist offensive would divert German aviation from the Western Front to the Eastern Front (the main ground forces of the Wehrmacht were already concentrated in the East) and thereby disrupt the Soviet landing operation (as you know, air supremacy is necessary for such a one).

A more difficult question: why did Stalin succumb to this request of the allies? Expected that Hitler simply did not have time to prevent the landing? We will return to this issue later, as well as to the request of the allies for help.

One way or another, the fears of the allies did not come true. After the beginning of the Vistula-Oder operation, when the Red Army marched from Warsaw almost to Berlin in three weeks, Hitler again turned his attention to the East. And West Germany, Scandi Navia, Holland, Northern Italy were without special

hassle busy allies.

Chapter XXV

WHO PROTECTED HITLER FROM ATTEMPT?

Muller - Stirlitz:

Stirlitz, did you keep an accordion in the safe?

Well, you won't see her again. Why?

You are not the only one who misses the Motherland!

(Popular joke)

Already in the 11th volume of his writings (p. 25), five years before the Nazis came to power in Germany, Stalin writes that it is necessary to "crush fascism, destroy

live capitalism, establish Soviet power..." "Fascism is the executioner of Europe," writes Viktor Suvorov, citing this Stalinist quote. "Stalin supports the executioner, but even before the executioner began his bloody work, Stalin prepared for the executioner the same fate as his victims" (Icebreaker, 2002, p. 25).

Viktor Suvorov returns to this question many times. Hitler did roughly the same job for Stalin, he writes, as did Tukhachevsky, Yezhov, Yagoda, and so on. in Russia. "While Yezhov was smashing Stalin's enemies, Stalin drank to his health, brought gifts, awarded orders, invented titles and positions for him. But here Yezhov fulfilled his function, and Stalin crushed him with his fingernail, like a bloody bug, obviously nothing but disgust, without experiencing it. Hitler, who destroyed Stalin's enemies in Europe and cleared the way for Stalin's triumph, was met with the same fate and attitude after completing this task, summarizes

V. Suvorov (Suicide. P. 100).

Logically. But on June 22, 1941, Hitler manages to strike first. And for some reason, Stalin is in no hurry to eliminate him. But he could have done it. Already in 1942, the real power in the Third Reich was not with Hitler, but with Bormann. Back in 1941, the latter became instead of Hess, who had flown to Britain, the head of the party office, and in 1943, Hitler's personal secretary (*G. L. Rozanov*, *Hitler's Last Days*. M., 1961, p. 97).

Now Bormann decided who could be admitted to a personal reception with Hitler and who could not (and there were infinitely more of the latter than of the former). In the second case, as a rule, Bormann himself sketched out the proposed solution to the problem, read it to Hitler, and he, as a rule, agreed.

But Bormann, in the opinion of very many (for example, General Gehlen), worked for Stalin (more precisely, for Soviet intelligence since pre-Stalin times). In 1919, he, fighting as part of the White Guard troops

in the Baltic States, was taken prisoner by the Soviets. However, two years later, instead of being shot, or in extreme cases, to Solovki, he was released. At the same time, the concentration camp in the Ostashkov area (now the Tver region) was subordinate to the Register (then the name of the Soviet military intelligence) (V. Suvorov . Suicide. S. 96-98). By the way, it is still unclear where Bormann could have gone in May 1945 from the Nazi bunker, which was tightly surrounded by Soviet troops, where he remained literally until the last minute.

By the way, here it is useful to recall the plans of Hitler's offensive in the south of the USSR in 1942. I wrote above, referring to K. Zakoretsky, that Stalin pushed Hitler to this step with the Kharkov operation. However, it is known that Hitler decided to attack in the south even before that, on April 5, 1942, so Stalin went on the Kharkov offensive, most likely just out of reinsurance. So: who pushed Hitler to the decision to attack exactly in the way that was beneficial to Stalin? Is it Bormann?

Now back to the problem of eliminating Hitler. If Stalin wanted to remove the Nazi Fuhrer by assassination, he could in principle do it. But ... But Stalin was satisfied with only one option for the destruction (or, if possible, captivity) of Hitler: not by the hands of intelligence, but by the hands of the Soviet troops surrounding Hitler's shelter. Any assassination attempt on Hitler was directly disadvantageous to Stalin, both before and after June 22, 1941.

Indeed, let us imagine for a moment that somewhere in 1941 the attempt on Hitler's life succeeded. There is confusion in the leadership of the NSDAP: after all, everything is tied to the Fuhrer. The generals and industrial magnates, who never liked the Führer and the party leadership in general, could well arrange a putsch, overthrow the Nazis and conclude a separate peace with the West. It doesn't matter if it was in the summer of 1941, or in the real situation of the end of 1941, when the Wehrmacht was

or in a hypothetical situation at the end of 1941, when, having managed to strike first on July 6, 1941, the Red Army goes to the Rhine. In any case, the elimination of Hitler also meant the end of the war until the Soviet troops completely occupied Europe. This was unsuitable for Stalin. But it is beneficial to Roosevelt and Churchill.

Whether it would be better for the Germans is another matter. As a result of such a scenario of the development of events, instead of breaking the totalitarian Nazi machine, it was quite possible to get a "post-Nazi" Germany on the model of the current "post-Soviet" Russia with a mummy on Red Square and a "Stalinist" anthem, albeit pro-Western oriented in foreign policy.

On July 20, 1944, an attempt was made on Hitler, in which just prominent military leaders (Colonel-General Beck, field marshals Rommel, Witzleben, Kluge, etc.) and industrialists participated: the political leader of the conspiracy Goerdeler, for example, was a confidant of the head of the IG Farbeindustrie concern, as well as Member of the Supervisory Board of Krupp. Through Allen Dulles, head of American intelligence in Europe, the conspirators were connected with the United States and Britain (*G. L. Rozanov, Hitler's Last Days*, pp. 3-4).

The result of the conspiracy is known. What role did the Soviet secret services play in its failure? Don't know. But let us imagine that the conspiracy succeeds, Germany stops the war and withdraws its troops from the occupied countries, granting them independence and freedom. And the Red Army had just entered the border of the U 1941, and even then not everywhere. Then Stalin would not only see all of Europe, but also Eastern Europe. Did he need it? As they say, who benefits?

It seems that if, in terms of misleading Stalin about Hitler's plans for 1941, German intelligence acted in the same vein as Western intelligence services (albeit for other purposes), then in terms of protecting Hitler from assassination attempts by

Western intelligence agencies, his security service acted in the same vein as Soviet intelligence (albeit again for different purposes). And in this respect, Stalin and Hitler outplayed the West.

Further, it was Bormann who was the most ardent opponent of negotiations between the leadership of the Third Reich and the West. By the way, it is still not known exactly how Soviet intelligence learned about the negotiations between the German and Allied command on the Western Front in the winter of 1944-1945. or about the negotiations between K. Wolf and Dulles in Switzerland in March 1945 (Ibid., pp. 30, 34-35). The arrest at the end of April 1945 of Goering, who tried to save his own skin by personal negotiations with the West, also occurred after Bormann informed the Führer about this. By the way, here Bormann himself drafted an order for the arrest of Goering, and Hitler only signed it (Ibid., pp. 69-70). A little later, about the same story happened to Himmler (Ibid., p. 87).

It seems that it was Bormann who carefully suppressed any plans to open a front in the West and let the allies into Berlin before the Red Army. In this direction, Stalin also outplayed the Anglo-Americans, although this did not affect the global results of the war.

However, whether the Allies were so eager to be the first to enter Berlin remains to be seen.

Chapter XXVI

EXPLOSION ON ATATURK Boulevard

If Russia subdues Turkey, it will
become stronger than the rest of Europe.

(K. Marx, 1853)

On February **24** , 1942, on Atatürk Boulevard in Ankara, a certain terrorist threw a bomb at the German ambassador in Turkey, von Papen. The conspirator did not calculate, he pulled with a throw, and the bomb exploded in his hands.

The conspirator died, and von Papen and his wife escaped with scratches.

Soon the Turkish police arrested two Soviet citizens, Pavlov and Kornilov, on charges of this attempt. As it became known later, Eitingon himself led the assassination attempt. The immediate organizer was Pavlov, whose real name was Georgy Ivanovich Mordvinov. A certain Bulgarian communist became the direct executor. The reason for it was the news received by Soviet intelligence that the United States and Britain, through von Papen, were preparing to enter into separate peace negotiations with Germany (*Nekhamkin S. Explosion on Ataturk Boulevard // Izvestia. 2005.*

May 24).

Oh, it doesn't look like it! Why would the Allies make peace with Hitler at such a favorable moment for them, when he is bogged down in Russia? And yet...

As already mentioned, Stalin's plans included, going on a general offensive in 1942, to completely defeat Germany in the same year and end the war with the implementation of the "icebreaking" scenario. That Stalin's plan for 1942 failed, in February

1942 was still far from clear to everyone. But that's not the point. Stalin had good reason to fear that the United States and Britain had figured out his plans and were ready to thwart them by making a separate peace or at least a truce with Germany and allowing her to release dozens of divisions in the West, which she kept there in anticipation of the opening of a second front. It was natural for Stalin in such a situation to try to disrupt these, albeit hypothetical, negotiations. In such a situation, it was better to overdo it than to underdo it. However, this was not the only reason for the activity of the USSR in Turkey.

Much has been said and written, including by Viktor Suvorov, about the fact that the USSR and old Russia cannot be identified, that tsarist Russia, as

and other great powers, was engaged only in regional expansion, not striving to establish "tsarism" throughout the world, while the USSR was only satisfied with the world domination of the communists. There were, however, periods in Russian history when our country became the "gendarme of Europe", but even then there was still no talk of global expansion. However, there was one country in which Russia showed an increased interest for several centuries, regardless of who ruled the country and what - liberal or conservative - tendencies were characteristic of the Russian government at the moment. It's about Turkey.

It is clear that it was precisely in those periods when Russia showed heightened aggressive intentions that it stubbornly sought to subjugate this country to its influence - because of the unique geopolitical position of the latter, primarily because of the straits. So it was in 1815-1856, when Russian tsarism was the "gendarme of Europe." This was also the case in Soviet times, when the USSR was striving for "world communism".

In the first half of the 1920s. Turkey, which fought against the victors in the First World War, who tried to finally divide it, was a natural ally of "red" Russia. However, since the second half of the 1920s. Turkey's foreign policy is gradually becoming "multi-vector". The USSR, of course, does not like this, and it is active

with the aim of bringing Turkey back into the wake of Soviet foreign policy.

On the other hand, Germany, during periods of increased aggressiveness, is also active in Turkey - both because of the same straits and because Turkey was the most convenient springboard for German expansion in the East. So it was in the period 1888-1918, so it was again with the coming to power of Hitler.

For its part, the West, opposing either Russia or Germany, also sought to draw Turkey into its sphere of influence. So, in 1937, through the efforts of British diplomacy, the Saadabad Pact was concluded between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan (Military bloc policy of imperialism. Edited by P.A. Zhilin and R. Brul. *M.*, 1980. P. 270), directed both against the USSR and against the fascist powers.

It is logical to conclude that with the outbreak of World War II, both the USSR and Germany should have stepped up their actions against Turkey as well.

On October 19, 1939, Türkiye signed an agreement with Britain and France on military assistance. At the same time, the USSR was warned about the signing of this treaty in advance, during the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoglu to Moscow in late September - early October 1939, Saracoglu informed Molotov (at that time concurrently head of government and head of the USSR Foreign Ministry) that the pact will not be directed against any particular power, but against any aggressor dangerous to any of the three parties (the treaty referred to "aggression on the part of any European state"), Molotov first tried to dissuade his Turkish colleague from signing the pact in general, and then proposed the Soviet "amendment": the treaty loses force if Britain and France oppose the USSR (*Gasanly J.*

The main directions of Soviet-Turkish relations at the first stage of the outbreak of World War II (1939-1941 // *Pravda* Viktor Suvorov-3. *M.*, 2007. P. 84-87.95).

Moreover, it follows from the context that the specific reason for such a hypothetical step by Britain and France did not matter - even if it took place in view of the Soviet attack on Turkey itself. At the same time, the USSR tried to evade any obligations of non-aggression, not to mention mutual assistance (*Ibid.*, p. 90).

The signing of the treaty evoked an immediate reaction from the USSR: on November 10, the Comintern declared in a statement that with the signing of this treaty "Turkey fell into an imperialist trap" and that, consequently, the Communist Party of Turkey should be against this pact (Ibid., p. 97).

With the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, Türkiye both calmed down. In any case, after the German occupation of Paris, Hitler ordered that the materials of the Anglo-French Turkish negotiations on the bombing of Baku and Batumi during this war that fell into German hands be made public (as is known, the Western powers were going to come to the aid of Finland, including such way). And Stalin in June 1940, in a conversation with the Italian ambassador to the USSR, pointed out this threat and proposed to jointly "squeeze" Italy (Ibid., pp. 98, 104, 110).

It is generally accepted that after the defeat in the summer of 1940, Turkey began to focus on Germany (see, for example: *Nekrich A.M.S.* 97). To a large extent, like Romania, this orientation was forced in Turkey: as early as the summer of 1940, the USSR began surveying the Turkish territories bordering the Transcaucasus, and the Soviet fleet began to be active, including near the Black Sea straits. This is not to mention the plans of the USSR to send troops to Bulgaria, including "to put pressure on Turkey" and even "force the Turks into Asia," as Stalin told Dimitrov on November 25, 1940 (Bunich I. Groza . S. 116, 139; *Hasanly*, pp. 112-113). It is clear that in the conditions that began in 1940 Soviet-German disagreements, Türkiye sought to use them to its advantage.

At the same time, where it was possible, the Turks adhered to the Western, and not the German orientation. Thus, in November 1940, Turkey warned Bulgaria that it would oppose it if it assisted Italy in attacking Greece (as is known, this attack began on October 28, 1940), as a result of which

Greece was able to transfer troops against Italy from the Bulgarian border (*Gasantry*, pp. 108-109).

With the capture of Bulgaria by Hitler on March 1, 1941, there was a danger for Turkey and from Germany. A month before, Churchill offered Turkey an alliance with an obligation to enter the war if the Germans entered Bulgaria, but unsuccessfully (*Bunich I. Groza*, p. 422; *Ga Sanpy*, p. 116-117). Actually, Turkey did not break with England, for example, in April-May 1941, she refused Hitler's request to let German troops through to help the pro-German regime of Rashid Ali in Iraq, as a result of which he was defeated by the British, but she also refused Britain in the transit of weapons through their territory (*Hasanly*, p. 119).

On June 18, 1941, a German-Turkish treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed, although at the same time Turkey did not dare to become a satellite of Germany, in particular, it refused to let German troops and military cargo through its territory (Nekrich A. M. S. 98-99). Moreover, Türkiye made a special reservation: the alliance with England is not cancelled. Thus, Turkey, friendly and neutral to Germany and at the same time allied to Britain, turned into a very convenient field for negotiations between Germany and the West. But there was another reason for the assassination attempt on the German ambassador.

As early as March 25, 1941, the USSR and Turkey issued a declaration of neutrality and non-aggression (*Ga sanly*, pp. 118-120). Now the USSR could send troops to Turkey only as an ally. Let's imagine the situation: let's say, in the winter or early spring of 1942, it was possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the German troops and start a "liberation campaign" in Europe. In this case, there was a temptation to "in passing" take over Turkey, but this could be done if the latter got involved in a war with Germany. And the assassination attempt on the German ambassador - why not a reason for war? Well, Stalin foresaw

such a turn of affairs back in February 1942? Not excluded. In any case, it was necessary to act quickly and decisively.

Thanks to the actions of the Turkish authorities, the plan failed. And since about 1943, Türkiye has firmly and irrevocably reoriented itself to the West. It was then that a powerful residency of the joint Anglo-American intelligence, the OSS, was organized in Istanbul, directed both against Germany and against the USSR (which, as we have seen, also had its sights on Turkey). This country itself is also being "worked" - for example, at the expense of its entry into the war against Germany and participation in the liberation of the Balkans from the Germans (in order not to let Stalin go there). Here, however, it did not work out: in September 1944, Zhukov (more precisely, F.I. Tolbukhin under the supreme leadership of Zhukov) broke into Bulgaria so rapidly that the Turks simply did not have time to fight (Yakovlev *N.N.* Marshal Zhukov. With 75-76).

Chapter XXVII

PERIPHERAL CASES

Between Europe and Turkey captured by Hitler, on the one hand, and East China captured by Japan, on the other, stretches almost the entire Asian continent. From the south, these lands adjoin the borders of the now former USSR. It is logical to assume that, while implementing their geopolitical doctrine, the United States and its allies, while fighting the Axis powers, will simultaneously try to gain a foothold here.

They do exactly that. British troops appeared in Iraq as early as May 1941 (having overthrown the pro-German regime of Rashid Ali, who came to power with the support of the Germans a month earlier and, by the way, was recognized by Stalin on May 12, 1941), from the Vichy), in southern Iran - in August - September. Then still neutral

On April 10, 1941, the United States declared the Red Sea a no-go area for German and Italian ships, with an order for American ships to sink those when they were discovered (*Suvorov V. Suicide*, p. 256). And in 1942, the Americans joined the British in Southern Iran, soon - in Saudi Arabia, in September they landed in the Belgian Congo (*World History. M., 1977. Vol. 15. S. 561 - 562*) - this country was far from the theaters of military operations, and from the borders of the USSR, but there were the largest deposits of uranium, and in America the atomic bomb was already being created. Finally, in the winter of 1942-1943. in the course of Operation Torch, the Americans also occupy French North Africa.

The Americans came into contact with the ruler Xinjiang Shen Shicai. But about Xinjiang - a separate
naya chapter.

On the other hand, the Americans have established themselves in China itself: since 1942, their aviation has been operating - and successfully - from Chinese territory, and numerous military missions have been settling in Chongqing. Between the summer of 1944 and the spring of 1945, American representatives also met with the leadership of the CCP. However, China was so important in the geopolitical games of the two superpowers that it is necessary to devote a separate chapter to it.

Finally, the Americans also gained a foothold in India, placing their Air Force there and taking away from the British the monopoly on military presence in this country. And back in January 1942, the United States signed an agreement with Australia on taking over its defense (*Utkin A.I. Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt. P. 225*) (and with Canada - back in 1940 (*Military bloc policy of imperialism. M., 1980. S. 199*)).

In a word, despite some setbacks - in Bulgaria and Xinjiang - by 1945 the United States surrounded the Heartland from the south - from North Africa to China and Australia.

FINLAND IN CENTRAL ASIA

After World War II, the USSR brought half of Europe under its control. At the same time, the establishment of the communist dictatorship in each country was preceded by the period of the so-called "Finnish development" for a duration of three to four years.

"Finlandization" meant that the country remained (so far) a democratic country with a market economy, but was already turning into a sphere of influence of the USSR. And only with regard to Finland itself, from which the term originated, did the Soviet nomenklatura keep its intentions in check, and the country remained a market democracy. This was done in order to show the rest of Europe that "Finlandization" is not a temporary but a permanent state! Don't be afraid, gentlemen Europeans, we won't drag you into communism by force! (*Voslensky M.S.*

Nomenclature. S. 469).

But the USSR had its own "Finland" in Asia as well. Only not after World War II, but before it. And it was Xinjiang - northwest China.

Since the time of Peter I, Russia has been striving to establish itself in this region, and this is understandable. The Russian occupation of Kulja in 1871-1883 is understandable. The Anglo-Russian rivalry is understandable. All this is a local colonial expansion, which Russia carried out in exactly the same way as other countries.

According to the Anglo-Russian agreement of April 16, 1899, the Chinese lands "to the north of the Great Wall" are recognized as the sphere of influence of Russia. Including Xinjiang (*Krasilnikov V.D.* Xinjiang attraction. M., 2007. P. 104).

In 1910-1914. to Ghulja, Kashgar, etc. Russian military contingents are introduced. They leave from there at the beginning of 1918 (*Ibid.*, pp. 118-123).

The situation changed after the Bolsheviks came to power. Their goal is "world revolution". And from this point of view, Xinjiang is an excellent springboard for action in China and India.

On November 2, 1928, the Chinese newspaper Jinbao writes about the significance of Xinjiang: The Soviets need to liquidate the British Empire, for which they need to go to India through Persia and Afghanistan, but first they need to try in Xinjiang (AVP RF. F. 100. Op. 12. P. 17. D. 33- L. 9-10). Well, the first experience of "Finlandization".

Of course, it is easiest to call a report in a Chinese newspaper a "bourgeois slander." But let's look at the Soviet policy in Xinjiang before and during the Second World War.

In May 1921, the Tarbagatai military governor allegedly appealed to Soviet Russia (the troops of the Turkestan Front) with a request to assist in the liquidation of the white detachments of Novikov and Bakich (Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1958. V. 4. S. 788). Indeed, by the spring of 1921, up to 50,000 white troops had accumulated in Xinjiang (AVP RF. F. 0/100-v. Op.4. Bakich's corps surrendered its weapons and submitted to the Chinese authorities, and there was no Novikov on the territory of Xinjiang at all, however, on May 17, 1921, an agreement on the entry of Turkfront troops for the joint liquidation of Bakich's and Novikov's detachments was signed (AVP RF. F. 100. Op 41-a, P. 163, D. 1, L. 27-29).

Whether there was an appeal or not, but from May to September 1921, the Red Army inflicts a defeat on the Whites in Tarbagatai (*Molokov I.V.* International assistance from the RSFSR and the FER to Mongolia and Xinjiang (China) in the defeat of the Whites in 1920-1922. Omsk, 1991 pp. 82).

The reason for this military action is simple: whites in Xinjiang interfere with propaganda work.

Shevikov, "these ideological gendarmes of the counter-revolution ... reached the point that even the most downtrodden poor, who had previously felt instinctively close to Soviet Russia, were imbued with fanaticism with the spirit of hostility to the Bolsheviks" (AVP RF. F. 0/100-v. Op 3. P. 101. D. 1. L. 2). Well, yes, it is one thing to listen to the stories of propagandists about the communist paradise, and quite another to talk with those who have blown their feet from there. Of course, it must be eliminated!

With regard to Xinjiang itself, however, the principle of "Finlandization" still triumphs. In June 1921, Lenin and Chicherin rejected Rudzut's proposal to recognize the republics of Kashgar and Dzhungar, which local separatists would not mind creating with the support of Soviet Russia (*Krasilnikov V.D. S. 145*). So, it seems that the bourgeois slander of the Chinese newspaper has been put to shame? Do not hurry! It is immediately emphasized that this is temporary, since the population is very ignorant and hates everything connected with "kafirs" (non-Muslims), so the stake should be on local Chinese (WUA RF. F. 0/100. Op.4. P. 102. D. 5. L. 48).

This policy is bearing fruit. In April 1928, the leaders of Xinjiang are sure that the USSR has no plans to invade Western China, therefore, until China receives a stable form of statehood, it is necessary to focus on the Soviet Union (AVP RF. F. 8/08. Op.11. P. 56. D. 185. L. 51).

By the end of the 1920s. the situation is changing. At first In 1929, after almost two decades of unrest that torn China apart after the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty (1911-1912), Chiang Kai-shek finally unites the country. His power is still weak, but if you give it time... And then, somehow amazingly on time (September 18, 1931), the Japanese invade Manchuria, which de facto marks the beginning of World War II. Recall what was said about connections

Bolsheviks and their allies with Japan, about the "Far Eastern icebreaker", and we ask: is all this accidental?

As for Xinjiang, here, just in 1931, an uprising of Muslim peoples against China begins. It was provoked, according to most historians, by British and Japanese agents. However, the question arises: who benefits? Obviously not Japan (why, we'll see a little later). The USSR refuses to support the rebels (*Krasilnikov*

B. D. Decree. slave. pp. 158-161).

As a result, in 1933, Shen Shi-Tsai's coup took place in Xinjiang. One of the principles proclaimed by the new ruler is friendship with the USSR (*Barmin V.A. Soviet Union and Xinjiang. 1918-1941. Barnaul, 1999. P. 120-121).*

An interesting call by Shen Shi-Tsai to the rebels is to stop the fight in order to unite to protect China from Japan, which wants to seize Xinjiang as a springboard against the USSR (*Khakimbaev A. To assess the activities of Ma Zhuning // Fourteenth scientific conference " Society and the State in China". Theses and reports. M., 1983 - Part 3.*

C. 117). Look at the map: in order to penetrate from already captured Manchuria into Xinjiang, the Japanese must either go through the entire thickness of China (which, as we now know, they did not succeed during the entire Second World War), or through Mongolia, which means conflict from the USSR. It seems that the Japanese threat is only a pretext for turning to the USSR for help. So this uprising hardly played into Japan's hands.

And Soviet help followed. In November 1933, a regiment of the Red Army and a regiment of the NKVD in civilian clothes, but with tanks, aircraft and artillery under the guise of the "Altai Volunteer Army" crossed to Xinjiang. This force holds Urumqi, which in January 1934 is besieged by the rebels of Ma Zhu-Ning.

And then two more brigades of the OGPU troops are sent to help, with the support of aviation; by April 1934, the uprising was suppressed (*Krasilnikov V.D.* pp. 174-176).

At the same time, it is interesting that the leader of the Dongganin rebels, Ma Zhu-Ning, who was interned on July 10, 1934 in the USSR, is refused to be extradited to Shen Shi-Tsai. Soviet troops left Xinjiang at the beginning of 1935. But even in 1938, the NKVD arrested (apparently in Xinjiang) the commander of the Russian convoy Antonov, a former White Guard colonel, to whom Shen Shi Cai awarded the rank of general for commanding the former Whites during the suppression uprisings (*Ibid.*, pp. 179-180).

In the spring of 1937, a new uprising broke out among the Uigur and Dungans. It is interesting that, asking the USSR for help against the insurgents, Shen Shih Tsai wages a struggle against the "Trotskyists", so that up to 400 people die from repressions. Two military groups are sent on a campaign to help him, each of which has two regiments (the Red Army and the NKVD), a mountain battery, a company of sappers and signalmen. In the autumn of 1937 the uprising was crushed there is.

In 1938-1940. The USSR goes to meet China in the construction of an aircraft assembly plant in the city of Hami. On October 1, 1940, the work of the plant begins; after June 22 1941 his products are sent to the war with Germany. By the summer of 1942, the production of 450 aircraft per year was achieved. Then the plant was mothballed, since it was unprofitable to carry everything needed (except for food) from the USSR, and then drive the planes back. In a mothballed state, the plant existed under the protection of the NKVD battalion until 1944 (*Ibid.*, pp. 203-206).

Little of. In August 1938 - Shen Shih Tsai's visit to Moscow, meeting with Stalin and Voroshilov (there, by the way, "leaders" thirty or forty years before Brezhnev first began to kiss at a meeting), and Shen Shi

Tsai became a member of the CPSU (b) (!) (Party card No. 1859118) (*Dedovsky AM USSR and Stalin in the fate of China. M., 1999*).

As early as 1938, a significant part of the mineral resources of Xinjiang (51% of antimony) was sent to the USSR. On October 26, 1940, the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the development of tin mining in Xinjiang" was issued. In the future, they are also looking for the raw materials necessary for the atomic bomb (*Krasilnikov V. pp. 280-288*). Thus, we are talking about Xinjia not as almost a part of the USSR.

And here the question arises: autumn 1940. Was Stalin going to attack Germany or not, but the war was on the threshold. Preparing for it, Stalin continuously receives either generals, or weapons designers, or heads of the labor resources department. Everything is subordinated to the preparation for the "liberation campaign" in Europe. Really, in the current situation, the Central Committee and the Government of the USSR have nothing more to do than "the development of tin mining in Xinjiang"?

And we ask ourselves the question: was the USSR preparing a springboard for a future campaign in China after the victorious completion of Operation Thunderstorm in Europe (we will talk about China later)?

Communists, including Mao Zedong's brother Mao Zemin, held a number of leading positions in Xinjiang and its districts in 1941. There is also a representative office of the 8th Chinese army (communist). A regiment of the Red Army is stationed in Khami, and a Soviet squadron of drill is stationed in Urumqi. The USSR receives food, horses, etc. from Xinjiang.

But after China (and the United States) declared war on the Axis countries (December 1941), Shen Shih Tsai was reoriented toward the United States. V.D. Krasilnikov believes that this happened under the influence of the failures of the Red Army (*Krasilnikov V.D. Decree. Work. S. 213-214*). However, remember that just in December

By 1941, the Red Army went on the offensive near Moscow. Rather, we are talking about a general reorientation of China, including the communists, under the influence of the disruption of Operation Thunderstorm (this will also be discussed later).

But the leadership of Xinjiang also reoriented itself. At the end of August 1942, Shen Shih Ts'ai completely submitted to the central government of China. In April

1943 American and British consulates were opened in Urumqi. In 1943, units of the Red Army were withdrawn from Xinjiang (Ibid., pp. 221-231). But, according to some reports, in 1943, projects for the construction of American military bases in Xinjiang were discussed (*Khlyupin V.N. Geopolitical triangle Kazakhstan - China - Russia. M. - Washington, 1999. P. 254*).

However, in the future, losing de facto power with the introduction of more and more Kuomintang troops into Xinjiang (up to 100 thousand by 1944), Shen Shih-Tsai turned to the USSR with a request to accept Xinjiang as a union republic on the condition that he would be chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, but is refused. Finally,

On August 31, 1944, Chongqing dismisses Shen Shi-Tsai (*Krasilnikov V.D. Decree. Work. P. 237-238*).

The Soviet refusal is not surprising: on May 16, 1943, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a decision was made to abandon "Finlandization" and to take measures to eliminate Shen Shi-Tsai and replace him with communists (*Krasilnikov V.D. Decree. slave. S. 259*). And again the question: the war is in full swing, the Battle of Kursk is just around the corner, and the Politburo is again busy with Xinjiang!

The installation is given to contacts with the underground, the training of partisan commanders, and most importantly, the creation of military units from the immigrants from Xinjiang who settled in Central Asia, who will be brought there after the uprising begins (*Obukhov V. Fight of six empires. M., 2007. C. 298*).

299). A "wild cavalry division" is also being formed from Soviet people, not only of the Uyghur, but also of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tatar nationalities, who have experience in the Great Patriotic War (*Krasilnikov V.D.* S. 267).

On November 6-7, 1944, an uprising begins in Xinjiang, and there is reason to believe that it is led by the Soviet consulate in Ghulja (*Ibid.*

pp. 246-247). By March 1945, the rebels occupied the entire Ili district, and on July 31, 1945, Chuguchak. At the same time, there is an offensive against Urumqi: in August, the rebels go to the river. Manas is about 200 kilometers from the capital of Xinjiang (*Ibid.*, pp. 254-255). In June 1945, the Politburo decides

about sending to Xinjiang an additional 500 officers and 2,000 sergeants and soldiers of the Red Army; massive deliveries of weapons and equipment begin (*V.M. Molotov's* special folder. Op. 2. D. 104. L. 116). At the same time, it is interesting that 64.5 kg of gold seized by the rebels from the Chinese turn into the income of the USSR (*Ibid.*, p. 273).

But the leader of the Kazakhs Tarbagatay Ospan-Batyr since 1940 he fought with Shen Shi-Tsai, and on October 5 1943 met with Choibalsan. On January 21, 1944, at a meeting with Stalin, Choibalsan discussed helping him, and on March 4, the USSR, through Choibalsan, transferred to Ospan 200 rifles, 400 submachine guns, and 30 machine guns. On March 11, the Kazakhs refuse to move to the south of Xinjiang and leave for Mongolia, which causes a Mongolian-Chinese conflict, in which Soviet aviation also participates. However, having liberated Tarbagatai by mid-September 1945, Ospan-Batyr subsequently conflicted with the VTR, and from 1946 went over to the side of the Kuomintang (*Ibid.*, pp. 275-279).

After 1945, and especially 1949, the need for "Finlandization" disappeared, and in the fall of 1949 Xinjiang became part of the People's Republic of China. But that is another story.

Chapter XXIX

ON THE PACIFIC

In the war against Germany, the Red Army was in the east, and the allies in the west; in a war against Japan, everything is reversed, but the result will be the same.

(D. MacArthur, August 1945)

So, in the space from Western Europe to Central and South Asia, by 1945 the Allies had gained a foothold. And in the Far East?

At the beginning of 1944, having accumulated sufficient forces and having created a three to five-fold superiority over the Japanese in air and naval forces, the Allies switched from advancing "step by step" (second half of 1943) to a swift offensive with the capture of mainly key positions - those that could serve as strongholds for a further offensive. This strategy is called "frog jumping". In the summer of 1944, the Mariana Islands were captured, which became the base for massive US air raids on Japan (the raids began in the late autumn of 1944). But the main thing is in June

In 1944, the Japanese fleet was utterly defeated, and after a naval battle near the Philippines (October 23-26 1944) it actually ceased to exist.

By the way, let's pay attention to one more aspect of the problem. V. Suvorov repeatedly contrasts the Soviet generals and marshals, who found the courage to argue with Stalin if they considered themselves right, to the German military leaders, who agreed with Hitler in everything, although the wrongness of his decisions was obvious to them (Cleansing. With 288-297, Suicide, pp. 115-127, etc.). And how was it with the Americans? Let's look at one typical example.

July 1944 The Americans had just defeated the Japanese fleet (ensuring the dominance of practically

Czech over the entire Pacific Ocean) and occupied the Mariana Islands. In the Hawaiian Islands, there is a meeting of top military leaders with the participation of Roosevelt about where to make the next "frog jump". Roosevelt insists: we must attack directly on Japan; MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in the Pacific, objected: they should land in the Philippines.

MacArthur's motives: the Japanese will fiercely defend their islands, the human losses during their capture will amount to at least a million people (I remind you that the total losses of the United States in the war are 450 thousand). It is better to subject them to a blockade for the time being (which became possible after the defeat of the Japanese fleet): for an island state deprived of its resources, a blockade is death. And in the Philippines, local partisans will help us, it will be much easier to fight there. With the fall of the Philippines, Southeast Asia is cut off from Japan, and without local oil, all Japanese equipment (as well as German equipment without Romanian oil) will turn into a pile of scrap metal. Note that MacArthur here thinks in much the same way as Stalin and Zhukov. "Oil is the blood of war."

But most importantly, with the occupation of the Philippines, the Americans are opening up a "front door" to China. China has been at war with Japan since 1937, but at the beginning of the Pacific War, the Japanese captured all approaches to China from the south and east. Everything necessary for the war can be delivered to the Chinese only by planes through Tibet, and there it is necessary to spend three tons of fuel to deliver one ton of cargo (*Yakovlev N.N.* September 3, 1945, p. 623). Now the situation will change: it will be possible to supply the Chinese with weapons uninterruptedly. China's boundless human resources will be combined with inexhaustible shareable technical and economic opportunities

USA. How long will Japan last?

However, it was planned to use China not only against Japan ... But about the US plans regarding

China after the war, we will talk later. In the meantime, we note one interesting fact. As is known, from November 28 to December 1, 1943, a meeting of the Big Three—Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill—was held in Tehran. So, a few days earlier, from November 22 to 26, Roosevelt and Churchill met with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo. So to speak, the Big Three No. 2, anti-Japanese

Skye.

It seems to be logical: the USSR was not at war with Japan at that time, and since December 11, 1941, China was only formally at war with Germany. So it would be logical for Roosevelt and Churchill to discuss European problems with Stalin, and Pacific problems with Chiang Kai-shek. However, even then the USSR was not going to stay away from the Pacific conflict after the end of the war in Europe. So why not meet all four and discuss the fate of post-war Japan? Moreover, the allies in 1943 needed the participation of the USSR in the war with Japan much more than in 1945: they had not yet won decisive victories in the Pacific.

I do not impose my opinion, but I offer an explanation: at the meeting in Cairo, some topics were discussed that were not intended for Stalin's ears. Now back to the meeting in the Hawaiian Islands.

MacArthur argued coolly: after talking with him, Roosevelt was forced to take aspirin in the evening, and then in the morning, and complained to his personal doctor that no one in his life had ever spoken to him like MacArthur (Buchin A.N., Yakovlev N. N. 170,000 kilometers with G.K. Zhukov. S. 215). And MacArthur achieved his goal. In the winter of 1944-1945. the Americans cleared the Philippines of the Japanese, and the British cleared Burma. In February - March 1945, American troops captured about. Iwo Jima off the coast of Japan, and on April 1 landed on about. Okinawa. And already in the second half of April - early May 1945, for the first time in the entire war, Chinese troops began to push the Japanese in southeast Ki

melting. In May-June, the city of Guilin and its environs were liberated; the Japanese retreated to ports in the east and southeast of the country (History of the Second World War. Vol. 11, pp. 104-107).

Meanwhile, the war in Europe was coming to an end, and it became obvious that the USSR would intervene in the war in the Far East and, of course, demand its share. Already on April 5, 1945, the USSR unilaterally denounced the non-aggression pact with Japan of April 13, 1941; even earlier, on March 14, practical preparations for a war with Japan began (on this day, a decision was made to transfer to the Far East the Soviet troops of the former Karelian Front, who had fought against Finland until the end of 1944) (Ibid., p. 191) .

Under these conditions, the United States faced two tasks: firstly, to keep the USSR out of the Japanese islands, and secondly, to give as little as possible to the USSR in China and Korea. However, it was necessary to take into account the fact that the USSR might not enter the war with Japan at all - in the already cited memorandum of I.M. Maysky on January 11, 1944, it was proposed just such a variant, calculated on the mutual weakening of the Western allies and Japan (*Filippov AM* In the corridors of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. P. 57). True, this was written before the decisive naval victories of the Allies in 1944 and before they reached the approaches to Japan and China. In Japan, by the way, in April 1943, the positions of supporters of peace with the USA and an alliance against the USSR strengthened. In particular, then the future prime minister in the first post-war government of Japan, created by the American occupation administration, entered the government (*A. I. Utkin*, Franklin Roosevelt's Diplomacy, p. 322), but after a little more than a year, in July 1944, , Japan declared its desire to establish friendly relations with the USSR to the detriment of the United States and Britain, which "have always been enemies of Russia" (Slavinsky *B.N.* Decree. Work. S. 232-252).

The first task - not to let the USSR into the Japanese islands - was not difficult: the US fleet dominated the seas, and besides, after mastering Fr. Okinawa (June 21, 1945) Americans in July-August

whether operations for continuous mining of approaches to Japanese ports (History of the Second World War. Vol. 11, pp. 140-141). Thus, two birds with one stone were killed: Japan was doomed to a complete blockade (which for an island state deprived of its resources meant, as already mentioned, slow death or capitulation), and Soviet ships, if they dared to approach Japan with a landing force, would not knowing the mining areas, they should have suffered heavy losses from mines. By the way, a similar operation was also carried out off the coast of Korea. One way or another, Stalin, who gave On August 23, 1945, the order to prepare for the landing on the island of Hokkaido changed his mind two days later (*Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy. M., 1990. T. 2. S. 410*).

In fact, MacArthur's prediction came true, and in the summer of 1945, Japan, cut off from sources of oil and other natural resources, stood on the brink of destruction. On July 18, 1945, General Marshall informed Truman that the final victory over Japan would cost the United States only 46,000 men. - by the standards of World War II, the figure is small even for the United States, at least when you consider that the result of these losses would have been the final defeat of Japan. The fact that a landing in Japan would cost the Americans 500,000 and even 1 million people was invented later to justify the use of the atomic bomb. Marshall's report with a figure of 46,000 was declassified only in 1985.

On August 8, 1945, the USSR attacked Japan. By the way, on July 24, the Americans decided to use nuclear weapons against Japan at all costs before the USSR defeats the Kwantung Army (*Ignatova M. Everything secret becomes clear. Why Truman dropped the bomb on Hiroshima // Wow*

some 1995. No. 32. S. 76-77). On August 15, Japan announced its surrender and ceased resistance. However, the Soviet offensive in Manchuria continued: Stalin had to give this region (producing at that time up to 60% of all industrial products of China) to the communists, although this was a direct violation of the Soviet-Chinese agreement of August 14, 1945, according to which all Chinese territories liberated by the Red Army from the Japanese were transferred only to the central government of China.

So the Soviet offensive continued, and by the end of August all of Manchuria was occupied. At the same time, from August 10 to September 10, the Chinese Communists occupied Weihaiwei, Chifu, Kalgan, Shanghaiguan, Qin Huangdao, reached the approaches to Beijing, Tianjin, Jinan, Qingdao and even to Nanjing, as well as to many smaller cities; they also reached the suburbs of Shanghai (GV Astafiev, *US Intervention in China*. M, 1985, p. 14).

The Americans decided to speed up the occupation of the remaining regions of China by the Kuomintang troops. With the help of the US Air Force and Navy, Chiang Kai-shek's troops occupied Guangzhou on September 3 (on the second day after Japan's official surrender), Changsha on September 6, Wuhan on September 11, and Zhengchzhou on September 18. In August-October, the Air Force and the US Navy deployed up to 500,000 soldiers to the eastern and northeastern regions of China in order to speed up this process. At the end of September, the Kuomintang entered Shanghai and Nanjing. On September 30, the Kuomintang troops landed near Tianjin and on October 10 entered Peking; on the same day, the Kuomintang entered Qingdao. Even earlier, on October 4, Chifu, taken by the Chinese Communists on August 24 from the Japanese, was occupied by the Kuomintang (*Ibid.*, pp. 34

On August 28, Allied troops began landing in Japan itself, and on September 8 in South Korea. At the end

August, as already mentioned, Stalin's attempts to occupy the Japanese island of Hokkaido were rebuffed.

At the same time, on September 23, 1945, the Allied armies captured Saigon, on October 12 - Phnom Penh (occupied by the Japanese in July 1941), and on September 29 they landed in Indonesia (occupied by the Japanese since the beginning of 1942).

Chapter XXX

AND WARRIORS!

By early 1945, US victory over Japan was close and inevitable. The American air and naval forces, which, as already mentioned, played a decisive role in the war, surpassed the Japanese in various classes of warships by several times, and in aircraft carriers by orders of magnitude (see table; compiled from: World Peace History, T.X.S. 497). The issue of the near future was the occupation by the Americans of the Philippines and the conquest of complete dominance in the air and at sea, which deprived Japan of the oil of Indonesia and Singapore and turned all its remaining military equipment into a pile of scrap metal.

	Japan	USA	Britain	Allies	Ratio
Battleships	6	23	2	25	1:4.17
Aircraft carriers	4	94	4	98	1:24.5
Cruisers	7	57	3	60	1 : 8.57
destroyers	22 350 Several	More than 350	1 : 16		
Underwater boats	44 217	-	217		1:4.93

However, from the point of view of some of the newest concepts of World War II, the United States by the beginning of 1945 was not only far from victory, but could hardly fight Japan on an equal footing. I'm not joking - this is precisely the conclusion that follows from the book of a certain A.B. Martirosyan "200 myths about the Great Patriotic War. Tragedy 1941" (M., 2008). We will not analyze the vocabulary of this scientific work ("bastards", "drive in an aspen stake", etc.) - in this sense, the current Stalinists have not gone far from Vyshinsky with his "vile mixture of a fox and a pig" (this is about Bukharin), we will talk only about the concept itself.

So, having lost hope of refuting the fact that the USSR had from 22 to 25 thousand tanks by the summer of 1941, the "refuters" of the "icebreaker" went the other way - they are trying to prove that this number was supposedly completely insufficient, not only for attack denia, but also ... for the defense of their territory.

How is it proven? Very simple. The number of German tanks is divided by the area of Germany, Soviet tanks by the area of the USSR, and it turns out that if in Germany there were 10 tanks per 1,000 km², then in the USSR there was only one. Approximately the same calculations are given for manpower (*Martirosyan A.B.* Decree. Work. S. 184-195). Oh what a lag! What an attack here, God forbid you defend your territory!

As you know, G.K. Zhukov wrote that the USSR in 1941 lacked 32,000 tanks, including 16,600 of the newest ones (Memoirs and Reflections. M., 1969. P. 205). Viktor Suvorov compares this calculation with the lamentations of a chess player who lacked 24 pieces, including three queens (that is, 3,000 newest tanks), against four enemy pieces, among which there was not a single queen and who would like him to have 56 pieces, of which 20 queens (I take my words back, p. 483).

Soviet military historians did not stop there. In "Pravda" for July 19, 1991, the head Ge

General of the Armed Forces of the USSR, General of the Army Moiseev, already speaks of a shortage of 31,400 of the latest tanks alone (and, one must think, for the same proportion, 60 530 tanks in total). Write right away that 100,000 of the newest tanks were missing (and, presumably, 200,000 of all types. - D.V.), V. Suvorov writes, and the communists will blind you, like Zhukov, a monument (I take my words back. S. 485).

And now Mr. Martirosyan seems to have heeded Zhukov's advice. Indeed, in German proportion, the USSR needed 224,000 tanks to defend its territory. That is, approximately 200,000 were not enough (obviously, including 100,000 of the newest ones).

The problem, however, is that all these strict standards - whether there is a lack of tanks, or the fact that they are all or almost all of them were "obsolete" - they always apply only to our country. And if they are applied to the same America? Well, taking into account the specifics of the war in the Pacific, count not tanks and infantry, but warships and aircraft. Then it really turns out that before the victory over Japan in early 1945, the United States was oh how far away!

In fact, the territory of the United States is 9363 thousand km². The territory of Japan - 372 thousand, i.e. about 25 times (even "with a tail") smaller than the American one. So let's calculate how much was needed to protect their territory by both. And it turns out that in the US carrier fleet by 1945 they were almost on an equal footing with Japan, but in other classes of ships and aircraft, poor Americans had to increase their forces by another 1,5-6 times in order to reach Japan. sky indicators!

For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that some American historians (and, after them, Soviet historians) wrote (at least before the report of General Marshall Truman was declassified) that without the atomic bomb and the USSR entering the war with Japan, the war in the Pacific the ocean would drag on until 1946,

1947 and even before 1948. And we repeat from generation to generation: well, these Americans and warriors! Although it would be necessary to repeat not about the American military, but about these historians: well, warriors!

But it is possible to apply the logic of Mr. Martirosyan to our country at the beginning of 1945. How many tanks did the USSR have by that time? Let us turn to the table of the balance of forces on the Soviet-German front at the beginning of 1945 (compiled from: History of the Second World War. M., 1979. Vol. 10. P. 37-38).

People (million)	3.7	7.55	1 : 2.04
Guns and mortars (thousand)	56.2	118	1:2.1
Tanks (thousand)	8.1	12.8	1:1.58
Aircraft (thousand)	4.1	15.5	1:3.78

In this case, it is not clear how the Red Army was standing near Berlin when it had to hold Moscow with difficulty (or maybe not hold it, but roll towards the Urals)! In general, the logic is the same that Suvorov ridiculed in The Last Republic: Stalin went to Berlin, but he could not reach Berlin!

And why should there be a different approach to our historians than to American ones? Why, when the next Martirosyan reports that 24,000 tanks against 4,000 German ones were not enough even for defense, we exclaim: well, these Russians (and also Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, Uzbeks and other peoples of the former USSR) and warriors! Let's address the reproach to the one who really deserves it: well, this A.B. Martirosyan and a warrior!

Chapter XXXI

WHO LOST CHINA?

The bacillus of Bolshevism will give in Asia quite different fruits than those on which Stalin counts.

(I.A. Ilyin, 1948)

Hearings with this name were held in the American Congress in 1950-1951. Americans could not accept the fact that the country, which so many in America had pinned their hopes on as the main "bastion to contain communism in Asia", so easily fell to the communists itself. Again and again the American people's deputies were looking for those responsible for what happened.

Later, when the USSR quarreled with the PRC, many blamed N.S. Khrushchev that he "lost" China, thus playing into the hands of the United States.

There are, however, reasons to think that neither the USSR nor the USA "lost" China for the simple reason that they never had it as their sphere of influence. China can be an ally, but not a vassal. At the same time, while the USSR was in strength and power and fought with America for world leadership, the USA had a much better chance of getting China into allies than the USSR. Whoever is in power in China.

Indeed. China and Russia (as well as other "Eurasian" states located north of the China Wall) are natural geopolitical adversaries. For 2000 years of Chinese history, all (except for the Japanese in 1937-1945) attacks that really threatened the independence of the country were carried out from North. In the same way, China, during its periods of power, threatened its northern neighbors, as it threatens them now.

Now let's look at the behavior of the "great friend of the USSR Mao Zedong" as the leader of the CPC. We have valuable evidence - notes before

Moscow's appointee at Mao's headquarters in Yan'an in 1942-1945. P.P. Vladimirova. Petr Parfenovich, you word.

So, already the second half of 1941 (what a time it was for our country - I think it is not necessary to remind) was marked by the growth of hostility of the CPC leadership towards our country, which by December 1941 had grown into outright hostility (Vladimirov *P.P.* . Special Region of China. M., 1974. S. 28). At the same time, although back in July 1941 the Soviet command informed Mao Zedong about the transfer of additional Japanese units to the Kwantung Army, the CPC leadership did nothing to divert at least part of the Japanese forces. By the summer of 1942, the communist armies had not been conducting combat operations against the Japanese for "a long time" (how long exactly? - YES) (Ibid., pp. 53, 57).

At the same time, the so-called "campaign to correct the style" ("zhenfeng") was carried out: the supporters of Moscow, "dogmatists who did not take into account Chinese specifics," were gradually pushed aside from the leadership of the CCP. Party workers returning from their studies in the USSR were directly advised to "forget everything they were taught in the USSR" (Ibid., pp. 62, 68).

True, when the Wehrmacht got stuck near Stalingrad in the fall of 1942, Comrade Mao "just in case" wrote an article praising the USSR, and after the Red Army went on the general offensive, he generally became "exceptionally polite." and P.P. Vladimirov already at the beginning of 1943 drew an absolutely correct conclusion: Mao viewed the USSR not as an ally and friend, but as a fellow traveler who could be used (Ibid., pp. 96, 117, 131). This conclusion Vladimirov throughout 1943-1945. repeats in his diary several more times. Once, in the autumn of 1943, he even takes the liberty of writing that he "does not see much difference between the leadership of the Maoist CCP and the leaders of the Kuomintang" (Ibid., p. 211).

As the turning point in the war in Europe came in favor of the USSR, Mao "rebuilt" and abandoned openly anti-Soviet views, but it was in 1944-1945. he established close contacts with the Americans. As early as the spring of 1944, Mao counted on the fact that the United States would count on the CPC as the main political force in China. Moreover, Mao counted on rapprochement with the United States and Britain precisely in order to create a counterbalance to the USSR (Ibid., pp. 283-285). In order to get closer to the allies, Mao even thought about renaming the CPC, removing the word "communist" from the name (Ibid., p. 315).

At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek in 1943 published his famous book *The Destiny of China*. The book was so nationalist and so offensive against the Western powers that the Chinese leadership forbade its citizens from propagating the book and translating it into foreign languages.

ki, so as not to spoil relations with the allies (Ibid., p. 281). After that, the Americans realized that Chiang Kai-shek's nationalism could well degenerate into anti-Americanism (Ibid., p. 528). They also understood something else: China will never become a sphere of influence of the United States, it can only become an ally. And if so, does it really matter who exactly will rule China? By 1945 the Americans realized that Mao's "Chinese Marxism" meant anti-Sovietism in practice.

Then, in 1944-1945, Mao's alliance with America burned out": the conservative part of the American establishment (led by the American ambassador to China Hurley) was afraid to make an alliance with the communists. But the backlog was made.

Most importantly, a wedge was driven between the leadership of the CCP and the leadership of the USSR. I think that it's not in vain that P.P. Vladimirov spent the entire war at Mao's Headquarters in Yan'an as a representative

Moscow. Of course, Stalin knew about Mao's art. True, in later years, when throughout the USSR they sang "Russian and Chinese - brothers forever", Vladi Mirs was, to put it mildly, not honored. But Iosif Vissarionovich did not put him in the camp either, but sent him as a consul to Shanghai, and then as an ambassador to Burma. Perhaps he foresaw that his revelations about the "great friend Mao" would still be useful? Incidentally, when Mao arrived in Moscow in December 1949 after the victory of the CCP over the Kuomintang, the reception given to him was by no means so warm at first. It got to the point that at the first meeting, Stalin called him not "comrade", but "master."

Then, however, everything was fine, you say. Yes, but the crack could not but remain. However, Mr. Comrade Mao continued to do his business. So, in 1949-1954. The People's Republic of China made urgent requests, not to say urgent demands, for the annexation of Mongolia (*Ernst Henry. Kitai v. Asia. M., 1979-p. 47*). Let me remind you that even Kuomintang China did recognize the independence of the MPR at the beginning of 1946. But communist China stubbornly harassed the "seized northern province."

In general, there are serious reasons to think that the United States deliberately neglected in the late 1940s. China, throwing all their free financial resources into the restoration of Europe according to the Marshall Plan. American geopoliticians reasoned soberly: China will not go anywhere from a confrontation with the USSR anyway, if not today, then tomorrow, but we can lose Europe forever. Therefore, China can be handed over to the Soviets for the time being, let them mess with it, let them grow it for their own future destruction.

By the way, Stalin also fell into the "Chinese trap" - simply because he was thinking about "world communism" and not about Russia's national interests. Otherwise, he would have done everything in his power to prevent

the unification of China, whether it be communists or Chiang Kai-shek. The best option would be "two Chinas" - the northern "red" and the southern "white", mutually balancing each other.

Of course, Stalin was not so stupid as to calmly look at what was happening. In 1950-1953 Stalin actually forced China to take part in the war with America in Korea, while he himself, in fact, remained on the sidelines. K. Zakoretsky argues that Stalin actually forced the Americans to get into Korea, who needed to create a springboard for a future war with the United States. In 1945, the Americans fully agreed that the surrender of the Japanese would be accepted by the Soviet troops throughout Korea. Stalin, on the other hand, had to create a springboard for unleashing a war, which, in his opinion, should have developed into the Third World War (*Zakoretsky K. Day M-2* (electronic version)). Or maybe Stalin needed Korea in order to quarrel the future communist leadership of China with the United States, "tying" it with American blood? For a while, Stalin succeeded, but only for a while.

1954 Stalin is no more, but the Russian and the Chinese are still "brothers forever." And at this moment, no map of China's territorial claims to its neighbors is being published in Peki. Including from the "brothers forever", it was supposed to seize, in addition to Semirechye, Amur and Primorye, which until 1860 were part of the Qing Empire, also Altai and East K (*Henry. China vs Asia*).

In a word, there were serious grounds for thinking that the "great friendship" was not stronger than the same "great friendship" ten years earlier with Hitler, although due to the prevailing historical circumstances it lasted much longer, not two, but as many as 12 years. And what would happen if the Soviet-Chinese cooperation of 1949-1961. did it go on even longer?

Let us put ourselves in the place of the Soviet leaders of the mid-1950s. and let's try to analyze Khrushchev's quarrel with China from this point of view. It is unlikely that the members of the former Stalinist Politburo did not understand Mao's true attitude towards Russia (whether Soviet or otherwise). At the same time, for almost all of the 1950s. they saw that China was getting stronger. Something was needed to slow down its development.

In this situation, the loud, scandalous debunking of the "cult of personality of Stalin" in the 20th century. and especially at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, it had an effect on Comrade Mao, who was already inclined to his own cult, like a red rag to a bull. The USSR was accused of "revisionism" and the Chinese comrades who sympathized with Moscow were also accused, and all sorts of "great leaps" and "cultural revolutions" began. For twenty years, China was shaking and shaking, and only after the death of Mao Zedong did the new leadership begin market reforms - in a devastated country in which much had to be started literally from scratch. And if, starting from such deplorable starting points, over the thirty years of these reforms, China has achieved such amazing results, then one can imagine what it would have achieved if the Chinese had started reforms according to Deng Xiaoping not in the late 1970s, but in the late 1950s. 1990s, and even in an undestroyed country?

In the 1970s China stopped maneuvering between opposing superpowers and turned its face towards the United States. It got to the point that at one time he was called the "sixteenth member of NATO." But if it weren't for twenty years of the "cultural revolution", already during the presidency of the United States by John Carter (1977-1981, by the way, the peak of the American-Chinese strategic partnership), China would have been as powerful as it is now. Well, let the reader imagine what China would have been like then by the time the USSR was defeated in the Cold War (1990), and even more so now (in

And how would this affect the geopolitical claims of the PRC to the USSR and to present-day Russia (and some other CIS countries) - let the reader imagine

myself too.

And now let's pose the following question: how would a united "red" China behave if the USSR started somewhere in the first half of the 1950s? a big war with the West in Europe and the Middle East, take over Western Europe and get involved in a protracted war with the USA? What would then be the relationship between the "brothers forever" - if not immediately, but five years after the occupation of Europe?

So, did the USSR have no chance to turn China into its sphere of influence? It seems that there were - until 1941. All communist parties were created from 1919 by the Comintern precisely as instruments for turning their countries into "Soviet republics". The Chinese one, founded in 1921, was no exception. China, which had just (in the second half of the 1920s) united after a decade and a half of internecine wars between the militaristic rulers of different provinces and had barely begun to transform (after the overthrow of the medieval Manchu yoke in 1912) into a modern state, was an excellent target. for communists. So in Xinjiang they began to create a foothold then ...

In 1937, when the "Far East Japanese icebreaker" launched aggression against China, the CPC joined the United Anti-Japanese Front on the orders of the Comintern. But already at the end of 1938-1939. there was a series of clashes between the troops of the CPC and the Kuomintang (*Efimov G. V. Essays on the modern and recent history of China. M., 1949. P. 372*), and in the fall of 1939, other instructions were given: to conduct operations against Japan, but gradually diverge from the Kuomintang. Then one of the leaders of the CCP, Zhou Enlai, came to Moscow. P.P. Vladimirov says that there is a discussion

the problems of "revolution in China, which will be made by Soviet weapons" were given (*Vladimirov P.P. Special Region of China. P. 451*).

In 1940-1941, simultaneously with a large-scale offensive against the Japanese ("battle of a hundred regiments"), the CCP again began to conflict with the Kuomintang. The "Battle of a Hundred Regiments" ended without much result because of this conflict, and in January 1941, the Kuomintang, in response to the aggravation of relations, defeated the 4th communist army.

The Soviet author of the Stalin era, of course, blames the Kuomintang for these conflicts (*Efimov G.V. Essays ... P: 375-379*), but let us remember: even in 1942-1943, when, for obvious reasons, the CPC could not count on the support of the USSR, it constantly provoked the Kuomintang into conflicts (*Vladimirov P.P. Special Region of China. P. 94-95, 163, etc.*), then what can we say about the time when the USSR was not at war with Germany yet? The calculation is simple: the USSR will defeat Germany during Operation Thunderstorm and start a war against Japan. Now is the time for the Communists to oppose the Kuomintang. And capture the part of China not occupied by the Japanese.

However, in the second half of 1941, the USSR was not up to China for several years. Taking advantage of this, Mao purged the leadership of the CCP. Those leading comrades who were "first Communists, and then already Chinese" gave way to others - those who were "first Chinese, and then already Communists." By the way, the "battle of a hundred regiments" at the 7th Congress of the CPC (April 23 - June 11, 1945) was also recognized as a mistake (*Ibid., p. 453*).

Much more water had to flow before China finally sided with the US in the Cold War in 1971. But all those thirty years, from 1941 to 1971, the leadership of the CCP behaved like

independent strength.

That is why in the summer of 1941 Stalin lost China.

Chapter XXXII

WHY THE ALLIES DID NOT TAKE BERLIN

On you, God, what is worthless to us.

(proverb)

And really - why?

Let's start with the fact that it cost them nothing to open a second front six months earlier. Then Berlin (together with the entire territory of the future GDR) would almost certainly have fallen to the Allies. But even after the opening of the second front, the chances of taking Berlin fall.

For example, back in the spring of 1944, the Allied Command developed a plan (Operation Eclipse) to land three Allied airborne divisions in Berlin in the event of a "sudden military July 20? - YES). But even after the failure of the conspiracy, not all was lost. However, one gets the impression that the allies were not very eager to get to Berlin.

Let us return at least to the very request of Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin after the well-known events of December 1944 in the Ardennes. The fact that it was superfluous, since the Allies had already stopped the offensive by December 25, 1944 in the Ardennes and by January 5, 1945 in Alsace (and in the Ardennes on January 3 they went on the offensive themselves), has already been mentioned. But in response to this request, Stalin began the Vistula-Oder operation on January 12 instead of January 20, more than a week earlier.

One of the results of such an accelerated Soviet offensive (in terms of pace exceeding the German offensive in Russia in the summer of 1941) was that the Germans in some cases did not even have time to occupy powerful fortifications between the Vistula and the Oder, the assault of which would certainly have cost the Red Army a lot of time and blood (*Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov.*

S. 81). And as a result, if by January 12, 1945, the Soviet and allied troops were approximately the same distance from Berlin (500 km), then after three weeks the Allied troops did not advance significantly, while the Red Army was only 70 km from Berlin .

But here is the Red Army on the Oder. And what? Now Stalin, at a meeting of the "Big Three" in Yalta, says that it would be necessary to speed up the offensive of the allies in the West, that it is desirable to start it in the first half of February. However, the Allies drag out this offensive for almost a month, and only on March 6-8 do they cross the Rhine and begin to advance deep into Germany. They are not in a hurry, although everyone seems to understand: the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Britain of January 24, 1945 states that "in the event of further rapid advance (of Soviet troops — D.V.) to the West, a situation *may* arise highly undesirable for the governments of the USA and England" (Ibid., p. 85).

In the spring of 1945, the Allies again revived the idea of capturing Berlin from the air, but only now the operation was to begin on the condition that the Allied land armies approached within a "reasonable" distance to Berlin. Moreover, real opportunities to reach the city first in mid-April

The Allies had 1945. By the way, the Soviet troops began the Berlin operation for the same reasons - not to let the allies into the German capital - 5-6 days ahead of schedule (Ibid., pp. 86-87).

What happened? On April 13, the Americans crossed to the east bank of the Elbe, but then their vanguards were stopped and driven back by German cadets of military schools who were nearby. The Americans lost only 4 people killed and 12 wounded, but this insignificant skirmish made the Allied command think:

the storming of Berlin promised heavy losses - up to 100 thousand people. This explains the refusal of the allies to further advance N.N. Yakovlev (Ibid., pp. 87-88). But I think that if Berlin really needed allies, they would put up with these losses. However, one gets the impression that they did not really need East Germany.

In fact, let's see what happened after the division of Germany into the GDR and the FRG. On the territory of the GDR, there was mainly the historical core of the Prussian monarchy, the unification of Germany under the leadership of which in 1870 turned the country into one of the most aggressive and militaristic in the world. Released from this burden, the bourgeois-industrial FRG turned, on the contrary, into one of the most peaceful states. And in the forty years of communist domination, East Germany had lagged so far behind West Germany that when the time came for German reunification in 1990, the West completely subdued the East economically and politically, and Prussian militarism was no longer revived.

My opinion: Roosevelt already in 1945 foresaw that everything would happen in this way. Is it very fantastic? May be. But it hurts so much!

One way or another, World War II, started by Stalin with the aim of pushing the "imperialists" head on and then destroying them all, ended according to the scenario of Roosevelt, who managed to deploy the "icebreaker" against its creator. As a result, the Americans implemented their geopolitical doctrine by occupying the coastal, most developed and densely populated regions of Europe and Asia ("Rimland"); The USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe occupied by it and Northern China ("Heartland") were surrounded. From that moment on, the defeat of the USSR in the beginning of the Cold War was only a matter of time.

Chapter XXXIII

WHY THE SOVIET TANKS DID NOT CROSS THE ELBA

It is obvious that the subordination of Western Europe to Russia is becoming less and less possible every day, and that such subordination is simply impossible for a long time.

(K. Marx, 1850)

So, May 1945. The war in Europe was over, and as a result, Stalin got only a smaller and worse half of Europe. The war in the Far East is still going on, but it is already obvious that the USSR can only count on Korea (as it turned out later, not all of it) and northern China.

World War II is lost. But at Stalin's disposal is a huge military machine: tank armadas of unprecedented quantity and quality, excellent artillery, powerful aircraft, 11.4 million soldiers hardened in battle. Why not try to start and win World War III - in other words, throw the armies of the Western Allies into the ocean and take over all of Europe (and the Middle and Far East)? This is exactly what Zhukov advised Stalin ("to advance from Brest to Brest"),

Many of our people, from ardent Stalinists to no less ardent anti-Stalinists, are convinced that Stalin made a fatal mistake by rejecting Zhukov's proposal.

Let's figure it out. To avoid accusations of bias, we will proceed from the most favorable scenario for Stalin: the United States did not use atomic weapons in the war, and the Red Army remained loyal to the regime and fought against the allies in the same way as before against the Germans (recall what was written in eighth chapter).

First of all, for Stalin, the war with the United States and Britain was, by definition, to turn into a protracted one. Indeed, we have reached the English Channel, and then what? The Allied fleet dominated the sea, and Stalin had no chance of defeating it: where where, but at sea the Russians were not warriors against the Anglo-Saxons. The Japanese fleet of 1941 was much stronger than the Soviet one in 1945, and it started the war with a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and Singapore. Nevertheless, by the end of 1944, "horns and legs" remained from the Japanese fleet (and by the summer of 1945, neither horns nor legs: the last large ship, the battleship Yama To, was sunk by the Americans on April 7, 1945.). The Soviet fleet could not think of a sudden attack on the naval forces of the Anglo-Americans: as soon as it became known that an attack in Europe, the Allied fleets will be ready to fight back.

True, Soviet amphibious tanks, judging by tests as early as 1935, could technically cross the English Channel (*Suvorov V. Suicide*, pp. 189-193), but still, I think, not under the fire of heavy Allied naval guns. So England is invulnerable, America even more so. Then what is a protracted war? It seems so.

Supporters of the fact that it was necessary to strike the Allies in 1945, fascinated by the huge superiority of the Soviet ground forces, forget the words of Stalin himself that "aggressive nations are better prepared for the outbreak of war than peace-loving nations", as well as about that such an advantage is a temporary factor, while economic superiority is a permanent factor (*Stalin I.V. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. P. 166-167). And the superiority of the American economic potential over the Soviet one was huge - ten times (more on this will be discussed at the end of the book).

They forget that the parties were, to put it mildly, in different starting conditions: until 1940-1941. America practically did not prepare for war, while the USSR in the 1920s-1930s. did almost nothing else. Suffice it to say that tank troops as an independent branch of service were established in the USA on July 10, 1940, after the Wehrmacht had crushed Western Europe; By June 1941, the entire US tank fleet consisted of 400 hopelessly obsolete vehicles (British and American Tanks of World War II. NY, 1969. P. 11; cited in: Suvorov V. Suicide, p. 183) .

Here is a clear example: in the spring of 1941, Soviet and American delegations of tank experts visited the German tank factories almost simultaneously. Both were shown everything that at that time was available in Germany. And here is the reaction. "The Americans were shocked by the German achievements. But then a Soviet delegation appeared (headed by the people's commissar of heavy engineering, I.T. Tevosyan, by the way). Our engineers indifferently glanced at the combat vehicles and demanded that the antediluvian equipment be removed, and instead they show what they promised - modern tanks. The Germans assured that they were showing the best they had. Soviet engineers refused to believe it" (Suicide, pp. 220-221). By the way, in Germany, a country fundamentally unprepared for a protracted war, they managed to significantly reduce the military-technical gap from the USSR during the war. In 1942-1943. The Germans had heavy tanks. And what can we say about the United States, a country with inexhaustible economic opportunities, perfectly prepared for a serious war?

By 1945, the USA still lagged far behind the USSR in the quantity and quality of tanks, but compared to 1940-1941. the backlog has been reduced by an order of magnitude. Already in 1943-1944. the United States not only h

quite decent medium tanks M-4 and M-7 weighing 25 and 32 tons, with 85 mm frontal armor, 500 hp engines. With. and guns of 75, and on some even 105 mm, but also heavy tanks M1A and M1B, respectively, weighing 57 and 50 tons, with 100 mm and 200 mm frontal armor (our KV has 100 mm), with an engine in 1000 hp, on which there were one 75-mm and two 37-mm guns (BSE. 1st ed. T. 51. S. 771-772).

If we extrapolate the balance of forces into the future, then, taking into account the permanent factor

relations of economic potentials are very

one can imagine that by the year 1950 the United States could, by exerting itself, surpass the USSR in this too.

Moreover, all the best Soviet tanks had an American progenitor - the American Walter Christie tank; a sample of this tank was sold to the USSR at the end of 1930 (*Shmelev I.P.* Tanki BT. S. 7; *Mealson A* Russian VT Series. Windsor, 1971; *Zaloga S.*

Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two. P.

67; cit. by: Icebreaker. pp. 27-28; The Last Republic. pp. 157-158). The American state, which at that moment

was not going to fight with anyone, did not claim the genius of Christie and his students, but life could force them ... And in general, who created in the 1920s and 1930s. the enormous military power of the Soviet Union?

Basically the same American engineers on American technologies (see: *Harrison M.* Soviet production 1941-1945 To reassessment // Russia in the XX century. Historians of the world argue. P. 492-501; *Sutton A* National Suicide: A Military Aid to the Soviet Union and many other authors).

At the same time, we must not forget: the Second World War for the United States was not so much a land war as sea and air, so tank building was given secondary attention. As for the fleet and aviation, then no one could equal America. The American fleet, which shared first place with the British until 1941, in 1945 did not have

equal (and the British has grown significantly over the years).

Germany, for which all of Europe worked, built in 1941-1944. 98,000 aircraft at full effort; During the period from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1945, the USSR, receiving huge assistance from the USA, built 140,000 aircraft - also at full effort (Vsemirnaya istoriya. M., 1965. Vol. 10. P. 427) ; The United States, receiving no help from anyone and helping everyone through Lend-Lease, built 182,300 aircraft in 1943-1944 alone, and without much effort (Ibid., p. 433) (according to other sources, even more - 60 000 aircraft in 1942, 125,000 aircraft in one year 1943 (*Utkin A.I.* Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt, p. 224).

And the quality of the aircraft was appropriate. Already in 1943-1944. aircraft were built with a ceiling of 10.5-11.5 km (flying fortress bombers, B-17 C and Martin B-26, Aero Cobra fighter), and even 14 km (Thunderbolt), with with a range of 4820 km (Flying Fortress), 5100 km (Mariner heavy bombers), and finally 6400 km (Coronado heavy bombers) (TSB. 1st ed. T. 51. S. 777 -778). Such a ceiling made the American bombers practically inaccessible to the enemy - for fighters (10 km), and "Thunderbolt" - and for anti-aircraft guns (12 km) (Den-MS 26). As for the range, then estimate those yourself on the map. And remember it's only 1943-

The years 1944 are far from the limit of American possibilities (we will talk about the possibilities in more detail below). The USSR in 1944-1945, by the way, was engaged in the fact that it collected damaged B-29s in the territories previously controlled by Germany and Japan and, accordingly, subjected to American air strikes, and during the war occupied by Soviet troops; these aircraft were used to build their own strategic bombers

supervisors (*Sokolov B.* Victory, which was more terrible than many defeats).

The Germans, except for Coventry, were not able to properly destroy a single city in a year of bombardments of England; this is not surprising, considering that in two years (1940-1941) they dropped only 58,000 tons of bombs on England; the Americans, in three years (starting in the spring of 1942), dropped 2,650,000 tons of bombs on Germany (*Brekhill P.* The Dam Busters.

L., 1951. P. 47, 117, 166, 249; *Goralski P.* World War II *Almanac*. P. 438; cit. Quoted from: The Last Republic. S. 153; Suicide. S. 250; my calculations. —D.V.). The difference is 45 times, almost two orders of magnitude! Starting from 1942, the Americans destroyed German and Japanese cities in a matter of days (Cologne, 1942, Hamburg, 1943) or even hours (Dresden, February 1945, a number of Japanese cities, March 1945; Tokyo was hit by a raid on March 10, 1945 stronger than from the earthquake of

As for the superiority of the Soviet military art (and it really was!), It is always transient. All the conquerors at first surpassed their opponents in the ability to fight - and Alexander the Great, and Attila, and Genghis Khan, and Napoleon, and many others of a lower rank. Only such superiority never lasted - the victims quickly learned to fight, and soon the war was on an equal footing. There is no reason to think that this time it would be

otherwise.

However, America had some superiority Kantsev even then.

In the air defense system, equipped with the latest electronic means, radars, and so on, the Americans and the British already in 1940 were sharply superior to both Germany and the USSR, as well as in the system of commands, control, command and communications. The reason for this was that Stalin declared cybernetics to be a "bourgeois false science alien to Marxism"; by the way, Hitler almost at the same time called cyber

netik "Jewish pseudoscience alien to National Socialism." The result was the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the "Battle of England" in 1940-1941. (*Bunich I. Groza*, p. 144) and the USSR's lifelong lag behind the United States and its allies in the most important area of modern warfare. By the way, during the Great Patriotic War, the USSR received 1803 radar stations from Britain - we didn't have our own (*Zalessky* S. Land Lease is worth a lot).

However, Stalin's dislike of communication was largely forced by the very nature of totalitarianism. Radio is a device, in theory, anti-Soviet. You can listen to "enemy voices", you can talk uncontrollably with each other, you can also transmit espionage information to enemies. Wired communication with field phones is somehow more reliable. Approximately the same thing was done in the rear - radio stations instead of radio receivers. Hitler, by the way, envied Stalin in this respect and was going after the war to carry out a general radiofication of Germany.

Only in the course of the war did the need force Stalin to put the radio first on planes, then on tanks. This, by the way, was possible only with the powerful help of the United States. And the USSR began to produce civilian radio receivers only after the death of the Leader of the Peoples.

This is yet another reason for the failures of 1941 and the loss of the entire struggle for world domination associated with them. What is the use of the excellent T-34 and KV tanks if, due to the lack of communications, they were not given fuel and shells? V. Lebedev compares such an army with historical pangolin: a mountain of muscles, half a meter long claws, monstrous fangs... and half a kilo of a small, poorly organized brain (*Lebedev V.*

March of Suvorov and Bunich to the book market // Bulletin. 1998. No. 5-6). But such a state was forced by the very nature of totalitarianism.

In the same corral was under Stalin and the organization of communications; military transport service (although according to other

reasons) and at the end of 1940 almost 80% worked at the expense of horse-drawn transport. The logistics service was even worse organized. The medical service also left much to be desired (Ibid., pp. 334-336). During the Great Patriotic War, all this was more or less managed only thanks to the supplies of the Allies, among which, in addition to the already mentioned, almost half a million cars and, among other things, 423,107 field telephones, hundreds of thousands of radio stations, and much more (op. Quoted from: The Last Republic, pp. 147-148). According to some reports, the Allies provided the USSR with almost 100% communications (*Sokolov B. Pobed*

An analogy between Stalin and Napoleon is appropriate here. He also rejected the idea of a steam fleet, rejected the use of convex rockets, etc. So the point here is not that Roosevelt was smarter than Stalin - it is not at all a fact that this was the case. But the very principle of concentrating all power and all decisions in one hand seems vicious in the industrial, and even more so in the post-industrial era. One person, even if it is such a person as Stalin, cannot know everything and understand everything! And it is also impossible to keep smart advisers around oneself on one or another issue. A democratic leader can afford to keep advisers smarter than himself, because he will be elected president anyway, since a public politician who knows how to please the voters is one thing, but a "very smart" adviser is quite another, voters will not like him. But the autocrat, in principle, cannot afford to have advisers smarter than himself: this is a blow to the "sacred" nature of his power.

By the way, about the "sacred" nature of power. Alexander Dugin laments that in Germany (Nazi) and Russia (Soviet) geopolitics was not recognized, unlike the USA and England, and rightly sees this as not the last reason for the history

of the defeat of Germany and Russia (Osnovy geopolitiki. M., 2001). But why did this happen? Yes, precisely because in non-democratic states the power is so dear to the heart of Mr. Duga for a "sacred" character. Not a person paints a place, but exactly the opposite. Hence the point of view: once appointed to a position, it means that the mind should automatically increase. And if so, then there is nothing to listen to all sorts of geo-politicians from the outside. It is quite possible to answer them: "We know everything ourselves" or "We have someone to do this." Or even ruder: "None of your business" or "Know your place!" And then there is nothing to be surprised at the results.

There is no reason to be surprised at the results of "autocratic-"sacred" power in other areas as well. Yes, the leader's task is not to lead everything himself, but to select leaders of the highest standard for all posts. But can one person succeed in principle, even such a person as Stalin? Stalin succeeded in this in terms of the selection of generals, more or less in the selection of leaders of the war industry. Although there were punctures. So, for example, the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik in 1940 ordered the people's commissar of armaments BL. Vanniko vu to put a 107-mm cannon on tanks instead of a 76-mm one. Kulik supported AA. Zhdanov. Putting a gun almost one and a half times larger in caliber on the same tank was in principle impossible, but Stalin supported Zhdanov and Kulik. As a result, Vannikov was arrested and miraculously not repressed (*Nekrich AM S.* 112-113).

But in the sense of selecting the leaders of the economy as a whole, he did not always succeed. In the field of science management, he did not succeed at all - the most promising branches were destroyed by him.

Yes, and the creation of an atmosphere of a cult of personality around the sole dictator cannot pass the demon

trace. To Stalin's credit, it must be said that he succumbed to the incense that was smoked in his honor much less than Hitler (for this, see: *Suvorov V. Suicide*. S. 75-78, 82-89, 101-103), but Still, he couldn't resist at all.

But back to the question of the balance of power. Stalin, however, had a numerical superiority over the armies of the allies in Europe - 6 million against 4.6 million, but only in Europe. The ground forces of the United States, Britain and the colonies and dominions of the latter by 1945 totaled 22.65 million people. (my calculations according to: *World History*. Vol. 10. S. 433-444, 524, 566 - *D.V.*) - significantly more than the USSR (11.4 million), and the degree of exhaustion of human resources among the allies was, undoubtedly much lower than that of the USSR.

Here is an excerpt from Goebbels' diary of March 3 1945. The entry is not for propaganda and not for publication, and in general, Goebbels very, very highly appreciates the military power of the USSR (we have already talked about this, see: *Suvorov V. Cleansing*. P. 3-20). But here is the entry on Soviet manpower dated March 3, 1945: "Their troops are extremely well armed, but they suffer more and more from a lack of people. Their attacking infantry consists for the most part of eastern workers and Poles detained in our eastern regions. And there is nothing to object to. Our people did not know how to protect and did not want to. The war ruined the men (*The Last Republic*, p. 331).

Army General M.A. Moiseev admitted ("*Pravda*", July 19, 1991), that during the years of the Great Patriotic War, 29.4 million soldiers were mobilized into the Red Army, not counting those who were already there (quoted from *Den-M.* S. 153) - that is, all not less than 35 million. Of these, 11-12 million remained by 1945. I think it would not be a big exaggeration to say that in a new war, if it began, Stalin could only count on the next

draft contingents under 19 years of age. And taking into account the fact that opponents were also to appear in Asia (this will be discussed in the next chapter), the USSR should soon begin to yield to its pros.

opponents in numbers.

As for the ratio of economic potentials, then in general, if we take the military production of Britain in 1941-1944. per unit, German military production would be 0.9, Soviet 1.4, and American 4.3 (*Harrison M.*

Soviet military production 1941-1945 S. 493). According to other sources, American military production accounted for two-thirds of the total Allied military production, Soviet one-fifth, and British one-seventh (*Pozdeeva L.V.*

Lend-Lease for the USSR: the discussion continues // World War II. Actual problems. S. 329). At the same time, one should not forget that the degree of mobilization of the American economy was significantly lower than that of the British, not to mention the German and Soviet ones: the United States by no means rebuilt its entire economy on a war footing: the production of consumer goods increased by 83% during the war years. %, while in 1944, at the time of the highest growth in military production, 700,000 unemployed remained in the country (World History. Vol. 10. P. 434). Here is the conclusion of Heinrich Mann: America fought the war in jest. If she strained her powers, the world would tremble.

Further, the USSR would hardly have been able to mobilize practically the entire able-bodied population either into the army or into the military industry if it had not received from the allies huge supplies of food capable of feeding the entire army and half of the country, raw materials, various equipment (and rear and medical service communications, managed to be organized in a modern way only thanks to American supplies; more about the size of the Allied supplies

kov have already been mentioned, about 7-8 million additionally mobilized thanks to them - too).

Almost all known facts allow to conclude that the Soviet economy, like the German one, was designed for a blitzkrieg, and not for a protracted war. Few people ask themselves the question: why, having such a powerful military machine, did Stalin start such a complex combination with an "icebreaker" instead of simply conquering the whole of Europe? Yes, precisely because he was afraid of a protracted war with the whole world!

But that's not all. The occupation of Western Europe by Soviet troops and the beginning of "socialist transformations" would inevitably provoke resistance in Europe. Recall that Bandera and the "forest brothers" in the annexed in 1939-1940. territories, cut off from the whole world, resisted for a decade and a half! The same thing would have happened - on an immeasurably large scale - throughout Europe, if only the allies would, of course, provide assistance to European resistance in war conditions.

Many of my opponents are for some reason convinced that in Europe the Red Army would have been greeted with flowers as a liberator no longer from Hitler, but from the "Anglo-American imperialists." There seems to be nothing to discuss with those who hold such views, but it is necessary. The word again to the personal driver Marshal Zhukov AN. I will. The action takes place in Poland at the end of January 1945, during the Vistula-Oder operation: "Taking at face value the talk of almost the love of the local population for us, at first we were in a hurry to smile, stretch out our hands, and so on. The reception was usually lukewarm. Once, with a friend, we were driving a Willis through Gniezno and heard loud music coming from a large house. Stopped and entered. Polish youth danced in the hall. But we failed to dance, ladies

huddled, looked at us as if we were animals" (170,000 kilometers with G.K. Zhukov, p. 126).

Well, let's say that the Poles had no particular reason to love the USSR after 1920 and especially 1939 (and the earlier history also did not differ in particular warmth from relations). But after all, we came to Poland as liberators from Hitler, and we had to come to Western Europe as invaders.

And finally, the allies, dominating the seas and oceans, could threaten with landing forces at any point along the coast of the USSR and the territories occupied by it. How many millions of soldiers would have to be kept to guard them? Let me remind you that during the Crimean War, when the mobility of the fleet and its ability to land army landings were incomparably lower than in the 1940-1950s, Russia was forced to keep 270,000 soldiers on the coast of the Baltic Sea to protect against the British squadrons with 12,000 troops on board.

Chapter XXXIV

DID STALIN HAVE AN ENEMY ON THE CONTINENT

Europe is just a large
peninsula of the Asian continent.

(I.A. Ilyin, 1950)

It will be objected that neither Napoleon nor Hitler could win the war and, in particular, capture the British Isles, because they had an enemy on the Continent. In Solzhenitsyn's *(In the First Circle)* Stalin argues this way: Napoleon and Hitler could not defeat England because they had an enemy on the continent. And he won't!

Let's start with the fact that Napoleon had no opponents on the continent for at least three years - from 1809 to 1812, but in the matter of conquest

over the years, he has not progressed very much. But we are not talking about Napoleon now, we are talking about Steel. So did Stalin have an opponent on the continent or not? Let's figure it out.

Imagine that Stalin occupied Europe. Let's put ourselves in Truman's place: where to look for a continental ally? The logic of the previous policy of Roosevelt, counting on China as a counterbalance not only to Japan in the present, but also to the USSR in the future (*Utkin A.I. Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt*. S. 327, 339, 528-530, etc.), pushed specifically to China. Under the Marshall Plan, with American aid going to Europe, China was neglected and taken over by the Communists. However, we have already said that there are serious reasons to think that the geopolitical picture of the world has changed little because of this, and Stalin still lost China. And what if Europe, due to its capture by Stalin, had not had to be helped?

Let me remind you that at the end of 1944, with the defeat of the Japanese fleet and the liberation of the Philippines (and with the liberation of Burma), the Americans got the opportunity to access China, so to speak, from the "front door" (before that, aid had to be delivered by planes through Tibet, where, as already mentioned, it was required to spend three tons of fuel to deliver a ton of cargo (*Yakovlev N.N.* September 3, 1945, p. 623) Now the re-equipment of the Chinese army with the latest American technology has become a matter of time, moreover, the nearest one.

Further, the invasion of the "northern barbarians" would inevitably unite the Chinese people. Under these conditions, the communists would have to choose one of the two. Or they could join the struggle of the whole people—it was all the easier for them because even then, as we saw, to put it mildly, Mao was not very fond of the USSR. Or it remained to turn into some kind of analogue of the "Vlasovites", doomed to rejection by their country. And considering the above

was said about China, the first option was more likely than the second.

In general, the conquerors of China did not end well. So, the Tatar-Mongols held out in China for 80 years, and then? Not only were they expelled, but they themselves lost their independence. And who remembers today about the Manchus? Examples can be multiplied. The only difference is that in relation to the 20th century, when the course of history has accelerated, the terms must be reduced at least ten times in comparison with the Middle Ages. Lasted in China for eight years, and then? China is a country where it is even easier to enter than into Russia, but it is even more difficult to leave. Almost impossible (in the sense - alive).

In addition, throughout the 20th century, China was clearly on the rise, turning in less than a century from a political corpse, on the territory of which the great powers could sort things out among themselves (for example, almost the entire Russo-Japanese war took place on the territory of China), into a superpower. Historical experience shows that nations at such a stage of historical development emerge from military upheavals only more intensified. In order not to go far, let us recall Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century. Remember, in Pushkin: "So heavy mlat, crushing glass, forges damask steel."

In any case, the war in China would have taken on a protracted character for the USSR, with the need to keep millions of soldiers there. In general, the Chinese theme is so vast and multifaceted that it deserves a separate book. Someday we'll get there. Now let's look at the rest of Asia.

The logic of war would drag the USSR into the Middle and Middle East And there - a numerous and in a significant part of it is a very militant Muslim population. Recall that in Central Asia the Basmachi resisted the Red Army for almost 20 years. Consider Afghanistan. Let us remember, finally, that under Steel

It was not the USSR that at all sought to establish relations with the non-communist forces of the Muslim East - for those who are interested, I recommend, for example, the characterization of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 in the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. In a word, many more troops would have to

reap there too.

True, Russians have traditionally been sympathized in India. But after all, in 1942, the Indians also prepared to meet the Japanese as liberators, until the Malays and Burmese who fled to India said what these "liberators" were. It is unlikely that the stories of hundreds of thousands (perhaps even millions) of Iranians and Afghans who fled from communism would have added sympathy for the Stalinist regime in India. In any case, it is known that even later, in the 1980s, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan sharply worsened Soviet-Indian relations. This is understandable: all the conquerors of India known to history, moving from the north, passed through Afghanistan.

So the front against China, the front in the Moslem East, millions of soldiers in Europe, millions of soldiers on the coasts—there are already four fronts. Let me remind you that the main principle of strategy is the concentration of forces. The same Napoleon won while fighting on one front, until 1809. In 1809, having won on one front, the Austrian, he could not win on the other. And in 1812 he lost in both - Russian and Spanish. While Hitler fought on one front - he won, how he led the war on two fronts - we know what happened. But Stalin fought in 1941-1945. on only one front. And Japan lost, getting involved in a war on two fronts - against China and the United States. But the Americans opened a second front in Europe only when the outcome of the war with Japan was already completely determined. Stalin, in the event of a war with the United States, would have to have four whole fronts against him.

In addition, Truman could well seize the anti-colonial initiative from Stalin. As you know, the United States did not have its own colonies, so the initiative to liberate foreign colonies would be beneficial for them - how sharply after that the chances of American penetration (economic and other) into the former colonies of European metropolises would increase! By the way, many leaders of the national liberation movement (Sukarno, for example) expected pressure from the United States on the European metropolises in order to convince them to grant independence to the colonies (and they were not always deceived in their hopes). And the Americans would have an additional source of manpower for the war. Well, and Britain, separated from the Stalinist hordes only by a narrow water strip of the English Channel, not to mention the French, Belgians and Dutch occupied by the Soviets, would hardly have been left with anything other than to agree to the American initiative.

So, Stalin would have to have four or five fronts against him, or even all six: the sixth front - aerial bombardment of the USSR, since a lot of forces would inevitably have to be diverted to air defense as well. In any case, the Americans are not the Germans, who did not have strategic aviation at all and who therefore could not inflict special damage to the Soviet industry located in the rear (what's in the rear - even Moscow did not suffer much, despite the fact that at some points units of the Wehrmacht had thirty kilometers to it).

And all of the above - in conditions of a hungry rear - who would feed us after the cessation of supplies from America? Let me remind you that back in 1941, before the mass mobilization of people, tractors, trucks and horses into the army, the yield was 4 centners per hectare, and the number of cattle did not reach the level of 1916 - the third year of the World War and

nun of the revolution (Zverev A.G. Notes of the Minister. M., 1973. P. 188). All this under the conditions of bombing, in the camps of many millions in the country, a significant part of the population of which in 1945 was ready to revolt if only they were given weapons (fifth front!). And what was it worth throwing him off the planes? This is not to mention the atomic bomb (by the end of 1945, America had 196 of them).

How many chances did Stalin have to win such a war?

Chapter XXXV

IS THE IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE

Such a stupid faith, not based on sound logic and numbers, is needed only by the priests, and not by the squadron commander.

(A. S. Novikov-Priboy, "Tsushima"),

Some will answer: for Russia in general and for Soviet Russia in particular, nothing is impossible.

This idea has been around for more than a decade. "For a Russian, even the impossible is possible," says one of the "positive" (young oprichnik) characters in the play by A.N. Tolstoy "Ivan the Terrible". The Russians are capable of defeating the rest of the world put together - this was instilled in us by Stalin's propaganda, and this is still repeated by many people who, to put it mildly, do not like Stalin.

Not only Stalin is no longer there, but for almost twenty years there has been no power of the CPSU, and some people still sing the same songs - for example, TV presenter Maxim Sokolov in the program "However" (ORT) of June 25, 2001 (just on occasion of the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War). Actually, I have great respect for Maxim Sokolov, if only for the fact that he was one of the first in Russia to realize that liberal

democratic and state-patriotic

ideas need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. But when he heard it, he was not very pleasantly surprised.

The main idea of Sokolov's speech was that the laws of history do not work in Russia. And he gives examples - the war with Napoleon, the war with Hitler. "With every week, Russia's position became more and more hopeless, and suddenly, when everything seemed to be over, a turning point occurred ..." And the conclusion is the same: nothing is impossible for Russia.

In this, so to speak, concept, everything is built on overexposure and juggling. It was Napoleon's army, as it moved towards Moscow, that melted away without fighting, simply from starvation and bad roads, while the Russian army, retreating, strengthened itself. Yes, and not only Russia, Napoleon fought, and the crisis of his empire began at least two years before 1812: the continental blockade, the war in Spain, which had already begun (at least since 1809), the lack of draft contingents ... Well, but the fact that the position of Hitler, who dragged himself into a war on two fronts, from that moment became hopeless, only the lazy did not write. And Viktor Suvorov also set forth his views on this matter (see: Cleansing; The Last Republic; Suicide, etc.).

And now about the USSR. Who among us has not heard (and more often than not, he himself has not uttered) such words: yes, frighten the people with detachments and terror, and they will crush any enemy! Yes, if Gorbachev had built camps for design engineers (and for workers who were late for work at the same time), instead of breeding democracy, they would have instantly overtaken America in everything in which they began to lag behind!

Actually, this is logic at the level of a demon-possessed Fuhrer. Hitler said so: there are no objective reasons that prevent a person from doing something. If something doesn't work out for a person, then either someone's betrayal and wrecking are to blame, or his own

natural softness. And for someone who is confident in success and with a firm hand throws away all obstacles, nothing is impossible. And his other statement (this is about the superiority of the Red Army or some other enemy, I don't remember exactly): the numbers mean absolutely nothing ... the number of tanks

kov and aircraft does not solve anything. They are powerless against the will of Almighty Rock, which predetermined the victory of Germany and its world role for many millennia to come (*Bunich I. Groza*, p. 302). Why not Tyutchev's "Russia cannot be understood with the mind ..."?

However, taking into account how Hitler ended up, these arguments are not the best example for them to imitate in the domestic field. I suggest to everyone who believes that anything can be achieved by the threat of camps, execution or barrage detachments, to answer one question, only honestly: could you personally run faster than a racing car? What about fear of being shot? That's it.

We were inspired from the cradle: with similar methods, you can solve all issues. Here is Viktor Suvorov there too. How, in his opinion, was the selection of leaders under Stalin? An impossible task was set: for example, to double and then triple the production of tanks without receiving additional resources. Those who failed were put up against the wall, and this continued until there was someone who was capable of it (*Suicide*, pp. 127-129).

Hence the conclusions (we were taught this way, Suvorov does not repeat this, but clearly leads to this): here, Hitler captured all of Europe and half of Russia, and the remaining half of Russia managed to defeat him. Hence again the same conclusion: for one who ruthlessly shoots all those who have shown some kind of weakness and does not show any hesitation, nothing is impossible.

I do not consider Russia to be the "homeland of elephants" and the Russians to be the inventors of everything and everything; however, the law of conservation of matter was discovered by the Russian - Mikhailo

Lomonosov (only a few decades later, the discovery was repeated independently by the Frenchman Lavou Azier). So, this law says: nothing comes out of nothing, how much came in one place, so much went away in another.

Translated into our language: triple production tanks, without receiving additional resources, is not possible, unless before that the workers of the tank industry were engaged in wholesale plundering of materials (which under Stalin, you see, was unsafe and did not become widespread). You can, of course, deal with postscripts and report that the impossible

the task is completed, - in peacetime, that's how things are elk all the time under Stalin, and under Khrushchev, and later. But in the war, you don't particularly deal with postscripts. Once tripled, it means that resources have been found somewhere. Where?

Here I refer the reader again to the figures for American deliveries. Just in time for September 1941, the Soviet and British armies had completed their occupation of Iran, and the Allied supplies went, so to speak, "front door" instead of the inconvenient and unsafe "back door" of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. As already mentioned, 80% of all allied supplies went through Iran. Well, since aluminum and other valuable raw materials are supplied, and food supplies make it possible to call up a significant part of the peasants from the villages to the war, then why not make reservations for workers in military factories and triple the production of tanks? And tripled.

What if there is a war with America? Then these deliveries will naturally stop. And the hunger is starting. spring In 1945 (when deliveries were still going on!) it had already begun in Central Asia and Transbaikalia. Here is a secret report from Beria to Stalin dated May 21-22, 1945: "In the Leninabad region (Tajikistan. -D.V.) there is 20 dead from starvation and 500 swollen from malnutrition

niya. In the Stalinabad region, 70 died of starvation. In the Chita region, there is a consumption of dead animals, trees, bark "and even cannibalism (*Volkogonov D.A.* Triumph and tragedy. T. 2. P. 415). I myself was told in 1990 by a Kirghiz (he was 15 in 1945): "It is good that the war ended in May 1945; if it lasted until August or September, we would all starve to death."

For Volkogonov, this is a secondary topic, but more fundamental works confirm the facts he cites, and not only in Central Asia and Transbaikalia. Thus, the yield during the war years in Siberia amounted to 4-5 centners / ha, in the steppe regions - 2-3 centners / ha (*Aniskov V.T.* Sacrificial feat of the village. Novosibirsk, 1993, p. 44). Siberian collective farmers in 1942-1943. they received 240 grams of bread per workday, their family members received 60-70 grams each (according to official reports, this was actually even worse) (*Ibid.*, p. 123). Only 30 out of 230 households on the Northern Lights collective farm in Novosibirsk Oblast had bread, the rest ate dead animals, including those that died of anthrax. In the Chita region (where, by the way, the average yield was 2.9 kg / ha) on February 26

In 1943, the collective farmer P. Sukhanov, in desperation from hunger, hacked his mother, wife and six children with an ax, and shot himself (*Ibid.*, pp. 144-146).

The food situation must be dealt with in a special way. The fact that the level of the number of cattle in the USSR in 1941 was lower than in 1916 (and in 1945, of course, even much lower - in 1942-1944 the number of cattle decreased by one and a half times, sheep - almost a quarter, pigs - more than 2.5 times (*Ibid.*, pp. 45, 54), we have already said. We add that in the Novosibirsk region, for example, even in peacetime, from October 1940 to May 1941, 35,300 horses, 21,400 cattle, 104,400 pigs died (*Ibid.*, p. 144).

Yes, even simpler: American supplies stopped, and in 1946-1947. famine really began, despite the fact that the peasants from the fronts to the villages returned, and the industry after the end of the war began to produce not only tanks, but also tractors and trucks. This is peacetime. And what if the military (in the context of the war with America)?

It was also said that the Soviet economy, like the German one, was designed for a blitzkrieg (what else could one count on with such an organization of the rear?). And here are a few more details.

On June 21, 1941, a meeting of the Politburo, devoted to the completion of the last preparations for the "liberation" war, decided to call up another 800,000 reservists into the army - of course, from collective farms: not workers from military factories should be called into the army (but others in Soviet industry in 1941 was practically non-existent). By creating huge fronts, Stalin upset the already precarious balance between a gigantic army and ruined, depleted agriculture. When the war began and open mobilization was announced, up to 70% of those mobilized were rural residents (Ibid., pp. 10-11). At least for this reason, writes V. Suvorov, Stalin could not postpone the invasion of Europe until 1942.

By the way, the replacement of the male labor force in the rear with a female one, begun in the autumn of 1939, when Pasha Angeli did not throw her famous cry "100,000 girlfriends, to the tractor!" (in fact, as many as 200,000 girlfriends came to the tractor) (Suvorov V. Den-MS 210-211), was much more successful in rural areas than in cities. Thus, in the Altai Territory, in the first week of the war, 700-1000 women were trained as machine operators in each district (90% of tractor and combine operators were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war). This is understandable - skilled industrial workers need to be trained for a long time. In order to carry out such a

the replacement, it was necessary to start not in 1939, but earlier (and they started, but still not on such a scale as required) (*Aniskov V.T. Sacrificial feat of the village. S. 10-15, Bunich I. Groza pp. 212*).

Operation "Thunderstorm" made it possible to feed on new territories that were to be captured in Europe (Ledokol. 2002, pp. 292-294). (Europe in 1941 was not yet ravaged by the war, or rather, this process was just beginning). In general, we have already talked about the fact that the food, logistics, and medical supply of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War was managed only thanks to the supplies of the allies. However, US deliveries to the USSR gained military scope already in 1939 and did not decrease until 1945 itself - it is not clear how pre-military deliveries differed from military ones (The Last Republic, pp. 192-193). In addition to American supplies, the Thunderstorm operation itself was conceived as a self-sustaining operation at the expense of pasture in the captured countries of Europe - "like a gigantic slaughter raid that supposed to supply the army with captured resources" (Bunich I. Groza, p. 336) .

Actually, it's not that bad. Napoleon also did not carry huge convoys with him and provided for the army by robbing the civilian population (his expression that "the war must feed itself" became popular) - this, by the way, explains the high mobility of his army, which surprised opponents. . But this approach to supply worked where the civilian population, after the defeat of the army, supplied the conquerors with everything they needed - in Italy, Austria, Prussia. And what if for some reason it is impossible to provide the army at the expense of the local population? For example, in Spain, where, firstly, the country is poor, where you can't feed a large army even in peacetime, and then all the people took up the pitchfork and, not only to feed, they just don't want to endure the French on their territory .

Well, okay, Spain is a small country, and France is nearby, so they somehow arranged the supply there. But Napoleon is in Russia, where the army and the population are waging a "Scythian war", devastating their territory on the path of the enemy. It is known that what happened to Napoleon in Russia. But between Russia and France there is still Germany; in 1813 (partly already in 1812) and the Germans, imbued with a patriotic spirit, refused to feed the French. And Napoleon had to carry his feet from near Leipzig to France.

So Stalin, if he had started a war with yesterday's allies in 1945, would have fallen into the same trap. When, in 1941, Hitler launched a preemptive strike and it was necessary to fight not in Europe, but on its own territory devastated by collectivization and preparation for war, the Allied deliveries corrected the situation. And in 1945, advancing through the already devastated Europe and, naturally, having no supplies from America, what could Stalin count on? In 1941, preparing an invasion of Europe that had not yet been devastated and with supplies from America, Stalin could not wait until 1942. And what can we say about the invasion of Europe in 1945, devastated by the war, and without the supplies of the allies?

So, once again: let us recall everything that was said in the two previous chapters, and ask: how many chances did there be to win such a war. Right. So Io Sif Vissarionovich thought so. And the excessively ardent Zhukov, who, with all due respect to him as a commander, still did not possess statesmanship, laid siege.

In general, Russian and German military men and politicians have always differed from Western ones in that they overestimate their own strength and underestimate the enemy, while Western ones, on the contrary, overestimate the enemy and underestimate themselves. Enough and more than enough has been written about how the Germans overestimated their strength; as for the comparison of Soviet and Western military lea

I want to look at the twelve-volume "History of the Second World War" and find the plans of the Soviet command for the second half of 1943 (on the maps). There, in particular, it was planned to reach Minsk and Vilnius in October 1943 (History of the Second World War. Vol. 7. P. 144)

But the Allies in 1944 planned to reach only the Mariana Islands in the Pacific Ocean - in fact, they already in October 1944 began the liberation of the Philippines. According to the plans of the Allies, 11 months were allotted for the liberation of France, in practice it took three - from the beginning of June to the beginning of 1944 - according to the original plans, by this time they were only going to liberate Normandy and Brittany and reach Paris, and in the south go from Marseille to Lyon (Ibid. Vol. 9. P. 24-25). Churchill's appeal to Stalin for help on January 6, 1945, i.e. already after the German offensive in the Ardennes was stopped - also an indicator. The allies also overestimated the strength and ability to resist Japan in 1945 (although there is another version of the events in the Pacific Ocean in 1945, set out in Chapter XIII), otherwise they would not have asked Stalin to join the war. True, he would most likely have done this without their request ...

But there is also a difference between Germans and Russians. German The Russians overestimated their strength, so to speak, at the state level, while the Russians only at the local, at the state - quite rarely. That is why Germany often lost wars (and not at all because the Germans do not know how to fight, as Viktor Suvorov believes (Purification, p. 147)), and Russia rarely. As soon as Russia overestimated its strength and set unbearable tasks for itself, it quickly got in the teeth. The conquest of world domination is, by definition, an overwhelming task.

Viktor Suvorov talks a lot about
Veteran propaganda, describing our "backwardness"

1941 and our "unpreparedness" for war, pours dirt on our own country. But this propaganda trick also has a downside. In fact, if with such an initial "unpreparedness" we nevertheless won, then, probably, for the USSR there is nothing impossible at all! And if you find out that in fact the USSR was ready for war like no other, then the picture is somewhat different.

Although Stalin inspired the Soviet people that nothing was impossible for them, he himself saw the limits of the possible very well. Unlike the adventurist Hitler, who, while also suggesting something similar to the Germans, eventually believed it himself, Stalin had a very clear idea of the limits of the possible. And when starting a war, carefully weigh the balance of forces. Therefore, he died a natural death at the pinnacle of power, and not in a bunker from rat poison. Let's not consider ourselves smarter than Stalin.

And so it happened that Soviet tanks in May 1945 The Elbe was not crossed.

Chapter XXXVI

FOR WHOM TIME WORKED

We have military superiority over the West, but this superiority is temporary.
change.

*(I. V. Stalin. Secret speech at a meeting
Politburo February 15, 1951)*

And now we turn again to Stalin's teachings about permanent and temporary benefits in time of war and try to apply it to our situation. We have already seen that the USSR was not preparing for the war, and by 1939 it was quite ready for it. Germany was also preparing for war, but by 1939 it was far from ready for it. At least in September 1939 Germany was stocked with: sleep

rows for mountain guns - for 18 days of war, mines for light mortars - for two weeks, for heavy ones - for 12 days, shells for heavy howitzers - for 60 days, for tanks - for 6 (!) days (Suvorov V.

Day-M S. 87). America, as of 1939, had not yet thought about preparing for war - let me remind you that in June 1941 there were only 400 tanks of hopelessly outdated designs.

To understand who time worked for, consider the dynamics of military output in these three countries from 1940-1941 to 1945. So, in May 1940, only 40 tanks were produced in Germany. In 1939 only 1,000 aircraft were produced per month. The share of the military industry in total production was 15%.

And now it's 1941. Military production in Germany is 19% of the total production (*Kerl G. Military economy and military industry // Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. P. 363-370; further data on the share of military production in total volume are given from the same source*). And here is the data on the production of the main types of weapons in absolute figures (in all tables - in thousands of pieces). At the same time, for the USSR, information is given only for the second half of the year, while for Germany - for the entire year (for the USA - for some reason, only through December 1941) (*History of the Second World War. M., 1981. T. 12. pp. 168, 181, 200; further data on military production are from the same source*).

Military production in 1941

	USSR	Germany	USA	
Rifles and carbines Assault	1.567.1	1.359	37.9	
rifles Guns	89.7	41.6	325	
Mortars	30.2	3.4	22.1	
	42.3	0.4	4.2	
tanks	4.8	0.9	3.8	
Aircraft	8.2	1.4	8.4	

Let us add that due to the fact that, in preparation for an aggressive war, the bulk of the military factories of the USSR were located in the western regions (Den-M.S. 112-113), they had to be evacuated to a large extent just in the second half of 1941 to the eastern regions. Thus, apart from machine guns, in the second half of 1941, when most of the country's military enterprises were forced to evacuate and behind the Urals often began production from wheels, the USSR produced more military equipment, or at least no less (aircraft) than Germany, whose industry then worked without serious interference: British air raids were still not strong enough to create serious problems for German industry, and American aircraft had not yet joined in the bombing. It hardly raises any doubts that in the first half of 1941 the military production of the USSR was much higher. As for the United States, their industry in one month produced,

for example, there are 2.25 times more tanks than there were just six months earlier.

1942 In January 1942, German industry was finally put on a war footing. The share of military production in the total production of Germany was 26% in 1942. In addition, within the military budget, expenditures were redistributed to the detriment of the fleet and to the benefit of the land army (*Felshtinsky Yu.G.* Reading the books "Icebreaker" and "Den-M" ... P. 152). Here is the data on military production for this year (Table 2).

Thus, despite the transfer of German industry to the wartime regime, the USSR, in which the epic with the evacuation and deployment of military enterprises in new places, surpassed Germany many times over in the production of military equipment, and, for example, in the production of mortars, by orders of magnitude. .

But the military production of the United States rushed forward sharply, surpassing the production of artillery pieces and especially aircraft of the USSR and Germany, together taken.

Military production in 1942

	USSR	Germany	USA*	
Rifles and carbines	4049	1370	1541	7
	1506	651.7	232	
Guns	127.1	40.5		187.6
Mortars	230	9.8		eleven
tanks	24.4	6.2		23.9
Aircraft	21.7	11.6		47.9

For the US, data on the production of tanks and aircraft is here and further are taken from World History (vol. X. M., 1965, p. 433).

By the way, let us note that starting from 1942 (and, as we shall see, until the end of the war), the USSR sharply surpassed Germany in the production of machine guns. V. Suvorov writes (with references to Guderian) that Hitler created big problems for the Wehrmacht by stubbornly refusing to introduce machine guns in the army instead of the carbines he knew well from the First World War (I take my words back.).

1943 On January 13, 1943, Hitler declared "total mobilization" and "total war." The share of military production in Germany is 38%. And here are the absolute dimensions of the production of military equipment and weapons.

Military production in 1943

	USSR	Germany	USA	
Rifles and carbines Assault	3436	2275	5683	
rifles Guns	2023	234		686.4
Mortars	130.3	73.7		220.9
	69.4	23		25.8
tanks	24.1	10.7		29.5
Aircraft	29.9	19.3		85.9

Do you notice that the gap between the USSR and Germany began to shrink? But Germany is already being subjected to heavy blows from Anglo-American aircraft, while the USSR is receiving enormous and ever-increasing aid from the USA. The qualitative gap between Germany and the USSR also significantly decreased: heavy tanks appeared, which did not exist before. In December 1942, "Tigers" arrived at the front, and in 1943 - "Panthers" (Suvorov V. The Last Republic. M., 1995. S. 393-397). The United States, however, still surpasses the USSR and Germany combined in the production of artillery guns and aircraft, including the production of aircraft - almost twice.

1944 The share of military production in Germany reached its maximum - 50% of total production. Here is the military production data for this year.

Military production in 1944

	USSR	Germany	USA
Rifles and carbines	2450	2855	3489.3
Automata	1970	228	347.5
guns	122.4	148.2	103.0
mortars	7.1	33.2	24.8
tanks	29	18.3	17.6
Aircraft	33.2	34.1	96.4

After reading this, you refuse to believe that dying Germany, tormented by Allied air strikes that demolished entire cities in a matter of hours, surpassed the USSR in the production of guns, mortars and aircraft. At the same time, the peak of military production was reached in July 1944. At the same time, Germany increased the size of the army - up to 9.4 million against 7.25 million in the summer of 1941 (*Felashtins*).

books "Icebreaker" and "Day-M" ... S. 151). But, as they say, facts are stubborn things.

Finally, 1945. For Germany, four months are taken - from January to April, for the USSR and the USA - seven, from January to August. In parentheses, to make it clearer, half of the Soviet and American production is given - at the rate from January to April. Let us add that in the second half of 1944, for obvious reasons, a decline in military production began in Germany, but still up to March 1945 it produced more armaments than in the summer of 1941 (Ibid., p. 152).

Military production in 1945

	USSR	Germany	USA
Rifles and carbines	637.(318.5)	665	1578.1 (789.05)
Automata	583(291.5)	78	206.7 (103.35)
guns	72.2 (36.1)	27.0	34(17)
mortars	3.0 (1.5)	2.8	40.1 (20.05)
tanks	20.5(10.25)	4.4	11.2 (5.6)
Aircraft	19.1 (9.55)	7.2	43.2(21.6)

So, Germany, which was already completely perishing, in terms of equal time intervals, in the production of guns and aircraft, was only about a third inferior to the USSR, and in rifles and mortars it surpassed it by about half. As for America, in the conditions of the end of the war, in the ground operations of which its troops did not play a decisive role, it curtails military production (partly already in 1944), only for aircraft, as before, as in 1942-1944 years, surpasses the USSR and Germany combined, although not as much as in 1943. Even in the production of automatic weapons, where, except for 1941, the gap between the USSR and Germany was

about an order of magnitude in favor of the USSR, it was reduced to only four times.

By the way, the huge superiority of the USSR in the production of automatic weapons is worth paying attention to. Kremlin historians constantly emphasize that aggressor Germany armed its army with machine guns in advance, and the USSR switched from rifles to PPSH only around 1943. Based on statistics, the truth turns out to be somewhat different, to put it mildly.

The economy of the USSR, like the economy of Germany, was designed for a "blitzkrieg" and could not withstand a protracted war. But earlier, data were given on the production of non-military products. Now we see that the situation with military products was approximately the same. Moreover, Germany, paradoxical as it may sound, turned out to be even more adapted to a protracted war than the USSR. The same Felshtinsky writes this way: the degree of mobilization of the economy in the USSR was much higher than the German one, and already at the beginning of the war, the peaceful industry, including the food industry, was reduced to nothing. Even the Poles occupied by Germany, mobilized for the German military for waters, ate better than the Soviet rear. And despite such a hard-to-understand tension
nie, it seems that the USSR won the Great Patriotic War only thanks to the massive help of the United States (Ibid., pp. 151-152).

And finally one more thing. As already mentioned, for the United States, the Second World War was not so much a land war as a sea and air one. Therefore, it is also interesting to look at the dynamics of the production of combat aircraft in various countries (which we have already done) and warships of all classes. Here we have statistical data on the structure of a warship (World History. T. X. M., 1965. S. 433, 439; History of the Second World War. T. 12. S. 168, 200, 202) .

**Production of warships
various classes in 1939-1945.**

	USSR	germa nia	Brita nia	USA Japan	
1939		10	17		
1940		60	106		
1941	35 (second half que)	207	170	1300 (second half que)	
1942	15	241	173	8000	
1943	14	290	168	18 400	
1944	4	250	352	29 200	63
1945	2 (January August)	93 (January April)		14 100 (January August)	48

Well, how impressive is the difference between America and the rest? Well, let's say, Germany, and especially the USSR, had no time for warships, for these countries the war was predominantly on land, especially for the USSR - the Allies basically took over the fight against the German fleet. But compare American production with the production of Japan, for which the Pacific front against the USA was the main one - at least for its fleet and air force. Compare with Britain, the traditional "mistress of the seas."

Should I explain later why the USSR in 1945 did not start a war with the former allies?

Chapter XXXVII

WHY STALIN DID NOT KILL ROOSEVELT

They will ask: why, then, did Roosevelt completely capitulate to Stalin in Yalta, yielding to him everything that he demanded (many cars wrote about this).

ry - it's easier to remember who didn't write)? Solzhenitsyn, for example, speaks of the "strikingly systematically obvious political myopia and even stupidity" of Roosevelt and Churchill (The Gulag Archipelago, Part I, Chapter 6).

Well, Solzhenitsyn is pardonable - The Gulag Archipelago was written when the USSR was, apparently, in full strength, and it seemed that it would simply go on for another century. But here is Viktor Suvorov in the same place (already in 2000, almost ten years after the end of the Cold War): "Roosevelt (although he was paralyzed) danced to the Stalinist tune all the numbers that the Kremlin Master demanded of him ... Before the war and during it, Roosevelt, with his ability to guess, capture and satisfy Stalin's desires, brought the world to complete amazement. And even now, one never ceases to be amazed, to put it mildly, at the compliance, compliance and desire of the President of the United States to please the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" (Suicide, p. 239).

And Suvorov goes further. He commemorates "the enigmatic gentleness that Roosevelt displayed from the very first day of his administration (remember the two tractors from New York?). Roosevelt's incomprehensible pliability constantly widened and deepened and culminated in complete surrender in 1945 at Yalta" (The Last Republic, p. 195).

"Two tractors from New York" are tank models of the American tank genius Walter Christie, which the Americans sold to Stalin under the guise of "tractors" and from which all the famous Soviet tanks of the war and post-war period trace their ancestry. Only now they were sold on December 24, 1930, that is, more than two years before Roosevelt occupied the White House - Suvorov himself reports this in the same book (p. 158).

But back to Roosevelt. To answer to

question, I propose a simple analogy. In 1929, Stalin expelled his main opponent Trotsky from the USSR. In The Holy Cause, Viktor Suvorov poses the question: why did Stalin do this? Trotsky was not dangerous to him in Alma-Ata exile. But abroad he became or, at least, could become very dangerous. If, as Robert Conquest writes in The Great Terror, Stalin could not destroy Trotsky immediately (the execution of the much less influential M.N. Ryutin had to be postponed for four years due to the resistance of the Politburo) (Great Terror. S. 68- 72), what prevented him from "marinating" Lev Davidovich in the USSR until 1936-37, either expelling him from the party, then reinstating him again, and so on until the very execution - well, in general, like all other oppositionists? And it was possible to kill him, like Kirov. Or slaughtered on the operating table, like Frunze.

Suvorov gives the answer: Trotsky shouted at every corner that "Stalin betrayed the World Revolution", that only he, Trotsky, can carry it out, and Stalin is dullness, mediocrity and there is no need to be afraid of him. Stalin could not have thought of a better opponent in exile.

But from about 1938, Trotsky understood Stalin's plan with the "icebreaker". And I began to write about him. And then Stalin made a decision: destroy Trotsky! Opa sen has become! (Holy cause. S. 189-191).

However, the question arises: why didn't Stalin destroy Roosevelt, who had guessed his plans? The enemy was more dangerous than Lev Davidovich - after all, the head of the richest and strongest power in the world, and not some oppositionist living behind the stove with the President of Mexico! And it was possible to kill him with the help of powerful Stalinist intelligence as far back as 1938-1939, when the war had not yet begun and in peaceful America the president was almost not guarded.

But the fact is that Roosevelt did not show that he understood Stalin's plan. So I don't know, as I already wrote, exactly when Roosevelt unraveled Stalin's plans. Having seen through Stalin's ingeniously simple tactics, the FDR also understood the tactics of the Soviet communists in general: if you want to win in the apparatus struggle, pretend to be dull and mediocre.

That is how he won in the mid-1920s. Stalin of the brilliant Trotsky, and not only him. That is how, in the mid-1950s, "Ivan the Fool" Khrushchev, who played the role of a jester and danced "hopak" at Stalin's night feasts, defeated the seemingly much stronger Malenkov. This is how, in the mid-1960s, Brezhnev defeated the seemingly much stronger Shelepin (*Voslensky M.S. Nomen klatura. P. 374*).

Roosevelt did the same thing. And he achieved what his totalitarian dictators did not take seriously. Here is what, for example, the Nazi leaders said about him.

"These Anglo-Saxons, fat from luxury, will not be able to wage war," Hitler said this back in the spring of 1939 (*Bunich I. Groza, p. 30*). And here is 1942. Quotes from Hitler's Table Talk. March 23: Roosevelt is insane. May 17: "American politicians surrounded by Roosevelt are full of fools" (quoted from: *Suvorov V. Suicide.*

S. 99). Of all the democratic leaders, Roosevelt was not particularly liked or respected by Hitler in general. Back in 1940, he somehow publicly expressed surprise at how such a large and dynamic nation as the American one "suffers a cripple at the head, who cannot even go to the closet himself" (I. Storm. pp. 262-263).

And on the edge of the grave, the Nazi leaders continue in the same spirit. An entry in Goebbels' diary dated March 8, 1945: "Stalin seems to me more realistic than the Anglo-American madmen." But for

letter dated March 20, 1945: "The Anglo-Americans have proved exceptionally inflexible in the pursuit of their war aims. They do not understand anything either in military psychology or in military management. April 4: "Stalin treats Roosevelt and Churchill like stupid boys" (quoted from Purification, pp. 15-16). They went to the grave without understanding anything...

Stalin expressed himself in approximately the same spirit. "America is incapable of waging an exhausting, bloody war on its own," Stalin believed. "Unable due to strong public opinion and democracy" (Bunich I. Groza, p. 449). However, even at the end of October 1940, the Soviet leaders did not believe at all that Roosevelt would be able to force his country to fight (Ibid., p. 177). And even if America enters the war, then the pampered Americans will never defeat such harsh ascetic warriors as the Japanese (Ibid., p. 210). What's there - even about the possibilities of naval construction of the USA and Japan, Stalin spoke as about comparable values: "the fleets of the USA and Japan must destroy each other" (Ibid., p. 236). By the way, the Soviet leadership underestimated the possibility of US landing operations - even B. M. Shaposhnikov believed back in February 1941 that the Allied landing in Hitler-occupied Europe was impossible (Ibid., p. 394).

Well, why kill Roosevelt after this, if he opponents did not understand anything? And some of today's historians too. Once again, as it was with V. Suvorov: "Roosevelt (although he was paralyzed) danced to the Stalinist tune all the numbers that the Kremlin Master demanded of him."

I don't know what Roosevelt danced to Stalin's tune there, but the Second World War ended with the implementation of the American geopolitical scenario. In other words, the US won the Cold War before it even started.

Chapter XXXVIII

ON THE CAPITULATION IN YALTA

After winning the campaign, you
can lose the battle.

(Napoleon)

And now let's talk about Yalta. And what, in fact, did Roosevelt concede? Eastern Europe? So she was in Stalin's hands anyway. And we have already seen that he did not consider this a victory in the war. Western regions of the future GDR in exchange for part of Berlin? (Again Solzhenitsyn: "How could they give Stalin the vast areas of Saxony and Thuringia for the ridiculous toy of four-zoned Berlin - their own Achilles heel" ("The Gulag Archipelago. Part I. Chapter 6). Of course, in the future "cold war" West Berlin added problems to the West. But did this exchange of territories in Germany improve the global strategic positions of the USSR? I allow myself to at least doubt it.

Did the Allies give Stalin all the "displaced persons"? The act, to put it mildly, is inhumane, but it still did not cancel the results of the war. General ge

the political balance of power from this again

hasn't changed. And if so, then why irritate Stalin because of some Vlasovites, who, after all, were traitors not only to the Stalinist regime, but also to their Fatherland. If Stalin did not want to push the West to extremes and therefore did not attack, then both Roosevelt and Churchill were not going to fight against the USSR without extreme need. Why, if the main thing has already been done? As for the concessions at Yalta... The main thing has been done—it is possible to make concessions in small things.

Over the past two centuries, the "slave", "semi-slave" and "slave-counterrevolutionary" rulers of Russia, Germany and other countries at certain stages of socio-economic development have allowed one and the same

same mistake, underestimating the ability of capitalist democracies to resist and taking the unwillingness to take up arms without extreme necessity (natural both for the peoples themselves, who live prosperously, and for their governments, forced in a democracy to reckon with the moods of citizens) for "cowardice" and "inability to fight." Let us list chronologically only the main errors of this kind.

1853 - Nicholas I regarding England and France ("this England with its bourgeois parliament can hardly wage war"); the result is defeat in the Crimean War.

1914 - Wilhelm II regarding England: a plan "wars before autumn leaf fall in 8 weeks" was it is built mainly on the assumption that on land it will be necessary to fight mainly against the Russians and the French; the result is a protracted war, futile for Germany, which it has become thanks to the participation of England.

1917 - Wilhelm II regarding the USA ("it is as weak an adversary as Romania", as one of the pro-government party leaders in the Reichstag declared); therefore, after the withdrawal of Russia from the war, the Kaiser considered the victory over the Entente already won; the result was the complete defeat of Germany in the 1918 campaign, in which American troops played a decisive role.

1940 - Hitler regarding England and the USA. A with Considering all of the above, it can be concluded that At the same time, Stalin made the same mistake.

1950 - Stalin regarding the USA. The blitzkrieg in Korea, as a result of the intervention of the Americans, unforeseen by the "leader of the peoples", turned into a three-year war that ended in nothing.

However, throughout the entire Cold War, all Soviet rulers in general believed that on the basis of certain mouths made by the West

for the time being, the West will continue to concede — until complete capitulation. How it ended is known.

So, Stalin was wrong about the West and in 1940 (together with Hitler) and in 1950. But not in 1945.

By the way, here again it is useful to recall that in early 1945 Churchill turned to Stalin for help after the German offensive in the Ardennes had been stopped. For what? Didn't he and Roosevelt already realize that it was better to immediately eliminate the Soviet threat than to live in fear of it for many decades? And there was only one way to persuade the public opinion of the West to go to war against the USSR—if the USSR itself attacked. Did not Churchill push Stalin to such a step by demonstrating his imaginary weakness? Remember Sun Tzu: "If you are weak, show strength. If you are strong, show weakness. Woe to the one who is deceived!"

Stalin, however, was not deceived. More precisely, almost not deceived. We have already raised the question: why did Stalin succumb to the request of Roosevelt and Churchill and start the Vistula-Oder operation eight days earlier - on January 12, 1945 instead of the 20th? Perhaps he decided that with such an accelerated offensive, neither Hitler nor the allies would have time to interfere with his airborne operation (I remind you that the division of Germany into zones of occupation was established only in Yalta in February, before that the principle was implied by itself: who whatever takes him first). If so, then Stalin made a serious tactical miscalculation and, as a result, neither West Germany, nor Northern Italy, nor Scandinavia was obtained.

Nevertheless, he showed enough strategic wisdom, the unwillingness of Roosevelt and Churchill to conflict with him without extreme necessity for complete weakness and helplessness did not take

Tew did not unleash a world war. True, this still did not save from the final collapse of the USSR ...

And the last question: if Roosevelt had remained alive by the end of the war, would Stalin have killed him?

Don't know. The question remains open.

Stalin realized that he had lost. But did you understand who?

Chapter XXXIX

WHO STARTED THE COLD WAR

We are on the mountain to all the
bourgeoisies We will inflate the world fire!

(A.A. Blok, 1918)

We will show you Kuz'kin's mother!
We will bury you!

(N.S. Khrushchev, 1960)

We have been told for decades that Churchill did this in his speech on the Fulton campus on March 5, 1946. Many Russians (if not most) still believe this.

Let's take a look, though. Let's start with the most elementary: who is Winston Churchill to start a war? As is well known, the British Conservatives were defeated in the parliamentary elections in July 1945, and Churchill was forced to leave directly from the Potsdam Conference, where he was replaced by the new Prime Minister, Laborist C. Attlee. Thus, on March 5, 1946, Churchill was a private individual. Moreover, Fulton, as you know, is not in Britain, but in the USA. So, how could a speech of a private person in front of students of a foreign country start a war, even a "cold" one?

But suppose that Churchill was both Prime Minister of Britain and President of the United States and his speech was delivered at a joint meeting of the House of Commons of the British Parliament and the House of Representatives of the American Congress. What was he talking about

Churchill? As far as I know, that the USSR wants to take over the whole world and establish the world domination of the communists. Was it not so? Or did the USSR at least hide it?

We have already spoken about the fact that at the beginning of 1945, the question of an attack on the allies was discussed in Stalin's entourage. But this was not the only thing that took place.

There has been aggression against Xinjiang since August-September 1944, i.e. when the USSR and China were listed as allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.

There was an attempt to ignite the communist "revolution" in Greece from October 1944 to 1949

In the summer of 1945, Mikołajczyk's Rural Owners' Party (analogous to our Socialist-Revolutionaries at the beginning of the 20th century) won the parliamentary elections in Poland, after which the leaders of this party were simply imprisoned, and the Communists gradually took over the government of Poland. (How similar to our story with the Constituent Assembly!)

There was the already mentioned transfer of Manchuria recaptured from the Japanese to the Chinese Communists - contrary to the Soviet-Chinese treaty of August 14, 1945.

This is not to mention what happened before 1941 - the same Poland, Finland, the Baltic states, Romania, which became victims of Stalin's aggression in 1939-1940. This is not to mention the plans for Operation Thunderstorm in 1941. This is not to mention attempts to export the revolution to various countries since 1920 (if not since 1918 - see: Su vorov V. The Last Republic. P. 48-51). And all this against the backdrop of the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR of December 30, 1922, which explicitly declared the expansion of the USSR to the whole world (as far as I know, this provision was never repealed by anyone until the very collapse of the USSR). This is against the background of the decision of the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b) that the Central Committee of the Party has the authority to break any agreements at any moment.

agreements with bourgeois and imperialist states" (also never canceled by either the CPSU or the current Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which proclaimed itself its successor). And wasn't that exactly what the USSR did with Japan, on April 5, 1945, unilaterally denouncing the Non-Aggression Pact of April 13, 1941, which Japan observed in the most difficult years for us, 1941-1942? This is against the backdrop of the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" published at the end of 1938, where it was written in black and white that the complete victory of "socialism" is possible in one country, but the final one is only on a global scale.

Well, statements like those that served as an epigraph to this chapter have been used more than once in our country. When in 1984 Reagan called the USSR an "evil empire" and promised to put an end to it, this caused an outburst of indignation in us. Meanwhile, he merely repeated what the Soviet leaders had been saying about the West for ten years.

a few years.

If one person loots one apartment after another, is going to loot even more, if possible the whole city, and does not even hide it, and the other publicly calls him a thief, then which of the two is the criminal?

Chapter XL

WHEN WORLD WAR II ENDED

"Cold War" is a sequel
hot war by other means.

(somewhat paraphrased by Clausewitz)

In 1990, I read in one newspaper (unfortunately, I don't remember which one) an article stating that, in fact, the Second World War did not end in 1945, but simply re

was moving from the "hot" phase to the "cold" one, and only now (it was in the summer of 1990, before the summit on November 19-21, 1990 in Paris, at which the end of the "cold war" was officially announced) is nearing completion.

Somehow I forgot about this article. But then the books of Viktor Suvorov went one after another, and in "The Icebreaker" I read that Lenin spoke about the Second World War back in 1916 (Icebreaker. 2002. P. 13-14), and then in "The Last Republic" - that the communists made the first attempt to unleash the Second World War in the winter of 1918-1919, immediately after the end of the First World War (pp. 48-50).

I began to understand - and really found six (at least) attempts by the communists to win world domination.

The first attempt - 1918-1923. Accompanied by attempts to export the revolution to Germany (1918-1919, 1920, 1923), Poland (1920), Iran (1920-1921), plans for campaigns in Europe and India, and somewhat later - in China (1925-1927) and Afghanistan (1929).

The second attempt - the beginning of the 1920s - 1941. - linked to Germany as the "icebreaker of the world revolution". I will not dwell on this attempt in detail - so much has already been written about it, including in this book.

The third attempt - 1945. It is described in sufficient detail in the XVII-XX chapters of this book, we will not dwell on it either.

The fourth attempt - the beginning of the 1950s. A war was started in Korea, which, according to Stalin's plan, was to develop into the Third World War. Preparations for war were in full swing until Stalin's death.

Attempt fifth - 1962 By nuclear shunt

Khrushchev tried to get the US to accept the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. If the United States had then shown compliance, it is not known what the further demands of the USSR would have been to the United States, in particular, and to the West, in general.

The sixth attempt was made in 1979. The entry of troops into Afghanistan was the first step on the way to oil in the Persian Gulf. Capture Arab and Iranian oil (together with the oil of the USSR itself, this accounted for almost 90% of all world production) - and after that you can dictate terms to the West. At least that's how the West understood it. Supporters of a tough confrontation with the USSR immediately came to power there. Even such traditional friends as India turned their backs on the latter. By the beginning of "perestroika", the USSR found itself in complete international isolation.

By the way, the sharp intensification of the war of the Soviet communists against their own people, as a rule, falls on these same years; To confirm this, let us simply list the periods of such activation.

The first - 1917-1921. I don't think it's required recall what happened during those years.

The second - 1929-1933. Again, a reminder is not required, but this is perhaps the only internal political aggravation that was not accompanied by a foreign political aggravation. And it is understandable why - while it was not before the global war, it was necessary to prepare an economic and political base for it, and for this to carry out collectivization, industrialization and help Hitler come to power.

Third - 1937-1941. Comments are superfluous.

Fourth - 1948-1953. A sharp increase in repressions after some relief in the first post-war years; planting national chauvinism

through the "fight against rootless cosmopolitans", the deportation of entire peoples, the introduction of unprecedented 25-year camp terms, in January 1950 - the restoration of the death penalty, which was canceled in 1947 executions.

Fifth - 1959-1963 "Second collectivization" - the liquidation of subsidiary plots of collective farmers. Under Stalin, although they stopped exporting grain, at least they managed without imports, but since 1963 they had to import. At the same time in the early 1960s. the regime in the camps became tougher after its weakening in 1954-1956.

Sixth - 1982-1985 It was interrupted at the very beginning by Andropov's illness and death, then by confusion in the top leadership, and, finally, by the beginning of "perestroika." It is difficult to say what would have happened if the course of events had been different, but it is obvious that partial Khrushchev-Brezhnev liberalization, while maintaining the foundations of the Soviet system by the 1980s. exhausted itself; it was necessary either to radically reform the system, or to tighten the screws. In any case, in 1983-1985. the rumors were the worst

nye - I remember.

And, of course, any external or internal aggravation was accompanied by a yell that "they're perialists are about to attack us." That is, we have always shouted about the "imperialist threat", but especially loudly - namely in 1917-1923, 1929-1933, 1937-1941, 1948-1953, 1959-1963, 1979-1985.

As we can see, the Second World War itself 1939-1945 fundamentally does not drop out of a long series of attempts to conquer world domination, differing from them only in a monstrous number of victims (however, 1917-1923 can compete with 1937-1945 in this as well). So what can we say about the Second World War of 1918-1990? By

looks like that.

Chapter XLI

WHO AND HOW BROKEN THE SWORD OF THE EMPIRE

America holds us by the throat with one hand while the other works; and we hold it by the throat with both hands, and there are no hands left for work.

(N. S. Khrushchev, 1960)

"Western agents of influence who ruined the USSR from the inside," is how the home-grown "communo-patriots" answer this question with no hesitation. And it is not clear how this system, which, according to all their (communist) laws of history, should have won, lost because someone there was not the right one, "sneaked" into the leadership. The entire previous history of mankind does not know such examples, and from the point of view of a materialistic view of history, this cannot be the case in principle.

To understand the mechanism of losing the Cold War, let's recall some facts and figures. Let's start with the organization of the Armed Forces.

The correct approach to military building is not only that the peacetime army should not exceed 1% of the population. There should also be little military equipment in peacetime, but it should be the latest, the latest models, and regularly updated. And when the war starts, then all the factories that can be switched to the production of military products and the latest military equipment at the moment begin to be produced in a stream. And then, if a lot of tanks are made in peacetime, they will become obsolete in a few years, and then what to do with them?

Stalin, it must be admitted, understood this. One of the reasons for Stalin's dislike for Tukhachevsky, which ended in the execution of the latter, was that Tukhachevsky proposed in 1927 to produce (immediately, in 1928 alone!) 100,000 (one hundred thousand!) Tanks. In 1927, no war was expected, but by the b

1940s these tanks would be hopelessly outdated...
(Suvorov V. Cleansing, pp. 200-232).

But the post-war Stalin was no longer the one to firmly resist the overgrown Soviet nomenklatura. As soon as he conceived in the early 1950s. a new purge, comparable to 1937, because somehow he died suspiciously quickly. Khrushchev, who tried to encroach on the privileges of the nomenklatura, was immediately thrown out. Well, and Brezhnev sat quietly, and therefore died a natural death in the post of General Secretary.

But the military nomenklatura also grew. And she also needed new divisions, corps, armies for new positions. And the military-industrial complex nomenclature needed new tanks ... And so ours riveted

military industry tanks by the tens of thousands.

By the end of the 1980s. the USSR had 67,000 tanks; the rest of the world has 63,000.

But after all, tanks have a bad property of becoming obsolete in 10 (maximum) years. And you need to replace them with you. But replacing, say, 7,000 obsolete tanks with new ones is one thing, but 67,000 is quite another. What economy can handle it? They were not replaced, and the percentage of obsolete tanks in the Soviet Army increased from decade to decade. "The result is that we defeat ourselves. After great victories, after ten years without war, we suddenly realize that we are in a defeated country. We suddenly become aware of our backwardness in all areas. And the most surprising thing is the backwardness in the field of armaments. It would seem that everything was given for armament ... "(Ibid., pp

However, if the Soviet economy as a whole was comparable to the Western one, maybe it would have cost. But here are the statistics relating to the last 15-20 years of the existence of the USSR. According to official Soviet data, our industrial production in 1975 was 75% of the American one, in 1980 it was "about 80%", and in 1985 it was "more than 80%". However, this figure was obtained in such a way that the American industrial

Induction was considered in dollars, Soviet - in rubles, while the dollar was taken for 60 kopecks. In fact, the dollar cost four rubles in 1975, five in 1980, and as many as seven in 1985. By simple calculations it can be calculated that in 1975 Soviet industrial production was 11.25% of the American one, in 1980 it was 9.6%, and in 1985 it was 6.86%. For comparison, Tsarist Russia in 1913 produced more than 7% of the industrial output of the United States, although it was a predominantly agricultural country. In agriculture and infrastructure, the ratio was even more unfavorable for the USSR.

And here we are talking only about the United States without taking into account their Western allies. By the way, "the second place of the USSR in the world in the production of industrial products" was obtained by Soviet extras in the same way; in fact, the USSR occupied seventh place in 1985, yielding not only to the USA to Germany, England and France, like Tsarist Russia, but also to Japan and Italy, and by the end of 1989 Spain and Canada were breathing down the back of the head (Selyunin V. Cherny holes in the economy // Novy Mir, 1989, No. 10, pp. 153-178).

But even this is not enough. In the late 1970s economic reforms began in China, which even earlier became an ally of the United States. Ordinary Soviet people out of inertia in the first half of the 1980s. disparaging jokes were still told about China, such as: "Support for the actions of the Chinese army by the navy is canceled: the rowers rebelled," but the Soviet elite (the more sensible part of it) had already noticed a trend towards the emergence of a new economic giant, ready to open a "second front" confrontation with the USSR.

With such a ratio, it is obvious that the maintenance of military parity by the USSR with the USA strongly resembled the wardrobe competition described by Ilf and Petrov between Ellochka the cannibal and the billionaire Vanderbilt; however, there the competition was "one-sided", because the American did not suspect

about the existence of a rival. And let's imagine that El lochka annoyed the billionaire with something, and she decided to ruin her with unbearable expenses on the wardrobe. This is exactly what happened in Soviet-American relations at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

For the 1980s The US increased military spending from 4% of GDP to 9%; The USSR, in order to keep up with them, had to increase its military spending, respectively, from 33% to 56% of GDP. In addition, the United States and its allies, using their influence in OPEC (and OPEC itself, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, did not really oppose this), managed in 1983-1984. achieve an increase in oil export quotas and, accordingly, a decrease in oil prices - from \$70 per barrel in 1978 to \$10 in 1986.

In a word, the result of this before our eyes is a lost Cold War and a destroyed superpower.

But not only in this matter. Striving to fight for World domination and the ensuing militarization of the country led to the fact that the Soviet government was forced to turn Russia into a modern state, create industry, science, and raise the cultural level of the people. Almost all the real achievements of the Soviet era are a side effect of the militarization of the country (by the way, the partial deindustrialization of the 1990s had the same reason: the new Russia did not need so many weapons, and the conversion turned out to be not as simple as they thought).

In a word, during the 20th century Russia has changed from a country 80% rural and three quarters illiterate to a country 70% urban and literate; and this also predetermined the future transformation of Russia into a modern capitalist state. The proletariat, in which the communists saw the "gravedigger of the bourgeoisie", became the gravedigger of their

Mikh, having supported the intelligentsia in the anti-communist revolution of 1989-1991 that it started. And in the presidential elections of 1996, it was the industrial regions that voted for Yeltsin, while the rural outback gave preference to Zyuganov.

So Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin knew what they were doing when they were preparing a war for world domination and tried not to put it off for a long time. The industrialization and urbanization of the country and the cultural revolution in themselves, even without contacts with the West, created the prerequisites for the collapse of communism. That is why Stalin hurried with the outbreak of war in the early 1940s, and then in the early 1950s. But Truman in 1951 removed D. MacArthur from command in Korea, who proposed moving the war from Korea to China. The logic is the same, only on the other side of the front: time is working against the USSR, the longer the decisive clash is delayed, the more favorable it is for us, the lower the cost of victory (and perhaps we will win without a war at all). All the years of his presidency, Truman proceeded from this attitude and in the same spirit admonished another general, who on January 20, 1953 succeeded him in the presidency - Eisenhower.

Chapter XLII

ONCE AGAIN ABOUT READINESS FOR WAR

Ready for war is not the one who loudly declares it, but the one who enters the war last and wins it, dividing his opponents and pushing their foreheads together.

(V. Suvorov. "Icebreaker")

And now let's ask ourselves the question again: who was ready for war, and who was not?

A lot has already been written about Hitler's unpreparedness for war by the same V. Suvorov (see: Suicide). About Stalin's readiness for war with Hitler - too

(The Last Republic. S. 121-165, etc.). And if we consider the Second World War as a struggle between the USSR and the USA, what then? Who better prepared for this war?

From the traditional point of view, one can quote the words of Stalin himself that "aggressive nations are better prepared for war than peaceful nations." This was said in the autumn of 1944, America was still an ally of the USSR, therefore Joseph Vissarionovich set it up as an example of a "peace-loving country not ready for war". Unprepared, of course, not for a war with the USSR (which, according to Stalin, was also "peace-loving" and "was not preparing for war"), but for a war with aggressive Japan (Stalin *I. V.*

About the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. pp. 166-167).

So, from this traditional point of view, the answer to the question seems to be obvious. Let us recall the titanic preparations for the war of the USSR in the 1920-1930s. and the almost complete absence of such training in the United States before 1940. Let us recall the overwhelming superiority of the USSR in 1941 in ground weapons and a very significant one in aviation. Finally, let us recall the beginning of the war (1941-1942). The USSR suffered defeat at the beginning of the war, because it was preparing not for defense, but for an offensive (see once again the works of Viktor Suvorov). And the United States - what were they preparing for? Obviously not for the offensive, but also for the defense against Japan in the winter and spring of 1941-1942. they weren't ready!

However, "chickens are counted in the fall, readiness for war is based on the results ... You can endlessly look for new facts and figures, but the result of the war covers all the pros and cons of both participants" (Suvorov *V.* The Last Republic. P. 123- 124). Let's compare the position of the USSR and the USA in autumn

1945, then we recall that it was said that from that moment the defeat of the USSR in the beginning

"Cold War" was only a matter of time, then we compare the position of the USSR and the USA by the end of this same "cold war" and ask again - who is better prepared for war?

Yes, by 1945 the USSR retained military superiority over the West (although much less than in 1940-1941, and only in the ground forces) and retained it for a long time to come. But not only the army is fighting in the war, but the entire economy as a whole; We have already spoken about the relationship between the Soviet and Western economies. Readiness for war is not about arming yourself beyond all reasonable limits in peacetime, but about supplying the army with everything necessary in the event of war (including, and above all, a protracted war) and expanding military production.

The same Germany in 1914 was armed much better than its opponents. Her army was the strongest in Europe. But it was not possible to crush all the enemies "before the autumn leaf fall", the war dragged on, and what happened to Germany?

So is the USSR. The first blow, unprecedented in power, was being prepared. But the Germans (the enemy, in principle, incapable of a protracted war) thwarted this blow, the war became protracted, and so what? The USSR survived only thanks to the supplies of the allies. And he did not dare to fight with the United States itself. So who was ready for war?

Yes, the USSR surpassed everyone with its military power in 1939-1945. But how much intelligence is needed for this, if the entire economy of the country long before 1939 was reorganized on a war footing? If the aviation and shipbuilding industry, at least since 1935, has been producing only military products (*Suvorov V. Den-MS 80-85*), etc.

But the United States, until 1940, did not seem to pay any attention to military issues (an exception is the navy, there has been a lot since the end of the 19th century

was done). But then the war began - and in three or four years huge armed forces were created "out of nothing", powerful aviation, tank troops increased by several orders of magnitude (by 1945, it was not possible to catch up with the USSR in this industry, but time was clearly working in the USA and here).

This is the readiness for war.

And one moment. V. Suvorov writes that in order to be convinced of the effectiveness (or inefficiency) of a system, one must look at it in the absence of a leader. Here, he says, Alexander the Great died, and his empire collapsed. And in the empires of Peter I and Napoleon, in their absence, in their own words, only stupid things were happening. Whether business Stalin! He could go anywhere and was calm for those whom he left in his place "on the farm" (Suicide, pp. 134-135).

Let me, however, remark: the empire created by Stalin did not outlive him for very long. Yugoslavia actually became isolated during his lifetime. Ten years had not elapsed since his death, when China and Albania seceded. Romania fell away in the second half of the 1960s. And the whole Empire did not exist after Stalin for forty years. Well, who knows history well: how long did the empire of Alexander the Great last after his death?

But what America had at the time of Roosevelt's death exists to this day, more than sixty years. And not only does it exist, but it is intensifying. Yes, not everything went smoothly, there were failures and setbacks (the biggest one was in Vietnam). However, since 1945, America has greatly strengthened its position in the world and has become, if not the only superpower (the second is China), but a recognized world leader. And now the Americans are not all cloudless, but in the foreseeable future they will remain world leaders.

This is efficiency.

Chapter XLIII

WHAT'S NEXT?

And now let's say a few words about Russia's place in the new world. Since the same processes took place in our country as in Germany in 1933-1945. ("slave counter-revolution" or "conservative revolution"), then it is logical to compare with Germany.

After five and a half years of its participation in the war, non-totalitarian National Socialist Germany suffered a complete defeat, was occupied, ceased to exist as a state for four years (1945-1949), and then for another 40 years (1949-1989) found itself divided into West Germany and East Germany.

After 70 years of its participation in the Second World War, the totalitarian international socialist Soviet Union suffered a complete defeat, ceased to exist and found itself divided into 15 independent states.

Since 1990, only the lazy seems to have not made such comparisons. The last selection of articles on this topic that came across to the author was published on the pages of Nezavisimaya Gazeta on May 16, 2001. And here, in general, you can argue a little. But if we were to compare, it would be nice to complete the comparison, extrapolate it into the future and remember how the Germans reacted to the post-war structure of Germany.

Yes, Germany repented for the crimes of the Nazis and cleansed itself of the filth of totalitarianism. Yes, the Germans reconciled themselves to the loss of Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia and other territories that had completely moved away from Germany to other countries. However, Germany reacted to the division into two states in a completely different way. The Germans recognized the division of the country as a given, but at the same time declared (albeit not immediately) that they considered it unfair and

the right, if the opportunity presents itself, to the peaceful reunification of the country. As you know, such an opportunity presented itself in 1989-1990, and on October 3, 1990, Germany became a single state property.

But what about us? First of all, if we want a democratic and civilized future for ourselves, then we must naturally renounce attempts at imperial restoration; However, in doing so, one must first decide: where does Russia proper end and where does its empire begin? As far as I know, no one has even raised this question so far. Not Soviet inter-republicans

boundaries, drawn by no one knows who and no one knows how, should be considered fair and final! Let's ask ourselves: are there any territories among the territories that fell away in 1991, in relation to which the country should take a position similar to the position of the FRG in relation to the GDR? Simply put, with what can the Russian Federation be compared within its current borders - with the FRG of 1949-1990? or with the present united Germany?

The German Reich within the borders of 1937 occupied 470 thousand km² ; Germany - a territory of 248 thousand km², and we The outer unified Germany is 356,000 km² , slightly more than three-quarters of the former Third Reich. In this sense, the Russian Federation can be compared precisely with the united Germany, it occupies 17.4 million km² - that is, also not much more than three-quarters of the territory of the former USSR.

Germany, however, is more or less evenly populated, as is virtually all of Europe. You can't say the same about the Soviet Union and today's Russia: with our population - where it is dense, and where it is empty. Therefore, it would be rather necessary to count not by territory, but by population. So, the population of the Russian Federation is almost exactly half of the population of the former

THE USSR; so that today's Russia is comparable with the FRG of 1949-1990.

However, it is permissible to ask: is it even possible to put the question in this way? Can we apply such a mechanistic-arithmetic approach to those inhabited by concrete living people and entire peoples? Moreover, we are talking about territories inhabited by peoples, to put it mildly, very different from Russians and from Russians in general; and most importantly, not all of these peoples are in the mood for rapprochement with Russia?

The question is not idle; that is why it seems expedient to start with the questions about the possibilities of integration with Russia. The Russian state was not created all at once and not in the same way. Some peoples entered it voluntarily, others by force. Some peoples turned out to be a way

we coexist peacefully, amicably and mutually beneficial (among ethnographers this is called "symbi oz") with Russian (as well as Ukrainian, Belarusian and German) colonists who settled on their territory, others did not. As a rule, it is the first nations in our day who are determined to draw closer to Russia again, while the latter, on the contrary, are moving further and further away from us.

So, the first among the CIS countries are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and - minus the extreme "zahidniks" hostile to the "Muscovites" and more pro-Polish (the so-called Galicia) - Ukraine. It was from these countries and peoples that the historically so-called Eurasian unity of the East Slavic and steppe peoples was formed. And in Russia itself, at the same time, there are (in the North Caucasus) several peoples who are clearly not striving for unity with Russia. So, by the way, it is this "Eurasia" that makes up (in terms of population) about three-quarters of the former USSR (220-230 million out of 300), and it is precisely this "Eurasia" that, in this sense, is quite

comparable to today's united Germany.

In general, in my opinion, there is a reason for Russia to treat these states in much the same way as West Germany treated East Germany: to reserve the right to peaceful, voluntary-treaty reunification with other countries of Eurasian unity in the event that conditions arise for such reconnection.

By the way, in one of the issues of *Novoye Vremya* (December 16, 2001), Denis Dragunsky writes: if Russia had not conquered Central Asia and the Caucasus, then the three East Slavic peoples would have made up 80% of the country's population, and then there would have been a chance to integrate into one nation. So, within the limits of the Eurasian unity, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians made up (according to the last all-union census in 1989) 84.1% of the population. As they say, information for reflection. It is better to integrate into a single Russian-Eurasian nation late than never.

But what is interesting is that almost at the same time, when the collection of the Eurasian lands under the rule of Russia was completed, Bismarck carried out the unification of Germany. Although it was said about this unification that it was carried out with "iron and blood", in fact, violence was used only against external forces that prevented the unification of the country (Austria, France, etc.); it was approximately the same when the Eurasian peoples were united by Russia (with the exception of the Kazan Tatars, who did not voluntarily become part of our country), while non-Eurasian peoples had to be conquered at the cost of blood, sometimes very large.

By the way, the subsequent history of Russia and Germany up to 1945 is generally a continuous historical analogy. Reforms of Alexander II and Bismarck's reform

ka, the counter-reforms of Alexander III - Pobedonostsev and the Bismarckian reaction of the 1880s, Wilhelm II and Nicholas II, the February and November revolutions, the Provisional Government and the Weimar Republic, finally, Stalin and Hitler.

We can also compare the imperial past of our countries. There were three "reichs" in the history of Germany - the first (the medieval "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation"), the second - the Kaiser's and the third - the Nazi. With this, the imperial era in Germany ended and the post-imperial and democratic era began. Maybe it's time for us, Eurasian Russians? After all, we also had three empires and have already ended - the first (Huns, IV-V centuries), the second (Tatar-Mongols, XIII-XV centuries) and the third (Russian-Soviet). Obviously, we have exhausted the limit on empires.

However, one can object to this: Germany (as well as another country defeated in the same 1945 - Japan) was able to revive as a great power, and then reunite only because the United States contributed to this in order to create counterbalances to the USSR in the beginning "cold war." Does the current West have a reason to contribute to the same strengthening of Russia? Is there such an adversary against whom it would be worthwhile to be friends with our country?

Such an adversary is already visible to the naked eye. This is none other than the notorious China, one of the main victors of the USSR in the Cold War, now a powerful country, in fact, already a new superpower, gaining strength literally before our eyes. At the same time, China does not hide its claims to a number of territories, both of Russia itself (Siberian lands, at least as far as Baikal), and of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (at least as far as Karaganda).

Recently, there has been a tendency towards confrontation between China and the United States. Someone haste

to declare a new confrontation between the two superpowers, and the position of Russia between the USA and the PRC in this sense has already been compared with the position of the same post-war Germany between the USSR and the USA. Let us recall, by the way, that immediately after World War II, the West did not at all want the restoration of a strong Germany. For example, it was planned to completely dismantle the enterprises of the German heavy industry, leaving the Germans the right to engage only in light industry and agriculture (as Churchill put it, it was supposed to "turn Germany into the potato field of Europe"). However, it soon became clear what "potato field" will become the gateway to the West for Soviet expansion in the context of the already beginning World War III, which in the 1940s-1960s. could change from "cold" to "hot" at any moment.

But even a weak Russia may well become a gateway for expansion to the West by forces that are by no means friendly to the latter. This is (at the moment) primarily about China. Indeed, imagine that the Chinese have captured the Russian Far East. Not very comfortable, I think, will America be separated from China not by the Pacific Ocean, but only by the Bering Strait.

Well, it is necessary to use the advantages of such a position, as Germany used them, that's all. Moreover, we have at least one advantage over Germany: not a single part of the Eurasian space has yet fallen into the sphere of influence of China (but, by the way, it may, if we don't catch ourselves in time), as after In 1945, a quarter of Germany fell under the influence of the USSR, which delayed the reunification of the country for 40 years. We have a chance to do it faster!

Chapter XUV

THE HISTORY OF
THE WAR THAT WAS

And the history of the Second World War in our country has not yet been written. Neither the "Khrushchev" six-volume book, nor the "Brezhnev" twelve-volume book contains objective information about the war. V. Suvorov lists: from these works it is not clear how many armies, mechanized and airborne corps were in the Red Army in 1941, where they (and all other troops) on June 22, 1941. were, what part of them was fully equipped ... and so on, the examples can be continued endlessly. The only thing that can be understood from the six-volume book is that "Khrushchev won the war" (Suicide, pp. 20-28). And the "Brezhnev" twelve-volume book turned out to be even funnier. Suffice it to say that it says nothing about repressions against the military in 1937-1938. And, of course, "Brezhnev won the war." And Gorbachev's attempt to write a ten-volume history of the war turned out to be zilch - they didn't write anything,

although subscribers contributed money for the first two volumes, to be released in 1991.

In general, the farther, the worse: Brezhnev's two-ten-volume book (1973-1982) is worse than Khrushchev's six-volume book (1960-1966), and Gorbachev's ten-volume book (they began to create in 1988, it was planned to finish by 1995, by the fiftieth Unfortunately, nothing happened at all. "Shame, shame: all the aggressors wrote the history of the war a long time ago ... But we don't see it. Doesn't dance. It doesn't splash out," concludes V. Suvorov and predicts that the history of the war, which is called the Great Patriotic War, will never be written (Ibid., pp. 35-36).

What if we try to write the history of another war? The one that, as Suvorov proves, was started by the USSR

and which, as this book proves, the United States won? I will try to propose my own project of "History of the Second World War" - a draft of a twenty-volume book with the main idea "Roosevelt won the war."

Volume I. Establishment of the hotbed of war (1917-1929). First of all, the communists had to seize a single country and turn it into a springboard for the "world revolution". This is what they have been doing in Russia all these years; this is the first volume.

Volume II. Icebreakers (1930-1934). In this five-year period, it was necessary to carry out collectivization and industrialization, otherwise there would be nothing to fight with. But the main thing was that it was necessary to create "icebreakers" to unleash a war by proxy. It was necessary to help Hitler come to power, and, well, Germany's assistance in preparing for revenge was sharply increased. And relations with Japan had to be improved - it was already then predicted for the role of the Far Eastern icebreaker.

Volume III. On military rails (late 1934 - late 1938). The Great Purge in the USSR was the beginning of direct preparations for war (the cleansing of the army; well, the people had to be brought into such a state that in the future it would be possible to do anything with this country and so that no one peeped). Well, the "ice cola" was also busy preparing for the war at that time
foxes.

Volume IV. Devil's Pact (January-August 1939). All the first eight months of 1939 were spent building bridges between Moscow and Berlin. And without the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the war would not be unleashed
chilo.

Volume V. "Friendship sealed by blood" (autumn and winter 1939-1940). Under talk of friendship and under the roar of a joint war against Poland, Stalin breaks down the barrier of neutral countries from Finland to southern Poland, separating him from Germany.

Volume VI. The icebreaker does its thing (first half 1940). Hitler conquers Western Europe with a blitzkrieg, and Stalin moves ever closer to the borders of his empire. Stalin's invasion of Bessarabia finally opens Hitler's eyes...

Volume VII. "Sea Lion" or "Barbarossa"? (second half of 1940). Hitler finally understood Stalin's plan and is preparing a preemptive strike, hiding behind a noisy imitation of preparations for the invasion of Britain. Stalin, for his part, is waiting for this invasion in order to launch Operation Thunderstorm, which he has been intensively preparing all this time.

Volume VIII. America enters the game (December 1940 - April 1941). Roosevelt is actively involved in the implementation of the Anglo-American war scenario. Stalin hatched his plans in the dachas; Roosevelt brought out his scenario of World War II during a cruise in the Caribbean (supposedly fishing entertainment) on the cruiser Tuscaloosa. How to make sure that Hitler and Stalin not only collide, but that Hitler attacks first; and most importantly - how to force America to enter the war - all these questions were resolved by Roosevelt.

Volume IX. Three war scenarios (April - early June 1941). We are talking about the Stalinist scenarios (Operation Thunderstorm after the landing of the Wehrmacht in England), Hitler's (the Barbarossa plan) and Roosevelt's (pushing heads of Hitler and Stalin in the war that Hitler starts).

Tom H. Who Strikes First? (June 1941). The last days before June 22, 1941, when it was decided which scenario of the Second World War would be realized, deserve a separate volume, just as this entire critical year (June 22, 1940 - June 22, 1941) is well worth four volumes.

Volume XI. June 22, 1941 (June - September 1941). The events of the summer of 1941 can also be stretched out over a whole volume. How did the Germans manage to defeat the collected pro

against them the Soviet troops? Given what was written in chapter VIII, these three months, if only for this reason, deserve a separate volume.

Volume XII. Second attempt (October 1941 - May 1942). The US enters the war. The main event of this period was the thwarting of Stalin's attempt to defeat Germany and Japan before the United States mustered its strength and began to fight in earnest.

Volume XIII. Stalingrad trap (May - November 1942). Stalin provokes Germany to launch an offensive in the south in order to lure him into the Caucasian pocket. The Wehrmacht is advancing on Stalingrad, and the Allies are delaying the opening of a second front. They know that the longer the war drags on, the less Stalin will get and the more they will get.

Volume XIV. Stalin finally loses the war (November 1942 - April 1943). Turning point in the war with the Axis powers; The United States and its allies launch the first offensive operations in order to realize their geopolitical plans, but at the same time Stalin loses the last chance for a sole victory in the war.

Volume XV. The beginning of a big competition (April - December 1943). The competition is between Stalin and his allies: who will occupy the most from the territories occupied by Hitler. In the Pacific, the Allies are also launching a large-scale offensive.

Volume XVI. Stalin enters Europe (first half of 1944). The Soviet armies are reaching the state border of the USSR, while Roosevelt and Churchill are hastily preparing the opening of a second front.

Volume XVII. Second front (second half of 1944). The grandiose victories of the Red Army (first of all, Operation Bagration in Belarus, the greatest battle of the Second World War) somehow overshadowed the main result of this period: the USA and Britain liberated Western Europe, gained a foothold in China, and finally in the Pacific Ocean. defeated the Japanese fleet, thereby making it only a matter of time

me the surrender of Japan to them, the allies. Thus, it was then that the Anglo American geopolitical scenario was finally realized.

Volume XVIII. End of the war in Europe (January-May 1945).

Volume XIX. End of the Pacific War (January-September 1945). These two volumes are about the last months of World War II. Not only was the defeat of Germany and Japan long a foregone conclusion, but the post-war balance of power, by and large, had already been determined. The struggle is for individual, but important, details of the post-war structure of the world.

Volume XX. War after the war (1945-1991). The Cold War, its course and results, which were predetermined much earlier.

Chapter XLV

HISTORY OF THE WAR, WHICH WAS NOT

So, Stalin did not dare to start the Third World War. And if he did, what would happen then? Let's try to imagine this, given all that we have said in the previous chapters. Let us remember the economic superiority of the United States as a constant factor, the end of the era of Eurocentrism, the growing role of China, which has turned into a new front against the USSR; Let us also note that in the conditions of war all these processes would certainly have gone much faster.

So, we remember that Stalin (and Zhukov) liked to strike on Sundays. There are many examples of this. August 20, 1939 - at Khalkhin Gol. September 17, 1939 - in Poland. November 26, 1939 - in Finland. On July 6, 1941, a strike against Germany was being prepared. Later, on June 25, 1950, the Korean War began.

The resistance of the remnants of the Wehrmacht was broken on May 15-16, 1945. The closest Sunday to this date was May 20. So, peace has come to Europe, and everyone thinks that the war is over. Only in the Stalinist headquarters they know that the real war for world domination of the USSR is yet to come.

On May 20, 1945, at three o'clock in the morning Berlin time, tens of thousands of Soviet guns unleashed a hurricane of fire on Allied positions from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic. After several hours of artillery preparation, unprecedented in its power, thousands of Soviet tanks went on the offensive. Statements have already been made to the American and British ambassadors in Moscow and to the US State Department and the British Foreign Office that the USSR has decided to go to war in order to complete the task of "liberating the world".

from the oppression of the imperialists.

The United States and Britain were not prepared to strike first, so their troops were not assembled at the very line of demarcation, and the initial losses were compared negligibly small. However, opposition to Stalin's hordes is out of the question for the time being. The Allies are retreating along the entire front from Norway to Turkey. By the end of August, all of Europe up to the English Channel was already in Stalin's hands, and the Allied armies had again been evacuated to Britain. By the end of September, the USSR also captured almost all of Turkey, except for Cilicia.

In the Far East, the USSR announces on August 8 about an alliance with Japan (a secret treaty was signed back in April), and the Soviet and Japanese armies go over to the offensive against China. In September, all of Xinjiang was captured, in November - Xi'an and Lanzhou.

However, there are already some initial setbacks. Japan, now an ally of the USSR, is defeated in Southeast Asia. In the autumn of 1945, the Japanese lose Indonesia, in the winter of 1945-1946. - Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, in the spring of 1946 - South Vietnam and Cambodia. But the main thing is the united forces of the Pacific

In October 1945, the Anan, Northern (transferred to the Far East by the Northern Sea Route) fleets of the USSR and the remnants of the Japanese fleet in October 1945 suffer a crushing defeat from the Americans, finally ceding dominance at sea to the allies.

Stalin's attack caused an outburst of fury in the US and Britain. In this situation, the US Congress decides to introduce a moratorium on elections until the end of the war and to endow the president with dictatorial powers. A decision is made on massive military assistance to China and, in general, to everyone who fights against the USSR. The 25th of January 1946 The UN adopts the Declaration on the war against the USSR until the complete destruction of the Stalinist regime.

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1946, the Soviet armies resume their offensive, recapture the lost Xi'an, and in May occupy Tibet. But then the Soviet offensive in China stalled. Bountifully fueled by American aid and relying on unlimited manpower, China's army is becoming a more formidable adversary every month.

In October 1946, the Soviet armies launched a new grandiose offensive in the Near and Middle East. During the winter they seize Iran and Afghanistan, in February 1947 they take Baghdad, and in April Damascus. By the autumn of 1947, the Soviet armies reach the approaches to India and Egypt.

The Soviet regime is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary at the zenith of glory and power. Stalin captured more territories than Attila, Genghis Khan and Napoleon put together. But there are already warning signs. The Soviet offensive was halted almost everywhere. The Japanese allies in 1947 finally lost Indochina. And on September 22, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a decision on the release from January 1, 1948.

colonies. Combined with millions of refugees from "communist happiness" from the countries of the Near and Middle East, this is a very intelligible argument for changing attitudes towards war in the third world. Millions of Indians, Arabs, Africans are volunteering under the banner of the Union

nicknames.

But the main thing is China. 1948 becomes a turning point. The rearmed and reorganized Chinese army goes on the offensive and during the winter of 1948-1949. inflicts a serious defeat on the Stalinist armies in the Yangtze valley, liberating Wuhan and Nanjing and effectively cutting off Shanghai from the main forces. With great difficulty, having transferred dozens of divisions from Europe, the Middle East and from within the country, Stalin manages to temporarily stabilize the situation.

But events on other fronts are not encouraging either. Attacks on Egypt in 1948 and 1949 repulsed. In the winter of 1948-1949, unable to withstand the American naval blockade, Japan capitulates, and soon declares war on the USSR. Finally, the Americans manage to create a new super powerful long range strategic aviation, and their aviation begins to systematically destroy the Soviet military industry and infrastructure.

In the winter of 1949-1950 and in the summer - autumn of 1950. Stalin, having transferred many more troops from other fronts, makes two more attempts at an offensive in China, hoping to turn the tide of the war in his favor. The first attempt ends in the spring of 1950 with the loss of Shanghai, and after the second, at the end of 1950, the allies go on the offensive everywhere - in China, from Egypt to Palestine, from India to Iran and Afghanistan

ganistan.

For the winter and spring of 1950-1951. the Chinese liberate Xi'an, Lanzhou, the lands south of the Huang He, and also most of Tibet. USSR loses southeast Ira

on, as well as Palestine. Allied aviation is finally and irrevocably gaining air supremacy on all fronts and in the skies of the USSR itself.

Since the outcome of the war has already been decided, in the United States with

On July 1, 1951, the dictatorial powers of the president are abolished and a return to democracy takes place.

ti. The elections of 1952 must be held as in peacetime.

In the summer and autumn of 1951, the Chinese liberate the remnants of the territory of Tibet and continue their offensive on the Yellow River until the spring of 1952. The Allies in the summer and autumn of 1951 liberate southern Italy, Syria, Iraq, southern Iran, and Afghanistan as far as the Hindu Kush.

In the summer and autumn of 1952, the Chinese army launched a grandiose offensive, liberated Peking, and moved on to Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Korea, Xinjiang. The Chinese hordes are advancing on a huge front from the Pamirs to the Sea of Japan, sweeping away every living thing in their path. Allied troops liberate France, Belgium, Central Italy, in late autumn - Greece and southwestern Turkey to Izmir. The Chinese offensive in Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea continues in the winter of 1952-1953.

On March 5, 1953, Stalin dies, leaving behind a hopelessly lost war and enemy hordes approaching from all sides. Moreover, if the Western allies are just crossing the Rhine and preparing an attack on the Balkans and Tehran, the Chinese have already come close to the borders of Russia itself. The heirs of the deceased dictator have to decide what to do next: to resist at all

fronts, which will inevitably lead to the loss in favor of China, if not all, then at least of Eastern Siberia (with all the consequences for the millions of Russians living there and in general Russian people, to whom the Chinese will not give mercy) or give a damn about

communist ideology and save the country, then there is to throw all forces against the Chinese, and the allies advancing from the west to surrender lands and cities without a fight, because they, at least, do not threaten the very existence of Russia.

All this was not? No, this is not fantasy.

All this was, however, not in the 1950s, but in the 1980s, 1990s, and continues today. And we lost the war (albeit a "cold one") due to the enormous superiority of the enemy, and not only economic, and by the end of the Soviet era we found ourselves in a vice between the West and the rapidly growing China. Well, we now have a similar choice. One can join the Americans and their allies in their upcoming confrontation with China (it has already been said that yesterday's victors of the USSR are already beginning to grumble at each other, and the American-Chinese "cold" war is not far off). Whatever one's attitude towards the USA and NATO, it must be admitted that at least they do not set as their goal the destruction of the civilian population of Russia and other Eurasian states, since they do not need to clear these territories for their excess population - they do not have one. and is not expected. Moreover, in the future, in a confrontation with China, the United States and its allies will be interested in a stable, relatively strong Russia as an obstacle to China's path deep into the Eurasian continent.

And you can remain alone and - given the fact that with the end of the era of "Eurocentrism" Russia has ceased to be a country that cannot be conquered - give the Chinese, if not all of Siberia, then at least Eastern (as well as Kazakhstan to Karaganda and Northern Kyrgyzstan), claims for which the Chinese do not even hide. Or maybe, taking into account the sharp increase in the power of China, we will have to give it more than just Siberia. I flow out with everyone

consequent consequences for the local Russian (generally Slavic) and Turkic-Eurasian population. What will happen to this population is also generally clear. Just the Chinese are interested in clearing "living space" for their excess population. Such is the alternative. And there is still time to choose.

Chapter XLVI

WHAT "SLAVE COUNTERREVOLUTIONS" BROUGHT TO THE

PEACE (INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION)

Know them by their fruits.

(Matthew 7:16)

So, in 1945, the attempt at a global "slave counter-revolution" by and large failed. Human extermination by inertia still continued (and continues) in individual countries, but still not on such a scale (for example, in the USSR, by the end of Stalin's rule, "only" 3 million people were in camps against 10-11 million in 1940 -1941), and most importantly, since 1945 there is no more talk of a global catastrophe with the mass destruction of people.

And yet: how many people died during the "slave counter-revolutions"? Let's calculate. Let's start, of course, with Russia (within the borders of the former Russian Empire and the USSR, and not the current Russian Federation, of course), as from the country that was the first to take this blow upon itself and suffered the most from it.

Recently, various apologists for Stalin and the Bolsheviks (and many researchers who have nothing to do with it) have been striving to whitewash the Soviet regime. And, of course, to mix V. Rezun-Suvorov with dirt, including for the desire to "put Russia out as the eternal aggressor."

Although V. Suvorov just emphasizes: the USSR is not Russia. And I agree with him.

In recent years, in connection with the intensification of Stalin's apology, the topic has become even more relevant. Now a friendly chorus of voices starting with S.G. Kara-Murza (Vremena, March 9, 2003) sings: to hate Stalin means to hate Russia! Blaming the USSR for the execution of Polish officers in Katyn is anti-Russian (not anti-Soviet!) meanness (this is exactly the name of the work of the notorious Yuri Mukhin, dedicated to the Katyn problem)! Well, of course, the supporters of the Icebreaker want to discredit Russia as the eternal aggressor! And in general, Stalin is our everything! True, they are offended when Russia is demanded an apology or compensation for Stalin's crimes against Poland or the Baltic States, while Viktor Yushchenko calls the Holodomor of 1933 "a genocide of the Ukrainian people organized by Muscovites." The accusation, of course, is absurd, insulting and unfair, if only because the Russian peasants then starved no less, but only those who do not identify communists with Russia have the right to be offended by it. A mu

chins and others like them, it remains only to answer:

was called a loader - climb into the body!

And here is another Stalinist. A certain Rudolf Balandin calls for "reviving pride in our Soviet past", and in particular for Stalin "as the greatest genius in the history of not only Russia, but also mankind", because "it was at this time that we accomplished the greatest feats on the battlefields and in work" (Balandin R. The magic of suggestion, or the secret weapon of Bekhterev. M., 2008. P. 313).

Well, all this has already been, it was ... I don't remember who said it, but it was said correctly: history - it is a museum where there are many copies, but few originals. The USSR is already at least the third great Eurasian conquering empire. Well, in such a

tea it would be nice to turn to the experience of the first two of them.

In the IV-V centuries. in the vast expanses of Eurasia there was the Hunnic Khaganate. The Huns "performed the greatest feats in battles" in the spaces from the Rhine to the Yellow River, and to this day many Turkic peoples, Hungarians and even Russians with Ukrainians argue about the nationality of Attila. But where are they, these Huns? Disappeared in the same V century.

In the XIII century. Turkic and Mongol nomads "performed the greatest feats in battle" under the leadership of Genghis Khan and his heirs, creating a huge empire. Today, dozens of Turkic and Mongolian peoples are vying for the honor of being called the native people of Genghis Khan. But where is his empire? Disintegrated after 150-200 years.

Here is Stalin from the same series. All his "feats" are aimed at unleashing a new world war and driving the whole world into communist barracks. Yes, let's take at least economic indicators. Balandin claims that "Stalin left the country on the rise" (Ibid., p. 243), but this only applies to the military-industrial complex. Here is the historian N. Dobryukha, who clearly sympathizes with Stalin, cites his statement, referring to 1952: "Either we will train our personnel ... on the basis of science, or we will perish ..." (Arguments and Facts. 2008. No. 10 (1427)). Need comments?

And here is the data on the implementation of the five-year plans. The first plan (1928-1932) was completed in 4 years and 3 months by 109% in group A (heavy industry), but not in group B (consumer goods) (Berchin *IB* Geschichte der UdSSR. Berlin (Ost), 1971 S.378). If so, then it was logical not to shout about early completion, but to use the remaining months to complete group B. But no one thought about this - in my opinion, it is clear enough

testifies to the direction of the thinking of Stalin and his associates. The second five-year plan (1933-1937) gave similar results (*Chuntulov V.T.* Economic history of the USSR. M., 1969 - p. 254). In the fourth (1946-1950), according to official data, the level of industrial production was 73% higher than in 1940, but "the production of consumer goods did not reach the pre-war level" (Berchin *IB*

Op.cit. S.590).

So, everything is on the military-industrial complex. For what? The answer is unequivocal: for world domination. Neither Lenin, nor Trotsky, nor Stalin, nor Khrushchev ever concealed aspirations for it. Nobody has yet refuted the same V. Suvorov. In part, the USSR achieved its goals - despite the failure of the "icebreaking" scenario, which allows us to talk about the loss of the Second World War by Stalin, a third of humanity entered the socialist camp, and they were afraid of us. But was it better for the common man? Here Balandin quotes

V. Bryntsalov, who allegedly wants to return "the former neck of the USSR self-esteem" (Balandin R. S. 261-262). Is it with a Soviet person who could be humiliated by any cashier, wah tersha, conductor, not to mention representatives of the authorities? "Lord of the world - and slave of everything around" - M. Veller in "The Great Last Chance" cites someone's quote about the Soviet man.

And then - well, where is this Soviet empire now? It all ended in the same way as the previous attempts - in failure. Balandin is looking for an answer to the question of why the country surrendered everything so quickly and without resistance, he speaks of some kind of recoding of the whole nation with the help of some ingenious technologies. But, in my opinion, everything is much simpler. Let us recall that the Huns also disappeared from the face of the earth, and the Turkic-Mongolian nomads in the 300-400 years that followed the era of Genghisids succumbed to Russia, some to China, some to whom. It is understandable - exhausting forces in

ny attempts to conquer the world, they could not keep their own. Russia was also unable to hold on to many of the territories acquired before 1917. It is possible that in 500-700 years the peoples inhabiting the territory of the present-day CIS will argue about Stalin, as well as about Attila and Genghis Khan, to which of them he belonged, but we, who are now on the verge of death, are giving away primordially their lands to anyone, easier than that? I don't know if Russia will be able to get out on some new paths, I hope so, but if we restore nostalgia for Stalin, we'll definitely stretch our legs.

So the struggle continues, and one of the directions of this struggle is to downplay the number of victims of the regime. For example, R. Balandin declares information about 10 million prisoners in Stalin's camps and about camp terms "for spikelets" "an invention of Goebbels' propaganda" (Balandin R. The Magic of Suggestion, or Bekhterev's Secret Weapon. P. 242) - well, this is at the level of "Limonka" ("The Gulag Archipelago" - a remake of Goebbels's propaganda"), He refers to archival data on 800 thousand death sentences passed (Ibid. p. 307), forgetting at the same time that 90% of the verdicts were passed not by the courts, but by "special meetings", which did this in lists of tens and hundreds of people. Suppose they bring a list: Rostov, say, region. 50 people arrested for "treason" - all shot! 100 people for "wrecking" - all for 10 years! Thus, 150 sentences were handed down, of which 50 were death sentences, and the statistics show two sentences, including one death sentence.

In addition, we must not forget that the dispossessed peasants (and this is at least 10 million) were not condemned by anyone at all, for their "eviction" (as a rule, to dead places for certain death) it was enough to decide the village council. Even more so, no one condemned the victims of the famine (at least the same number

not to mention the fact that the archives of the NKVD-KGB-FSB have been repeatedly and well cleaned, and I don't believe that in our country, where, say, the archives of the battles at Khalkhin Gol are still classified (what is there to keep secret ?!) , all archives about repressions are available.

In order not to use someone else's mind, the author decided to conduct his own demographic investigation. Balandin himself believes that "dispassionate numerical demographic indicators prove that the Soviet people had reason to praise Stalin" (Ibid., p. 243). Well, let's see.

So, for the period from January 1, 1950 to January 15, 1959, the population of the USSR increased from 178.5 to 208.8 million people. If we extrapolate these growth rates to 1913-1950, then taking into account the fact that at the end of 1913 the population of Russia totaled 159.2 million people. (USSR. Enzi klopedicheskii reference book M., 1982. P. 17), we get that in 1950 298.5 million people should have lived in the country. But there are other data - that the population of Russia in 1913 totaled 169.4 million people. (History of the Civil War in the USSR. M., 1936. Vol. 1. P. 32). Then, in 1950, 317.62 million people were supposed to live in the USSR. The difference with the actual population of 1950, therefore, is 120–139.12 million. hide the scope of the repression.

The share of victims of the Civil War accounts for 12.75 million, of which 6.5 million are victims of the "red terror" (Gerchikov O. Losses of the Civil War // Arguments and Facts. 2007. October 24. No. 43 (1408), according to we exclude 6.25 million from the decline in the population 27 million died in the Great Patriotic War. Communists do not hesitate to write down the current

born among the victims of the reforms, but again, let's not waste time on trifles. And without them, there is from 63.25 to 73.25 million population loss.

At the same time, it must also be taken into account that in 1913-1950. our society was more traditional than in 1950-1959, and women should at least therefore give birth more. Balandin himself admits that under Stalin the population growth was higher than under Khrushchev and subsequent ones (pp. 339-340 and others), but again let's not be petty. Thus, it remains unclear where the other 45-50 to about 75 million people have gone; otherwise you cannot write them down as victims of terror and repression.

This is Russia (within the borders of the Russian Empire in 1913 or the USSR in 1989), which, due to the prevailing historical circumstances, found itself at the epicenter of the "global slave counterrevolution". In the rest of the world, during this incomplete 20th century, the following died from wars, repressions and economic "experiments":

Chinese	200,000,000
Vietnamese	Over 20,000,000
Koreans	15,000,000
Germans	12,000,000
Polyakov	6 500 000
Jews	6,000,000
Cambodians	5,000,000
Japanese	3,262,000
Burmese	2,400,000

Yugoslavs	At least 3,000,000
Ethiopians	At least 3,000,000
Indonesians	2,000,000
Filipinos	Approximately 2,000,000
French	2,000,000
Afghans	At least 1,500,000
Indians	At least 1,500,000
Chekhov and Slovaks	1,300,000
Italians	1,200,000
Austrians	1,150,000
British	1 120 000
Hungarians	1 100 000
Turk	Approximately 1,000,000
Greeks	1,000,000
Romanian	Over 1,000,000
Iranians	1,000,000
Malaysians	At least 1,000,000
Spaniards	About 1,000,000
Bulgarian	Approximately 800,000
Mongols	Approximately 680,000

Albanians	Approximately 680,000
Cubans	Approximately 650,000
Americans	585 000
Angolans	At least 500,000
Finns	400 000
Algerians	350 000
Thais	350 000
Belgians	At least 300,000
Canadians	200 000
Syrians	160 000
Dutch	42 000
Portuguese	30,000
New Zealanders	15,000
Norwegians	10,000
Danes	5000

In total, it turns out, together with our country, from 355 to 385 million dead. The calculation is incomplete and inaccurate; it is not known, for example, how many Iraqis, Egyptians, residents of the Maghreb countries (except Algeria) and Black Africa, and how many Latin Americans died in these years. If we add here the victims of natural disasters and epidemics (only the influenza pandemic in 1918-1919 claimed 20 million lives, according to other sources - up to 50 million), then we can talk about not half a billion dead.

Attempts to return humanity to the past gave rise to as many cannibals in the incomplete XX century as the previous history of mankind could not give birth in three millennia. Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, Ceausescu, Tito, Franco, Choibalsan, Enver Hoxha, Rakosi, Mussolini, Hussein's Garden of the Dames - these are just the bloodiest of them.

This is not counting the material losses, estimated in trillions and trillions of dollars. This is not counting cultural losses, which cannot be calculated in money at all.

In a word, I really want to hope that more something will not happen again.

Omsk—Moscow, 1988-2008

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